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Disorderly and Inhumane: the United States and the Expulsion of Germans after World War II

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By

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This dissertation examines the role of the United States in the mass expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe from spring 1945 through 1947. By agreeing to allow Czechoslovakia and Poland to expel their German minority populations in 1943, and again in 1945 under Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement, the United States permitted approximately 14 million to 16 million Germans to be forcibly relocated into a truncated, war-torn Germany, an incident that is the largest example of ethnic cleansing in world history. Although these expulsions threatened the postwar stability of Europe and were of great concern they were of marginal interest to most people in the United States. Informed discussion of these expulsions occurred among a fairly narrow group of military officials, diplomats, politicians, intellectuals, and immigrants or exiles. In fact there was a dearth of contemporary debate and analysis on all aspects of the United States role in the expulsion of Germans, both within governmental and in society more generally. Newspaper reports, magazine articles, diplomatic documents, government documents and the personal papers of diplomats and politicians reveal that the expulsion of Germans it seems that most Americans lacked both awareness of and compassion for

the plight of the German expellees. These expulsions however, changed the politics and the demographics of Europe forever and made the ethnic cleansing of the minority populations of nations an international legal precedent. Today, the expulsions remain a controversial subject within the region of East-Central Europe where the people of Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland still debate the expulsions as if they occurred yesterday. In the United States, however, the expulsions have been long forgotten. This dissertation is unique in that examines the involvement of the United States in the planning of the expulsions and the reaction of the American press, intellectuals and policymakers whereas previous literature has focused very sparingly on this aspect of the expulsions.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother Beverly Sue Brewer.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	*Allied Control Council*
ACLU	*American Civil Liberties Union*
AFC	*American Friends of Czechoslovakia*
AFL	*American Federation of Labor*
CDU	*Christian Democratic Union*
CIA	*Central Intelligence Agency*
CRALOG	*Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany*
CSD	*Czech Social Democratic Party*
CSU	*Christian Social Union*
CSL	*People's Party*
CSNS	*Czech national Socialist Party*
CSR	*Czechoslovakian Army*
DS	*Democratic Party*
DP	*Displaced Person*
EAC	*European Advisory Commission*
EU	*European Union*
EUCOM	*European Command United States Army*
FDP	*Free Democratic Party*
FDR	*Franklin Delano Roosevelt*

FRUS	*Foreign Relations of the United States*
GDR	*German Democratic Republic*
KSC	*Communist party of Czechoslovakia*
KSS	*Slovak Communist Party*
NSB	*Czech National Security Corps*
OSS	*Office of Strategic Services*
PPR	*Polish Worker's Party*
SdL	*Sudetendeutsche Landmannschaft*
SHAEF	*Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force*
SPWW3	*Society for the Prevention of World War III*
SS	*Schutzstaffel*
UN	*United Nations*
UNCHR	*United Nations Commission for Human Rights*
UNO	*United Nations Organization*
UNRRA	*United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency*
USFET	*United States Force European Theatre*
WCC	*World Council of Churches*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The cessation of World War II hostilities in 1945 marked the end of hell for some, and the beginning of hell for others throughout East-Central Europe. Complete surrender by the German Reich to the Western Allies ended the war and the calculated extermination of European Jews and other minorities deemed racially inferior to Germanic peoples in accordance with the racial policies of Adolf Hitler. As the Holocaust came to an end in 1945 the stage was set for another great European atrocity, the ethnic cleansing of Germans by forced expulsion from their centuries old homelands of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and territory acquired by Poland after the war that previously had been the Eastern region of Germany. The expulsion of Germans from their homes by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments represents the single largest episode of ethnic cleansing in recorded history and resulted in the forced movement of approximately 15 million Germans back to Germany.[1] Though the expulsion of Germans continued sporadically into the early 1950s, most occurred between 1945 and 1947 a period of time that saw millions of Germans forced into a crowded Germany that was

[1] Alfred M. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam* (London: Routledge Keegan & Paul, 1979), xix.

geographically just a bit smaller "than the state of California and possessed a population density of 600 persons per square mile.[2] Thus the demographics of Europe were forever shifted and the unique culture and tradition of the expelled Germans became a distinct subculture of the West German nation.[3]

Early in the war Allied leaders were very aware of the intent of Czechoslovakia and Poland to expel Germans from within their respective borders so as to cleanse their nations of the German menace that they believed was a threat to their future stability. As far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned, there was no doubt that the Germans of East-Central Europe were to be transferred but "how many and from where," and what would their final destination be?[4] By agreeing to the expulsion plans of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments, the United States and Great Britain legitimized ethnic cleansing in the form of forced population transfer (expulsion) as acceptable within the arena of international politics for the remainder of the twentieth-century.[5]

The initial expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe lasted from early spring of 1945 until the finalization of the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945.[6] Undertaken by Czech and Polish military and political leaders as well as non-

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[2] Ibid, xx.
[3] Ibid, xix.
[4] Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Public Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007), 92.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 233-234.

governmental groups, the objective of the "wild expulsions"[7] was to rid themselves of as many Germans as possible before the Allies could react and possibly halt the expulsions altogether.[8] What the Czechs and Poles wanted to achieve was the elimination of the German minority within their borders before the Allies could address the expulsions at a peace conference thus accomplishing a "fait accompli."[9] Public and political sentiment in Czechoslovakia and Poland wanted the German minority out of their respective nations so as to protect themselves from a repeat of German aggression and as a measure of revenge for the atrocities committed during Germany's wartime occupation of both nations.[10]

In fact the United States and Great Britain never intended to halt the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe, and Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement finalized on August 2, 1945 made that strategy very clear.[11] Article XIII confirmed that the expulsions of Germans by the Czechs and Poles were to continue but in an "orderly and

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[7] Alfred M. de Zayas, *Nemesis At Potsdam,* 104. The term "wild expulsions" is described by de Zayas as being the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments that occurred during the ante-Potsdam period in the spring and early summer of 1945. The "wild expulsions" was the unilateral expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments without the consent of the Western Allies but with the support of the Soviet Union. The goal of the "wild expulsions" was to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland as quickly as possible in order to present a *fait accompli* to the Western Allies at the Potsdam Conference. The expulsion of millions of Germans proved to be much more difficult than expected.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Giles Macdonough, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 493.

humane manner," and would be subject to regulation by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Until then all further expulsions were to be halted until the Allied Control Council could evaluate the situation and develop "time and rate ordinates" that would allow the transfer of population to run smoothly and subsequently be more orderly and humane.[12] During the interim period when the transfer of expellees was supposed to be halted, some expulsions did continue, but for the most part the Germans of East-Central Europe were temporarily interned at camps, where they were "living in limbo waiting for a destination" that they would be forced to call home.[13]

The Potsdam Agreement gave population transfers an international legality that allowed Czechoslovakia and Poland to ethnically cleanse Germans from their borders.[14] Sadly, the orderly and humane transfers dictated by Article XIII made the expulsions a bit safer but the German expellees were still subject to being "robbed and abused before their departure" from either Czechoslovakia or the recovered territories of Poland.[15] Potsdam merely sought to make the expulsion process more tolerable for Germans who were forced to give up their occupations, property and cultural history all because of their German ethnicity.[16] Removal of the German minority from their historic homelands in

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[12] Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: 1945-1955* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 75.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 55.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hared: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 111.

East-Central Europe by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was, even with Allied supervision, still a nightmarish experience for the expellees who had no control over their fate.[17]

[17] Ibid.

Figure 1 Ethnic Cleansing in Europe: 1944-1948.[18]

[18] Philip Ther and Ana Siljak, ed. *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in Europe, 1944-1948* London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), xii.

The forced population transfers that occurred following World War II brought about what has been called the greatest demographic change to the European continent since the medieval era.[19] Not only were people moved, but historic cultures were also wiped from existence as towns that were once German in population and name were given Czech and Polish language names.[20] Expulsion of the German population of East-Central Europe changed Europe in a unique way that has had a long-lasting impact on the nations of Europe. The expulsion of Germans from their historic homelands unleashed upon Europe the trend of "ethno-nationalism," defined as the dominance of a nation both politically and culturally by a single ethnic group.[21] Europe was changed forever as the expulsions moved populations (mostly Germans) from their native lands instead of moving the borders to fit the ethnic distribution of the population, as had been done at the end of World War I.[22] Once the Germans (or others depending on the nation) were removed from the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland those states became ethnically homogenous, ironically fulfilling the legacy of Nazi Germany with Russian, British, and most disturbingly of all, United States connivance.[23] Not only did World War II rid the world of the Nazi racial state, but its aftermath also brought to an end the multi-ethnicity of many European nations by allowing the expulsion of Germans and other minorities to

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[19] Mark Kramer, "Introduction," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, ed. Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 16.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Jerry Z. Muller, "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethno-Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 87 (March/April 2008): 19-20.
[22] Ibid, 27.
[23] Ibid.

become “the largest forced population movement in European history,” for the sake of European and world security.[24]

There are certain circumstances that make the post-World War II expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe very perplexing. For one the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Americans and other Allies put an end to German racial politics and social engineering throughout Europe, but racial politics were not abandoned after the war and were practiced by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union through their expulsion strategy. The fact that the supposedly democratic and humanitarian nations of the United States and Great Britain approved of population transfer by the Czechs and Poles well before the war had ended, while nominally fighting to free Europe of genocidal German racial policies is a paradox to say the least. Also, the willingness of the Soviet Union to support the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments in their quest to rid themselves of their German minority populations presented the Western powers with a very special problem. The postwar peace, therefore, was characterized by the politics of racialism that had started the war.

This study will demonstrate that the implementation and regulation of the expulsion of Germans under the stipulations of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement marked the adoption of ethnic cleansing as United States policy. Such a policy was in direct opposition to the American values of democracy and humanity and set an international legal precedent by making ethnic cleansing a universal legal solution for

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[24] Ibid.

nations with troublesome minority populations. United States officials saw Article XIII as a quick and convenient solution to a complex problem that was of secondary importance in comparison to other postwar issues, such as the battle with the Soviet Union over the location of Poland's western border and the distribution of reparations, the threat of Communism spreading throughout Europe and the termination of the war with Japan. On the domestic front the expulsion of Germans lacked importance for most Americans except for those with direct ties to East-Central Europe, such as immigrants and diplomats. There were, however, strong protestations by American intellectuals and even strong doubts about American policy pertaining to the expulsions by U.S. soldiers, diplomats and congressmen, all of whom questioned the immediate inhumanity and the long-term ramifications of Article XIII. This study will further show that the absence of a coordinated information strategy by the United States government explaining expulsion policy combined with sporadic coverage of the expulsions by the American print media resulted in a lack of interest by the American public the expulsion of Germans. As a result the U.S. policy of ethnic cleansing enablement was never really challenged within the social or political strata of the United States. Politically and socially the expulsions were an afterthought, which is often the case immediately following a prolonged war when the welfare of nations overrides the welfare of individual human beings.

Chapters I and II function as the foundations for this study by introducing the scholarly literature on the expulsions and delving into the definition of ethnic cleansing and various incidents of ethnic cleansing that occurred during the twentieth century. Chapter III focuses on how the German expulsions originated from the 1938 German acquisition of the Sudetenland and subsequent takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet

seizure of eastern Poland in 1939. It also explains how Czechoslovakian President Edouard Beněs secured the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans through crafty, separate negotiations with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The expulsion of Germans from the new Polish territories was inevitable after the Allies decided to compensate Poland with German territory in the west to make up for losing eastern Poland to the Soviet Union. The expulsions were inevitable because of the disdain and mistrust of German minority populations in Czechoslovakia and Poland that fomented during the inter war years. It was the circumstances of war that provided Czechoslovakia and Poland with an opportunity to make their nations ethnically homogenous at the expense of their German minorities.

Chapter IV explains how the expulsions went from being the calculated unregulated and revenge driven wild expulsions that began in the spring of 1945 to the post-Potsdam expulsions that occurred from January 1946 through the end of 1947. A flood of German expellees into the U.S. Zone of Occupation prompted the U.S. officials at Potsdam to seek a way to slow the expulsions to a manageable pace, which resulted in the orderly and humane stipulations of Article XIII. Orderly and humane might have been the objective, but it did not bring an end to the violent inhumanity that characterized the expulsions.

Chapter V examines how the expulsions were discussed and covered within popular print media vehicles and scholarly publications in the United States. Though sporadic, media coverage of expulsions was ample enough to generate public awareness about the violence and hunger the expelled Germans faced during and after their journey west. The numerous newspaper and magazine articles ran the gamut from those that

defended the expulsions to those that portrayed the expulsions as an affront to humanity perpetuated by the U.S. government's sponsorship of the Potsdam Agreement. Most Americans saw the expulsion of Germans as one of many problematic postwar situations that faced the United States, which seems to have contributed to the lack of focus on the expulsions. The limited scholarly literature was the exception. It vociferously proclaimed the expulsions a violation of humanity and decried U.S. implementation of Article XIII as a betrayal of the American values of freedom and compassion.

Chapter VI examines the private and public opinions of diplomats, military officials and Congressmen regarding Article XIII and the forcible expulsions. American diplomatic and military officials in Europe were responsible for the enforcement of the policy provisions of Article XIII, and some witnessed their negative impact within Germany. In Washington D.C., members of both houses of Congress largely opposed the starvation, crowding, disease and potential long-term instability caused by the provisions of Article XIII. Ironically, the release of a Congressional investigation of United States involvement in the expulsion of Germans in 1950 known as the Walter Report revealed that the United States was not responsible for the expulsions and had only attempted to make them more orderly and humane. Despite pervasive doubts concerning the impact of Article XIII among some individuals within the government, the course of United States policy regarding the expulsion of Germans never changed.

Chapter VII centers on the legacy and reality of the expulsions from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the present and how the paradigm concerning the expulsions in Europe has shifted over the past twenty-three years. Once the Berlin Wall fell the expulsions emerged from the darkness of communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany

and Poland. Both the German expellees and the nations that expelled them demanded apologies for crimes committed against them by the other. Over time debate about the expulsions in the early post-Cold War era from 1989 to 2002 focused on the demands for reparations for suffering and property lost by the expellees amidst the backdrop of reconciliation agreements between Germany and the once German occupied nations of Czechoslovakia and Poland. After 2002 popular literature within Germany shifted discourse on the expulsions to the subject of victimization. Authors such as Gunter Grass wrote about the German expellee experience during the war and asserted that the expellees had been just as much victims of war as those who endured German occupation. The citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland who believed that the German expellees had no right to claim victimhood vehemently debunked this assertion. Although not of much concern in the United States today, the expulsions still evoke raw emotion within East-Central Europe where conflicts over property rights, battles over degrees of victimization and how the expulsions should be memorialized have made the expulsions a point of contention not only within Germany but in Czechoslovakia and Poland as well.

Review of Literature

Ethnic hatred has not only defined the culture and politics of twentieth-century East-Central Europe, but it has also defined scholarly literature pertaining to the region. From ethnic hatred came the solution of ethnic cleansing, which throughout the twentieth-century consisted of the forced removal of troublesome minority populations by both organized and unorganized means. Forced removal of minority populations, or

expulsion, is neither new nor unique in the annals of world history.[25] What made the expulsion of Germans from the various nations throughout East-Central Europe after World War II different was that they were born of the prospect and circumstance of peace, not war.[26] There is no denying that the racial policies of Adolf Hitler both before and during the war set the stage for the postwar expulsions. Most scholarly literature on the subject explains that the post-World War II expulsions, and the violence and destruction that characterized them, were a product of the pursuit of ethnically homogenous nation-states by Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The German occupation of Czechoslovakia and Poland gave rise to a hatred of Germans that was "understandable but not justifiable," but did not make the expulsion of Germans a certainty.[27] Eagle Glassheim makes the point that ethnic hatreds often lie dormant until events transform them it into a moving social and political force as happened following World War II in Czechoslovakia and Poland.[28] Hatred and mistrust of Germans by the citizens and politicians of Czechoslovakia and Poland fostered the thinking that the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland and the recovered Polish territories was not only "necessary but desirable."[29] The immediate aftermath of the war

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[25] Benjamin Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60-61.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Eagle Glasshein, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, ed. Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 215.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate,* 249.

presented the Czech and Polish governments with an opportunity to rid themselves of their troublesome German minority populations. It was a combination of Soviet support for the expulsion of Germans and a passive Allied presence in East-Central Europe that allowed the Czechs and Poles to unilaterally expel Germans from their borders in the spring and summer of 1945. It was the events of peace that allowed ethnic hatred to assert itself in the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments so as to present a "fait accompli" so they would not be bound by Allied regulations regarding the transfer of populations.[30]

Presented with an opportunity to expel Germans from their borders and achieve ethnically homogeneous states, the Czech and Polish governments allowed violent acts against expellees to occur and go unpunished. Their need and opportunity to rid their nations of Germans saw the "logic of ethnic cleansing" welcomed and diligently practiced by citizens and governmental officials and was seen part of the inheritance of the war.[31] Expulsion of Germans after World War II was an example of societal and governmental acceptance of the "ideology of hate" which manifested into a culture of ethnic cleansing throughout East-Central Europe.[32] Poland desired a "uniformly Polish state" and pursued it with a nationalistic fervor that resulted in 350,000 Germans being expelled from east of the Oder-Neisse during the wild expulsions of spring and summer

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[30] Frommer, *National Cleansing*, 60-61.
[31] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 249.
[32] Tomasz Kamusella, "Ethnic Cleansing in Upper Silesia, 1944-1945," in *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 310.

of 1945.[33] In the opinion of T. David Curp it was the ethnic cleansing of Germans from the recovered Polish territories following World War II that shaped the character and culture of Poland until the end of the Cold War.[34] Curp explains that the quest for a homogenous Polish state through the ethnic cleansing of Germans from its borders actually enabled Poland to remain freer from Soviet influences than any other nation in the Soviet sphere.[35] Neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland invented ethnic cleansing. Instead the Czechs and Poles utilized a strategic policy that had been introduced by the Western Allies as part of the Lausanne Treaty of 1922, which gave legal sanction to the post World War I "Greco-Turkish" population exchange.[36]

The wild expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments during the spring and early summer of 1945 were cruel ruthless and very unorganized in an organized way. Both governments knew they were going to happen but did very little in the way of official planning and monitoring of the process on the ground level which left most of the uprooting and expelling of Germans to various non-governmental groups at the regional and local levels. Article XIII of Potsdam was an attempt to take the spontaneity and ruthlessness out of the expulsions so as to streamline the process and make it more efficient and manageable for the Western Allies and the Czech and Polish governments. In addition, the "orderly and humane" diktat of Article XIII specified that

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[33] T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945-1948* (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2006), 53.
[34] Ibid, 5.
[35] Ibid.
[36] De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*, 11.

the transfer of Germans would be less violent and would focus on the welfare and security of those being forcefully uprooted from their homes.

One school of thought suggests that the situation, such as the one that existed between the German minority populations subject to rule by Czechoslovakia and Poland, could be best handled from "without" by outside parties because as the best way to achieve a long-lasting peaceful solution to such problems.[37] Outside involvement of the United States and the Western Allies in the expulsion of Germans is the confirmation of the "injustice of an arbitrary or careless decision," in the opinion of Isaiah Bowman.[38] Although the "orderly and humane" provision of Article XIII was flawed, and the United States seen them as the only plausible solution to the expellee problem.[39] Article XIII was interpreted differently by the Allies who saw it as a humane solution to the expellee problem, whereas the nations conducting the expulsions saw it as an opportunity to purge unwanted German minority populations.[40] For U.S. officials Article XIII was a means of having input on how, where and when the expulsions were to occur and it was a way to deal with circumstances that could not be changed.[41] The United Kingdom also supported population transfer, viewing the expulsions as a "rational and progressive choice of last

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[37] Isaiah Bowman, "The Strategy of Territorial Decisions," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, no. 2 (January 1946), 180.
[38] Ibid, 187.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, 189.
[41] Debra J. Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland and Germany in the Cold War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 31-32.

resort" and a means by which to achieve lasting peace in Europe.[42] Another circumstance that played a large role in the American decision to allow the expulsions to occur was the Russian military presence in the region of East-Central Europe.[43]

The main problem the Allied policy of forced migration looked to solve was to make the region of East-Central Europe one that consisted of nations of ethnically homogenous nation-states in order to prevent future ethnic conflict.[44] Gregor Thum concludes that the expulsion of Germans after World War II was a unique case of ethnic cleansing in that responsibility can be placed on a "global military alliance" of nations that were members of the "anti Hitler coalition."[45] In actuality, responsibility for the post World War II expulsion of Germans rests with all parties involved in the grisly and inhumane process of population transfer. Thus the objective of all nations involved was the creation of ethnically homogeneous nations as a convenient means to achieve permanent peace.[46]

Scholar and human rights lawyer Alfred de Zayas places responsibility for the inhumanity of the expulsions on the governments and populations of Czechoslovakia and Poland but explains that the United States and United Kingdom were the facilitators of

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[42] Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context,* 275.
[43] Ibid, 187.
[44] Gregor Thum, *Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wroclaw During the Century of Expulsions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 53-54.
[45] Ibid.
[46] A.F. Noskova, "Migration of the Germans after the Second World War: Political and Psychological Aspects," in *Forced Migration In Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950*, ed. Alfred J. Rieber (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 97.

violence and inhumanity through the provisions of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement.[47] He acknowledges that had the Allies not gotten involved in the expulsion process, the violence and inhumanity could have been worse than it actually was, but he faulted the United States and United Kingdom for the failure to "re-examine the principles for which the war had been fought'" and the failure to determine whether or not "those principles were being observed in the peace process."[48] Wilhelm K. Turnwald, who has compiled an important set of expulsion documents, came to the same conclusion much earlier and explained that although the Czechs and Poles did the dirty work, the Western Allies and the Soviet Union were just as complicit because through Potsdam they gave the expulsions a "certain international legality" that became an international precedent for the removal of problematic minority groups by host nations.[49]

Allied implementation of Article XIII of Potsdam legalized physical reprisal in cases of assumed collective guilt Joseph B. Schechtman explained that "compulsory transfer of an entire population has nothing in common with guilt and penalty nor even justice" and should be "preventive" measures not conduits of revenge as they were in the aftermath of World War II.[50] The historical background of the expulsions is draped in collective guilt and absolute victimhood, which ignores the harsh realism that they were a "process of cause and effect, action and reaction" because there are no absolutes in the

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[47] De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*, 184.
[48] Ibid, xxii.
[49] Wilhelm K. Turnwald, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* (Munich, Germany: University Press, 1953), xxiii.
[50] Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: 1945-1955* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 364.

early stages of postwar peace.[51] Despite the orderly and humane specification of Article XIII the Western Allies became the purveyors of everything they fought against and assisted in the perpetuation of the Czechoslovakian and Polish pursuit of homogeneity.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the removal of constraints on scholars, writers and the media in what was once Communist Europe allowed the expulsions to be critically analyzed and debated in an impartial manner for the first time. The expulsions are still a very complex subject that defies definition and is prone to "political instrumentation" by the expellees and their descendants who reside in Germany and the nations that expelled them.[52] Gregor Thum asserts that, after being so "politicized" for so long it is hard to find a way to debate the expulsions in a realistic and impartial, open-minded approach that is not rife with the stench of politics.[53] The end of communism and the reunification of Germany not only allowed the expulsions to become a part of "mainstream discourse" in East-Central Europe, but those events also enabled the formation of distinctive collective memories by expellees, expellers and their descendants.[54]

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[51] Bill Niven, "German Victimhood and the Turn of the Millennium," in *Germans as Victims* ed. Bill Niven (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006), 16-17.
[52] Thum, *Uprooted*, 3.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Karoline von Oppen and Stefan Wolff, "From the Margins to the Center? The Discourse on Expellees and Victimhood in Germany," in *Germans as Victims*, ed. Bill Niven (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006), 197.

CHAPTER II

ETHNIC CLEANSING IN EUROPE BEFORE THE POST–WORLD WAR II EXPULSIONS

This chapter focuses on ethnic cleansing in Europe and how it became an acceptable and common occurrence in twentieth-century Europe before World War II. Ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century did not begin in the well-publicized case of the former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s; it has a long sad and twisted history that dates back to before World War I and into World War II. The forcible removal of the Armenians by the Turks during the World War I, the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey after the war and the exchange of populations in the Baltic States between Germany and the Soviet Union during the first two years of World War II, removed troublesome minorities from places they were not wanted. The often violent, and stressful act of forced minority population removal became a solution that focused on the security of the state rather than the welfare of the people, and came to be utilized by both dictatorships and democracies in a twentieth-century Europe characterized by various episodes of ethnic cleansing.

Ethnic Cleansing Defined

Ethnic cleansing is an ancient practice but the term “ethnic cleansing” is quite modern. Though there are recorded instances of ethnic cleansing being employed as early

as 1912 in the Balkan mountains of Southeastern Europe, the term ethnic cleansing came into common usage during the wars of Yugoslavian Secession in the 1990s via international media coverage.[1] International law expert Drazen Petrovic was the first to identify ethnic cleansing as a term originated by the Yugoslavian Army, which was translated into English from the Serbo-Croatian term *etnicko ciscenje*.[2] Klejda Mulaj explains that ethnic cleansing was a term used by "soldiers, journalists, sociologists and social scientists, among others, to define a phenomenon which is not described by law," but has been utilized extensively in the twentieth-century by nations to deal with troublesome ethnic populations.[3]

There are varied definitions of ethnic cleansing but all have the common theme of forcible removal of one ethnic group by another ethnic group, which possesses a numerical advantage and military or political power. Petrovic was one of the first to coin the term ethnic cleansing and did so in the broadest sense.[4]

According to him:

> Ethnic cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religion, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible

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[1] Drazen Petrovic, "Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology," *European Journal of International Law* 5 (1994): 343
[2] Klejda Mulaj, "Ethnic Cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's: A Euphemism for Genocide," in *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe,"* ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 695-696.
[3] Ibid, 696.
[4] Ibid, 349.

> means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.[5]

Ethnic cleansing has also been examined, from a historical perspective by Andrew Bell-Fialkoff who explains that ethnic cleansing is very difficult to define but contends that from the late nineteenth-century onwards instances of ethnic cleansing have increased and "intensified" in the modern era, despite supposedly greater tolerance of others and acceptance of universal human rights.[6] Bell-Fialkoff defines ethnic cleansing in a straightforward manner:

> Ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an undesirable population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic, or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.[7]

Philipp Ther, the leading Europeanist at the Free University of Berlin, defines ethnic cleansing in a fashion similar to Petrovic emphasizing state control over the process of cleansing a particular nation of unwanted peoples.[8] He states:

> Ethnic cleansing is always directed at a particular ethnic group or nation perceived as harmful and the goal is almost always the complete removal of that group from a given territory. The ethnicity of the victims is defined by the state, occupying power, or dominant nation and groups or individuals so defined usually have no opportunity to declare a different ethnicity or prevent their removal from their homelands.[9]

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[5] Ibid, 351.
[6] Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of ethnic Cleansing," *Foreign Affairs* 3 (Summer 1993): 110.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*." Ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 43, 343.
[9] Ibid, 43.

As the above definitions suggest, although there are commonalities in all cases of ethnic cleansing the act and strategy of ethnic cleansing can be viewed and defined from many different perspectives.

How Turkey Made the Armenians Disappear

The terms genocide and ethnic cleansing are often linked, as evidenced in the Ottoman Empire's effort to cleanse itself of its Armenian population during World War I. The Armenian genocide and the removal of Armenians by the Turks from Turkish territory can also be defined as ethnic cleansing. The main goal was to remove the Armenian population from Ottoman lands regardless of the cost in lives to the Armenians. When United States Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau attempted to placate the Turks in 1915, by stating that they were in no way responsible for brutalities committed against Armenians, Young Turk leader Enver Pasha replied with the following words: "I am willing to accept responsibility myself for everything that happened."[10] Proud of his government's deportation of the Armenians and the violence and death that accompanied it Enver Pasha was offended by Morgenthau's suggestion.[11] Turkey possessed a mostly Muslim population among which lived Christian populations such as the Armenians who were treated as second-class citizens by their Islamic rulers.[12] While Turkey appeareed to be a tolerant society on the surface, hatred and intolerance toward

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[10] Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 111.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 19.

the Armenians occurred sporadically from the late nineteenth-century until the beginning of World War I.[13] Turkey was an empire in decline and the deportation and violence that targeted the Armenians "happened in an empire on the verge of extinction."[14]

The fate of the Armenians owed much to the course of the World War I. Significantly, Russian military successes in the area resulted from the fact that many Ottoman Armenians fought against the Turks throughout the conflict at places such as Sarikamish.[15] Even though many other Armenians fought with the Turks, Turkish nationalists "focused on those that fought for the Russians against Turkey" and saw all Armenians as traitors, and as a result the removal of Armenians from Turkey became their major objective.[16] Upon securing power in 1913 through a military coup, the Committee on Union and Progress (or the Young Turks, as they were also known) had been waiting for a chance to deport the Armenians from Turkish borders.[17] The first step toward the deportation of Armenians began in February 1915 when Armenian soldiers from Turkey were sent into slave labor or in some instances executed by Turkish army leaders despite the lack of evidence the Armenians were a military threat.[18] Another episode occurred on April 24, 1915 when the Turkish army arrested important and influential individuals of Armenian origin in Constantinople such as doctors, lawyers, professors and writers, and deported them to the hinterlands of Turkey.[19] The official

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[13] Ibid, 23.
[14] Ibid, 24.
[15] Lieberman, *Terrible* Fate, 99.
[16] M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 29.
[17] Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate, 98.*
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

policy of deporting Armenians formally began with the Emergency Law of May 27, 1915, which made it clear that the Armenians of Turkey were no longer welcomed in their traditional homeland.[20] By August 1915, the deportation of Armenians was underway throughout Turkey.[21]

The Committee of Union and Progress created the Special Organization Teliskat 1 to handle internal security problems in Turkey.[22] The deportations began with the arrest, torture and imprisonment of prominent Armenians from a city or village followed by a posted declaration that ordered all Armenians to leave their places of residence.[23] Orders for deportation were given with little or no prior warning and the Armenians were deported in anywhere from just a few hours or four to five days after the orders were issued.[24] Not surprisingly, their Muslim neighbors took advantage of the doomed Armenians by buying up their property for virtually nothing.[25] In some cases individual Armenians tried to save themselves from deportation by "bribery" and in other instances, Armenian women attempted to sell themselves as wives to Muslims while yet others mutilated their faces so as not to be "forced to live in a harem."[26]As Armenians marched to the Turkish frontier many fell victim to hunger and disease, some committed suicide, and others were massacred at the hands of the Turks.[27]

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[20] 102-103.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Naimark: *Fires of Hatred*, 27.
[23] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate,* 103.
[24] Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 31.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 107-108.

Some Armenians were deported via railroad herded on to boxcars like "cattle" which resulted in many of them being crushed to death during the journey to the city of Konya. From where there, the deportees traveled south crossing the Euphrates River traversing to Aleppo and various cities and towns in the Syrian desert.[28] Other less lucky Armenians were driven across Anatolia where they were forced to endure intense daily heat and very cold nights with no shelter and little food or water on their trek south to the Euphrates.[29] According to foreign eyewitness statements the Armenians were treated as if their lives had no human value and to make matters worse the Turkish government forbade foreign missionaries from providing food or other assistance to the Armenians on their long trek out of Turkey.[30] The Armenians were truly an unwanted people on their own.

Turkish ethnic cleansing of the Armenians was so inhumane and severe that it crossed the line to genocide possessing characteristics of systematic extermination.[31] Of course, many Armenian deaths were attributed to the deportations, but the real total is unknown. The Armenian Patriarchate estimated approximately 2.1 million Armenians resided in Turkey before the deportations and the Ottoman Census estimated that 1.6 million Armenians resided in Turkey before the deportations began.[32] Most historians in

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[28] Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth-Century*, 31-34.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate,* 110-111.
[32] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 40-41.

the twenty-first century now estimate the number of Armenians killed during the deportations at somewhere near 800,000.[33] Norman M. Naimark suggests that the Young Turks achieved their intended goal of "eliminating the Armenians as a serious force in Anatolian politics and society" while also eliminating any historical memory of the Armenians by destroying Armenian churches, monuments and graveyards.[34] The success of the deportation of Armenians is verified by the fact that Turkish historical maps do not list the Armenians as ever having existed and Turkish tourism literature fails to mention the Armenians as a historical culture for tourists to consider learning about.[35] The Armenians are considered a historical culture in that they were part of Turkey's Anatolian and Ottoman heritage.[36]

In retrospect, it is disheartening to realize that the Turks knew what they were doing and that many Armenians perished but what is even more worse is that despite grand ideas and promises, the United States government did nothing to help the Armenians. A major reason for this inaction was that the administration of President Woodrow Wilson very much wanted to avoid war with Turkey as part of its policy of neutrality toward World War I. In fact, some American officials believed that the deportation of Armenians was "justifiable" since their homeland was located in a "military zone of operations."[37] Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to President

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid, 41.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Attitude of the United States Toward Warfare Employed by Belligerents, The Secretary of State to President Wilson, November 21,1916, U.S. Department of State,

Wilson on November 21, 1916, that he had no problem with the general principle of deportation, but did find the "horrible brutality" of its implementation quite appalling.[38]

United States neutrality ended with the declaration of war on Germany in April 1917, but American entry into the European conflict did not result in any action on behalf of the Armenians. Despite being faced with the reality that he would possibly have to expand military operations east, Wilson refused to do so.[39] Wilson's hesitance was influenced by ties to American Christian missionaries who had cultivated quite a bit of political influence within the Ottoman Empire and opposed an American war against Turkey out of belief that it would damage their status and influence and leave them unable to help the Armenians at all.[40] This American intent to remain friendly with Turkey was expressed in a March 31, 1917, directive from Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Ambassador in Turkey Abram Elkus that instructed him to make it clear to Turkish leaders that the United States had "no controversy" with Turkey and had no desire to "sever relations" unless Turkey took it upon itself to follow a "German mandate." [41] Wilson had been sympathetic to the plight of the Armenians and the creation

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*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914-1920. Vol. I: The Lansing Papers (*Washington.: GPO, 1939), 42-43.
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS19141920v1

[38] Ibid.
[39] Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide And America's Response* (New York: Harper-Perennial 2003), 304.
[40] Ibid, 304-305.
[41] Neutral Rights, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Elkus) March 31, 1917, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement I: The World War (1917) Part II:* (Washington: GPO, 1936), 191-192.
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS/FRUS1917supp01v01

of an Armenian state as part of his "struggle for the vision of international justice" but he knew that any such proposals would have to be made after the convening of a peace conference after the war.[42]

Wilson's view of the post World War I world was a "vision of world democracy" in which the smaller nationalities possessed and used the right of self-determination to create and structure their individual nations as they wished. This was articulated in his Address on the Fourteen Points for Peace on January 8, 1918.[43] Wilson viewed the Armenians as the epitome of a smaller nationality and made them the focus of his twelfth point, which guaranteed the sovereignty of Turkey, but also that: "nationalities under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life, and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."[44] Wilson believed that smaller nations, such as the proposed Armenian state should be protected by the League of Nations through a "mandate system" that would safeguard smaller nations from the transgressions of larger ones.[45] Great Britain, Italy and France all balked at supporting

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[42] Balakian, *the Burning Tigris,* 303.
[43] Ibid, 300-301.
[44] Woodrow Wilson Address on the Fourteen Points for Peace, 8 January 1918: Address of the President of the United States, Delivered At A Joint Session of Congress. Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, eLibrary. (Accessed on September 13, 2012). http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30716;
The Continuation and Conclusion of the War-Participation of the United States, Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, January 8, 1919, United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement I: The World War Vol. I. 1918, Part I:* (Washington: GPO, 1918), 12-17.
http://digitl.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1918Supp01v01
[45] Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 300-301.

such a mandate, citing that they were "overburdened" by other mandate commitments throughout the Middle East and Africa, which left the United States as the lone guarantor of the Armenian mandate.[46] The American position on the Armenian question derived from an analysis by President Wilson's King-Crane Report issued in August of 1919.[47] The King-Crane Report concluded that the repeated massacre and inhumane treatment of the Armenians by the Turks made them "unfit" to rule over the Armenians.[48] Thus the report favored the idea of an Armenian mandate, which was also supported by the American press and the various Armenian relief organizations in the United States.[49] Congress, however, opposed such a scheme and the Senate vote against United States membership in the League of Nations on March 19, 1920, and eliminated the possibility of American involvement in an internationally-sanctioned mandate arrangement.[50]

Even though the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, Wilson believed American public opinion so strongly favored the Armenian cause that a mandate could still be achieved if there was a sufficient public outcry to pressure Congress into action.[51] By January of 1920, however, support for the Armenian mandate had waned in the Senate where Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) vehemently opposed it, despite recent British, French and Italian recognition of the

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[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid, 350.
[48] Ibid, 351-352.
[49] Ibid, 358-359.
[50] Ibid; "The Senate Kills The Treaty," *New York Times,* 20 March 1920.
[51] Robert L. Daniel "The Armenian-Question and American-Turkish Relations," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46, No. 2 (September 1959), 262.

Armenian Republic.[52] The principal grounds for opposition were that the borders of the Armenian Republic had not been finalized and Lodge considered that Armenia was a "poorhouse" of no clear strategic or economic value to the United States. [53] Subsequently, on June 1, 1920, the Senate defeated the Armenian mandate by a 52-23 vote despite some continuing public support for its approval.[54] The combined rejection of the League of Nations and the Armenian mandate by the Senate ended the possibility of Wilson's vision for the postwar world becoming a reality. Thus, the League of Nations was doomed to failure absent of United States membership.

From 1920 to 1922 the American government's focus on an Armenian mandate gradually dissipated despite lingering public support.[55] World War I had impressed upon State Department officials that access to an abundant oil supply would be vital for "the national defense" and economic growth of the United States, and thus the procurement of oil became a major focus of foreign policy decision making in the Near East.[56] The problem was that in 1914, before the onset of the war, Great Britain had purchased the Turkish Petroleum Company and worked with the French and Dutch during 1919 and 1920 to prevent United States entrance into Near Eastern oil fields.[57] With a European

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[52] "Congress Opposes Armenian Republic," *New York Times*, 27 April, 1920; Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 359-360.

[53] Ibid.
[54] Albert W. Fox, "Mandate Is Refused, *Washington Post*, 1 June 1920.
[55] Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 368.
[56] John A. DeNovo, "The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920," *The American Historical Review* 61, No. 4 (July 1956), 855.
[57] Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 355-356.

monopoly over Mesopotamian oil fields a real possibility, Secretary of State Lansing and United States representative at the Lausanne Conference Admiral Mark L. Bristol concluded during the last days of the Wilson Administration that to focus financial "resources and political capital on a new Armenian state" was not expedient.[58] Such thinking laid the foundation for an American "open door policy" in the Near East focused on access to oil.[59] To secure access to oil in the region the United States needed to be on friendly terms with Turkey, but at the Lausanne Peace Conference the Turks insisted that the Armenians had to be removed.[60] As a result the American need for oil made the exile of Armenians from Turkey a certainty.[61] The United States State Department became the chief representatives of American business interests, and most prominent were claims of Admiral Colby M. Chester of the Chester Oil Company. In June 1920, that he had been awarded "concessions" to a Mesopotamian oil field in 1911-1912 by the government of the Ottoman Empire that preceded those awarded to Great Britain in 1914.[62] Turkey indeed granted concessions to Chester in 1923 that included access to Mesopotamian oil projects, public works projects and rights to railroad construction from Turkey into

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[58] Ibid, 367.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid, 369.
[62] Revival of the Chester Project for Concessions in Turkey, Memorandum by the Assistant Foreign Trade Advisor, Department of State, (Hall) June 10, 1920 U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Turkey, Vol. II, 1921* (Washington: GPO, 1936), 917. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1921v02

Persia.[63] Most importantly American oil companies secured access to Mesopotamian oil fields that had been under British control since before World War I.[64]

The importance of American strategic and business interests began to take precedence over the Armenians in Turkey in the latter years of the Wilson administration and this became even more pronounced under President Warren G. Harding's Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.[65] Access to Mesopotamian oil fields and protection of the ""vast real estate holdings of American missionaries" combined with the prevention of the spread of Bolshevism throughout Europe comprised the foundations of the American foreign policy stressed by Hughes.[66] Turkey came to be viewed by the United States as nation that was not a threat to infiltrate the labor force or endanger the American way of life in order to provoke a world Bolshevik revolution.[67] Turkey's geographic border with the Soviet Union led Hughes to envision Turkey as a buffer against the spread of Bolshevism.[68] The pursuit of oil and the emerging presence of Bolshevism in Russia predicated a shift in United States policy that became increasingly pro-Turk and ignored

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[63] Negotiations by the Ottoman-American Development Company (Chester Project) and the other American Interests for Concessions in Turkey, Rear Admiral C.M. Chester to the Secretary of State, February 8, 1922, U.S. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Turkey, Vol. II 1922* (Washington: GPO, 1938), 966. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1922v02
Albert W. Fox, "Turks Reaffirm Oil Grants to Chester Oil," *Washington Post*, 30 March 1923. Concessions granted Chester in 1923 were backdated to 1909.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Balakian, *The Burning Tigris, 376.*
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid, 376.

the Armenian deportations and genocide.[69] The combination of securing access to oil and the containment of a hostile ideology became the foundation of United States foreign policy until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and beyond.

Trading Populations for the Greater Good

The next major episode of ethnic cleansing in Europe during the twentieth-century was the reciprocal population exchange between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. Ethnic conflict was a major problem in Europe after World War I and European leaders relied exclusively on two strategies to deal with ethnic hostilities. One was the adoption "Minority Rights Treaties" which protected minorities within a nation from majority encroachment upon their minority rights.[70] A second strategy was the implementation of population transfers of which the 1923 exchange of people between Greece and Turkey was a prime example.[71] A Greco-Turkish population exchange became a realistic possibility at the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922-1923 as a means by which to extinguish ethnic problems between the Greek and Turkish nations by making them ethnically and religiously homogenous.[72]

Tensions between Greece and Turkey had been high since the end of World War I, which saw the Greeks euphoric over Turkey's wartime misfortunes. Greek leaders saw Turkey's wartime troubles as an opportunity to achieve their long-held strategic goal of

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[69] Ibid, 375.

[70] Lieberman, *Terrible Fat*, 149.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.

the "Megali Ideal," or a "Greater Greece."[73] The Megali Ideal was a nationalist vision of consolidating surrounding areas of the Aegean Sea into Greece because the area was so heavily populated with "ethnic Greeks."[74] Despite the predominance of Greek culture in the Aegean region, Greece had never been a nation that incorporated all Greeks.[75] Many Greeks resided within Turkey and were defined by the Turkish government as being unredeemed Greeks.[76] Thus, the new Turkish state strove to repossess former Ottoman lands.[77]

Turkey's strategic policies were oriented eastward and focused on the Muslim world and the presence of so many Greek Christians within Turkish boundaries meant that the Greeks would eventually have to be dealt with.[78] In 1918, Greece invaded Turkish Anatolia and occupied the city of Smyrna, located on the Aegean Sea, and parts of the Anatolian hinterland.[79] Greek leaders viewed the occupation of Smyrna as a chance to achieve a Greater Greece through the union of Hellenic and Anatolian Greek lands and a return to the former splendor of the Byzantine age.[80] Initially, Turkey was too weak and near defeat to muster much resistance to the Greek offensive.[81] The Greeks also expected

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[73] Perti Ahonen, Gustavi Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tomas Stark and Barbara Stelzl- Marx, *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in the Second World War and its Aftermath* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 7.

[74] Ibid.
[75] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 120.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid, 120.
[78] Naimark, Fi*res of Hatred*, 43.
[79] Ibid, 44.
[80] Ibid, 44-45.
[81] Andrew Bell Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing, 25. (Book).*

that if the Turks did mount any formidable resistance, the Western Allies would bail them out.[82] The Greeks badly miscalculated and their 1921 offensive to the north and east of Turkey stalled in the face of strong Turkish resistance.[83] Led by Mustafa Kemal the Turks drove the Greeks back to Smyrna in September 1921.[84]

During the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the Greek military showed no mercy to the Turkish Muslim population and subjected the masses to brutal atrocities, but the most horrific acts of terror were targeted toward the Turkish upper class.[85] Greek aggression and subsequent acts of violence toward the Turkish people alarmed Turkish officials who saw the attack as a Greek attempt to annihilate the Muslim Turks from the face of the earth.[86] Thus the Turks were radicalized when they drove the Greeks back and used the nationalist fervor created by the attacks to achieve Turkish strategic goals.[87] With Greek refugees following the Greek military back to Smyrna Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal seized the opportunity to clear Western Anatolia of its Greek population in a very bloody and violent manner.[88] The Turkish counterattack against the Greeks "had all of the characteristics of ethnic cleansing" which saw murder, rape and pillage of Greeks who were forcefully removed from their homes by the Turks.[89] In beating the Greeks backwards and then out of "Western Anatolia and seizing Smyrna in September 1922,"

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[82] Ibid.

[83] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 44.
[84] Ibid, 46.
[85] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 124.
[86] Ibid, 123-124.
[87] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred,* 46.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

the Turks were on the way to the achievement of the nationalist goal to make Anatolia a homogenous Turkish dominion.[90]

At the 1922 Lausanne Peace Conference the Turks proposed population transfers but the lead diplomat presiding over the conference, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of Great Britain, declared that the "populations in question were way too large," and argued that many Greeks and Turks would refuse to move.[91] The United States government also opposed the population exchange of Greeks and Turks, a position made clear by United States Ambassador to Turkey W. C. Child at the Lausanne Conference in December of 1922.[92] An American Observer, Child let it be known that the United States and its people had no problem with providing Turkey with financial assistance to deal with its minority refugee problem but wanted to supervise the allocation and administering of funds.[93] Outward opposition to the exchange of Greeks and Turks by the United States was an attempt to appease an American public repulsed by the Turkish treatment of Armenians, however, at the same time the administration of President Warren G. Harding placed great importance on the advancement of economic relations with Turkey.[94] Eventually, Curzon dropped his objections to the compulsory transfers due to the refusal

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[90] Ibid, 52.

[91] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 149.

[92] Edwin I. James, Rumors of Trades Are in the Air, as Capitulations and Mosul Issues remained Unsettled, " *New York Times*, 14 December 1922; Ismet Gets U.S. Plea, *the Washington Post*, 14 December 1922. Robert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46, no. 2 (September 1959): 266-267.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Balakian, *The Burning Tigris,* 368-369.

of the Turks to accept Allied control and monitoring of Turkish minority affairs and departed the Lausanne Conference in early February of 1923.[95] Once Curzon left the scene the United States pursued an economic agreement with Turkey that became official on August 6, 1923, after the main Treaty of Lausanne had been agreed upon.[96] The Turko-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce granted U.S. ships unrestricted access to the Dardanelles Straits, the protection of Christians in Turkey and an "open-door policy for American business, especially oil business."[97] Thus, economic interests of the United States overrode public opinion, both abandoning the Armenians and also setting the stage for the population exchange between Turkey and Greece.

The Turks believed that to turn over control of their domestic and diplomatic affairs was a "violation of their sovereignty."[98] Thus the stage was set for legally recognized ethnic cleansing in accordance with the stipulations of the final Treaty of Lausanne that was signed in 1923.[99] Both Greek and Turkish officials accepted the compulsory exchange of populations.[100] Turkish officials favored the transfers because they believed they would prevent Greeks from ever being able to return to Anatolia.[101]

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[95] Lieberman, *A Terrible Fate*, 149; "Turk Peace fails; Conference ended,"; *The Washington Post,* 5 February 1923.

[96] Ibid, 369.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Lieberman, *A Terrible Fate*, 149; "Turk Peace fails; Conference ended," *The Washington Post,* 5 February 1923.
[99] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 149-150.
[100] Perti Ahonen, Gustavi Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tomas Stark and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in the Second World War and its Aftermath*, 8.
[101] Ibid.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Youssouf Kemal explained that the removal of Greeks from Anatolia was "justified because immediate deportations and transfers" were to "prevent spying and a possible Greek landing on the Black Sea Coast."[102] Most significantly Turkish leaders believed the Greek population of Turkey had "stabbed them in the back."[103] Greek leaders were no different in that they approved of the population exchanges with Turkey and believed that by forcing their Turkish population from Greece the "resettlement of Greek refugees" would be much more easily accomplished.[104] Hence the population exchange in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne served to make ethnic cleansing a valid legal option for nations to utilize in dealing with troublesome ethnic minority populations.

A combination of officials from Greece and Turkey administered the transfer of 1.2 million to 1.5 million Anatolian Greeks to Greece and the reciprocal transfer of 365,000 Turks from Greece back to Turkey.[105] Large numbers of Greeks died in transit to Greece, and many of the Turks traveling to Anatolia faced the same fate as their Greek counterparts.[106] Both groups faced major difficulties assimilating into the new cultures after arrival at their new homes.[107] In the case of the transferees, religion defined their ethnicity as the Turks were Muslims and the Greeks were Christians of the Greek

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[102] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 127.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Perti Ahonen, et. al., *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in the Second World and its Aftermath,* 8.
[105] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 54.
[106] Ibid, 55.
[107] Ibid.

Orthodox.[108] It was religion that mainly identified one as being Greek or Turk.[109] Transferees found the process very difficult and the exchange of population also taxed the Greek and Turkish governments. [110] Above all the legally-sanctioned ethnic cleansing by Greece and Turkey changed the ethnic and religious makeup of both nations and left both with "widely divergent memories" and very distinctive histories, despite the fact that "Greeks and Turks had lived beside one another for centuries but possessed different views of the events of the recent past."[111] Ethnic cleansing redefines the future by eliminating the past and forces the cleansed to adopt a past that is not theirs and in some cases never will be.

Toward a Greater Germany

Ethnic cleansing and genocide were cornerstones of domestic and foreign policy during Adolf Hitler's reign as leader of Germany, which lasted from January 30, 1933 until his death on April 30, 1945.[112] National Socialists wanted to "widen the union of all Germans in order to form a Greater Germany" that would allow Germans throughout Europe and the world to assert themselves as the world's most powerful race.[113] In order to achieve European and global dominance Germany needed more natural and human resources, which were to be acquired via the acquisition of *Lebensraum* (living space or

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[108] Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 150.
[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 32.
[113] Ibid.

elbow room).[114] According to Hitler Germany needed what he referred to as "vital space" and it was the quest for space that led to the removal of many conquered peoples from their homes in order to make room for Germans allowing the *Reich* to expand and become ever more dominant throughout Europe.[115]

During the period of Nazi rule over Germany, Germans were the most numerous ethnic group throughout the nations of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.[116] Germans had migrated throughout Europe in two major waves: one during the eleventh century and the other periodically from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. They made homes in what became the Sudetenland, Poland, the Volga basin, Yugoslavia, Hungary, the Baltic region, the Danube basin and the Wartheland region of the Carpathian Mountains.[117] Before Nazi rule, Germans living outside the *Reich* were of "little concern" within Germany proper especially in the years leading up to World War I during which time Emperor Wilhelm II "proposed to disavow" Germans outside the *Reich* in conjunction with his policy objectives.[118] The Weimar Republic acted sparingly on behalf of the German diaspora in Europe because their "rights were guaranteed by international agreements."[119] This changed dramatically when Hitler became Chancellor

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[114] Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of WW II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 44.

[115] Perti Ahonen, Gustav Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tomas Stark and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *People on the Move: Movements in the Second World War and its Aftermath,* 11.
[116] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945*, 24.
[117] Ibid, 27.
[118] Ibid, 28.
[119] Ibid, 29.

of Germany. He identified German populations throughout Europe as strategic assets who could assist in bringing the German *Reich* to European dominance by serving as cultural and political "missionaries."[120] Hitler's foreign and domestic policy called for all Germans to be part of a "common *Reich*" whose borders would stretch throughout East-Central and Southeastern Europe, thereby achieving "the union of all Germans in order to form a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination."[121]

On October 7, 1939, Hitler declared that "all Germans threatened by de-Germanization" were to be transferred to the *Reich* immediately and he named Gestapo leader Heinrich Himmler Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom.[122] This put Himmler "in charge of resettlement programs" throughout Europe.[123] Hitler assumed the role of "protector" of Germans in Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania and the Baltic region through agreements that freed Germans from those countries to leave voluntarily if they wished to do so.[124] The most important of these agreements to transfer various populations of *Volksdeutshe* back to Germany was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of September28, 1939.[125] By the terms of the agreement Germany was to receive 49% of Polish territory whereas Russia was to occupy the

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[120] Ibid, 35.

[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Hedwig Wachenheim, "Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 20, no. 4 (July 1942), 705.
[124] Ibid, 705-706.
[125] Perti Ahonen, Gustav Corni, Jerzy Kohanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tomas Stark and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *People on the Move: Population Movements in the Second world War and its Aftermath*, 20-21.

remaining 51% of Polish land.[126] The redistribution of Polish lands led to internal population transfers within the Soviet Union as well as population exchanges between the Nazis and the Soviet Union.[127] By March 1941 approximately 490,000 Germans from the nations of Eastern Europe had been moved or transferred from their historic homelands back to Germany with the exception of those located in the recovered territories who were deemed unacceptable the Third Reich.[128]

As Germany sought to use the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact to bring Germans residing outside the *Reich* within the *Reich,* the Soviet Union used the agreement to rid itself of unwanted Germans from the Baltic and other areas of the Soviet hinterlands. By allowing Germans from the Soviet Union and Baltic states to relocate to Germany, Soviet officials believed that they were eliminating a potentially problematic minority population.[129] Soviet officials realized that "immediate evacuation of Germans" to Germany was the most convenient and painless solution to a very serious problem and would avert any "German influence in the Baltic" region of the Soviet Union.[130] Most importantly the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to rid itself of a minority population of Germans who were likely to be resistant to Soviet nationalization plans.[131]

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[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.

[128] Wachenheim, "Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe," 708; R.M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 43.
[129] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945*, 106.
[130] Ibid, 77; 81.
[131] Ahonen et. al., *People on the Move: Population Movements in the Second World War and its Aftermath*, 16-17.

Of the three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Lithuania witnessed the largest number of repatriations back to the German *Reich* as the Soviets deported approximately 50,000 Germans in 1940.[132] Estonian and Latvian Germans were a mostly urban population made up primarily of merchants and those who pursued "liberal professions," which German officials considered to be less productive than the largely rural Lithuanian German population.[133] Estonians and Latvians may have been viewed as less German than the Lithuanians but they still possessed value to the *Reich*. In one instance approximately 12,000 Estonian scientists, technicians and military officers were repatriated to Germany despite some of them having little or no German ethnic origin.[134] Nearly three-quarters of the Lithuanian German population resided in rural villages where craftsman and agricultural workers were prominent and whom German leaders deemed important to the expansion of the *Reich*.[135] Lithuanian Germans also seemed to be more German than those from Estonia and Latvia because they had preserved their national character through the creation of German schools, welfare organizations, libraries and various other institutions.[136] Most of the Eastern European Germans were

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[132] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945,* 133-134.

[133] Ibid, 131.

[134] The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, March 18, 1941, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. I, General* (Washington: GPO, 1958), 610. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1941v01

[135] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945,* 131. Statistics show that 58.7% of Lithuanian Germans were agricultural workers.

[136] Ibid.

relocated to the Wartheland region of Poland because, according to German officials, it was "the region in which Germanization was most urgently needed."[137]

As historian Alfred J. Rieber points out, from 1939 to 1941, the division of Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet areas led to a series of forced population transfers and violent atrocities that radically changed the demographic profile of the region.[138] The Soviet Union occupied the nations of the Baltic region and nearly half of Poland while the remaining portion of Poland was taken over by the Germans who assigned the SS to deport Poles and Jews in order to make living space for Germans on the new frontier.[139] In accordance with the expansionist policy of Nazi Germany 700,000 Poles and 500,000 Jews were forcefully removed from Eastern Europe and replaced by nearly 720,000 Germans.[140] German officials "never had enough settlers to effectively Germanize Poland" which was a major problem but there were other problems that plagued the Germanization of Eastern Europe.[141] First and foremost Nazi agricultural goals were unrealistic and never met despite the placement of German farmers in agricultural areas such as the Wartheland.[142] Agricultural production in the annexed lands of Eastern Europe lagged behind projected goals because "the war effort required increased

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[137] Wachenheim, "Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe," 709.

[138] Alfred J. Rieber, "Repressive Population transfers in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe: A Historical Overview," in *Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950*, ed. Alfred J. Rieber (London: Frank Cass, 2000) 13.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Wachenheim, " Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe," 711.
[142] Ibid.

production and settlers were not familiar with modern methods of farming" utilized by farmers in the German homeland.[143]

During 1941 Hitler decided to halt his pursuit of the "colonial idea" of resettlement during preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.[144] However, Hitler's plan for the resettlement of Germans to newly acquired lands in Eastern Europe was only to be delayed until German soldiers could occupy the farms they were to receive as "victory rewards" for assistance in the acquisition of land that would enable the *Reich* to expand eastward.[145] Hitler's colonial dream was never realized, but ethnic cleansing was the primary tool used to achieve strategic policy goals by the Germans and Soviets before and during World War II.

United States official reaction toward the Hitler and Stalin's agreement to transfer Baltic Germans to Germany is quite sketchy. Although United States officials knew that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact contained provisions pertaining to territorial concerns and other issues, they were more concerned with improving diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union and preventing a German attack on Poland.[146] Diplomatic dispatches provide evidence that the United States possessed some detailed knowledge of the transfer of the Baltic Germans to Germany. A dispatch sent from the United States Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Laurence A. Steinhardt to Secretary of

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[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

[145] Ibid.
[146] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull: Vol. I* (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1948), 657-658.

State Cordell Hull on January 17, 1941 reported that Germany and the Soviet Union had agreed to transfer 45,000 Lithuanian Germans along with 12,000 Germans from Estonia and Latvia in accordance with a repatriation agreement finalized between Germany and the Soviet Union on January 10, 1941.[147] Another dispatch from Steinhardt to the Secretary of State delivered on March 26, 1941, contained a report from the *Moscow Press* that announced the repatriation 21,343 Lithuanians, Russians and White Russians from the German occupied Polish Provinces of Memel and Suvalki to the Soviet Union, along with the repatriation 67,805 Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Germans to Germany under the stipulations of the January10, 1941 repatriation agreement considered fulfilled as of March 25, 1941.[148] Thus, there was no real United States policy pertaining to the transfer of populations between Germany and the Soviet Union but there was some knowledge of the events taking place, and the fact that population transfers had been used in the past in Europe to settle minority population problems.

The United States had no past record of support for population transfers or exchanges but did nothing to stop them, as was the case with the forced removal of the Armenians from Turkey during World War I and the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey that took place in 1923. Both instances were publicly condemned by the United States in order to placate the American public but that condemnation was halfhearted due to strategic reasons deemed more important to national security. Support

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[147] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 17 January 1941, *FRUS, 1941, I: 126.*

[148] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 26 March 1941 *FRUS, 1941, I: 134.*

for population transfers by the United States first came about in 1943 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt mentioned that Germans could be transferred in East-Central Europe after the war similar to how the Greeks and Turks had exchanged unwanted minority populations.[149] United States officials were well aware of population transfers as a solution to minority problems in Europe long before World War II, but it did not become part of American policy until after the war ended.

In the first half of the twentieth-century, ethnic cleansing offered a solution to the problem of minority populations in Europe for both democracies and totalitarian regimes alike. Population transfers seemed to offer an easy and efficient way to settle problems concerning minorities quickly, as in the case of the Armenians, swapping of populations between Greece and Turkey and the transfer of Baltic Germans by the Third Reich. In all of the previously mentioned cases the nations of the west watched from afar as minorities were uprooted from their homes and it seemed to the leaders of Great Britain, France and the United States that an established legal precedent and formula for dealing with problematic ethnic minorities in Europe had been found.

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[149] Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, March 15, 1943, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. III: The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe and the Far East* (Washington: GPO, 1963), 13, 15. The Conversation between Roosevelt, Eden and Hopkins will be explored further in Chapter III. President Roosevelt mentioned the transfer of Germans (Prussians as he called them) after the war similar to the Greece-Turkey population exchange in 1923 after World War in a conversation with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and his Special Assistant Harry L. Hopkins. His statement was not official policy but a and idea for a solution to a complicated problem.
http://digital.library.wisc/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1943v03

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF THE EXPULSIONS

After the Nazis were defeated and driven from Czechoslovakia and Poland, "the war against National Socialism turned into a war against Germans."[1] Other than being dead, permanently injured or maimed the worst thing an individual could be after the war in Czechoslovakia or Poland was German. At the outset of the war, Czechs and Poles made some differentiation between Nazis and innocent Germans but as the war continued and Nazi oppression and violence against inhabitants of occupied nations increased in viciousness such differentiation disappeared.[2] By the time World War II ended most Czechs and Poles identified all Germans as responsible for their exploitation and oppression.

As unfair and inhumane as the act of expulsion seems today, the "practice of cleansing minorities to conform to border changes" to create ethnically homogenous nations was inline with "accepted moral standards" in 1945 because of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty precedent.[3] Forced population transfers were also validated by the most

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[1] Perti Ahonen and Gustav Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tomas Stark and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath* (New York: Berg, 2008), 61.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Krystyna Kersten, "Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish Society in the Postwar Period," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe,*

strident proponent of democracy and human rights in the world, the United States of America.[4] Many politicians of the time saw the World War II expulsions as a "culmination of a process that had already begun spontaneously" when German soldiers and civilians in retreat sought to escape the wrath of a Red Army looking for vengeance.[5] Chaos at the end of the war enabled the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the support of the Soviet Union, to attempt to rid their nations of unwanted Germans.[6] Both Czechs and Poles used the spring and early summer of 1945 to expel as many Germans as possible in order to achieve a *fait accompli* before the United States and Great Britain decided to regulate or halt the expulsions altogether.[7] Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945 eventually stipulated all transfers be orderly and humane and be regulated by the Allied Control Council (ACC). According to American demographer Douglas Kirk the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe proved that "greater permanent movements of populations are caused not only by war but also by the peace that follows."[8] The following examination of the initial wild expulsions and those governed by the Potsdam Agreement the reveal that the art of making peace can be just as deadly as that of making of war.

1944-1948, ed., Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 77.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, 77-78.

[6] Alfred De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977),104.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Krystyna Kerstyn, "Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish Society During the Postwar Period," 75.

The United States emerged from World War II as global military power that also possessed great financial strength and could assume the bulk of the financial burden for rebuilding Germany. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and other American leaders came to the realization that the expulsion of Germans would have to be regulated from a point of strategic practically that would allow for the transfer of limited numbers of people as efficiently as possible.[9] Most importantly during the wild expulsions immediately after the war American administrative officials came to the realization that the Czechoslovak and Polish governments wanted their German minority populations removed from their borders by any means necessary, and these violent and unorganized population transfers might destabilize occupied Germany if left unchecked.[10] The Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 aired the contrasting ideologies and strategies between the Western Allies and the Czechs, Poles and Soviets. The Allies (including the Soviet Union) declared that expulsions would be conducted in an orderly and humane manner under the direction and regulation of the Allied Control Council. But by allowing the expulsions to occur at all the United States adopted characteristics of Hitler's racialist policy that had sought to establish a homogenous Germany.

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[9] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt,) October 19, 1945, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 1294. http://www.digitallibrary.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945v02; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 81; De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*, 80-81.

[10] De Zayas, *Nemesis At Potsdam*, 80.

The Czech Government in Exile and the idea of German Expulsion

The Czech and Polish expulsions of their German minorities from their borders emanated from Czech nationalism of the nineteenth-century and post World War I policy engineered by the United States under President Woodrow Wilson.[11] As the borders of Europe were being redrawn after World War I by western powers, Czech leaders (Edouard Beněs and Tomas Masaryk) campaigned for the creation of a Czech Republic based upon the ideologies of nineteenth-century Czech nationalism and the democratic idea of the self-determination of peoples championed by Wilson whose fourteen points for peace proposed that the various peoples compromising the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires should be able to pursue "autonomous development."[12] Historian John Milton Cooper Jr. points out that Wilson's speech did not call for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman empires, for he believed their dismemberment would be too "destabilizing" for Europe to handle, but rather proposed that the nationalities within those empires be given autonomy.[13] As for the Austro-Hungarian Empire Wilson favored a federation of autonomous nationalities but the disintegration of the empire forced him

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[11] Eagle Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947, in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, eds., Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 198.

[12] Ibid; Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, January 8, 1918, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Vol. I: The World War Supplement I* (Washington: GPO, 1933), 15-16. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1918Supp01v01

[13] John Milton Cooper Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 2009), 423-424.

to "amend the fourteen points by recognizing the new state of Czechoslovakia."[14] Despite the Czech campaign for self-determination the nation of Czechoslovakia ended up being a multi-ethnic state whose population according to the 1930 Czechoslovakian Census, consisted of a Czech and Slovak majority of 14,729, 536 and a minority population of some 3,231,688 Germans who accounted for 21.9% of Czechoslovakia's total population.[15] There were 2,270,536 Germans in Bohemia, 799,995 in Moravia and Silesia, 147,501 in Slovakia and 13,249 in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.[16] As a minority within a nation dominated by Czechs and Slovaks the Sudeten Germans had trouble accepting their secondary status, such as the fact that their representation within the state governmental apparatus was limited to 12.9% of total government employees.[17]

Following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1919, Czechoslovakian political leaders assured Sudeten Germans that that they would not fall victim to discrimination.[18] They were granted "full minority rights" that included the creation of German schools and the seating of German judges within the Czechoslovakian judiciary system.[19] Such

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[14] Ibid, 496-497. Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War and Peace* (Wheeling Harlan Davidson, 1979), 95.
[15] Wilhelm K. Turnwald, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* (Munich: University Press, 1962) VIII; Radomir Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 1; Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, *Annuaire statistique de la république tchécoslovaque*, Prague, 1934 is where Luza obtained his statistical information
[16] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, 1*.
[17] Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 198.
[18] Francis Dostal Raska, *The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue* (Prague: Karolinium Press, 2002) 12.
[19] Ibid.

recognition and guarantees were "not in harmony with nationalist sentiments" of Czech and Slovak citizens and revealed the underlying mistrust and tension within the multi-ethnic state of Czechoslovakia during the interwar years.[20] Czechoslovakian policy toward the Germans continued to be "firm but conciliatory" after Edouard Beněs succeeded Tomas Masaryk as president of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1935.[21] Even though Beněs attempted to improve relations between the Czechoslovakian government and its German minority, the relationship deteriorated amidst tough economic times during the mid-1930s.[22] The depression created an atmosphere of paranoia and suspicion between the majority Czech and Slovak population and the Sudeten German minority which helped set the stage for the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia that began after the war in 1945.[23]

On September 29, 1938, the relationship between the Czechoslovak majority and German minority in Czechoslovakia changed forever when the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy concluded that the heavily populated German Sudetenland located on the border with Germany be forfeited to Hitler's Germany.[24] The Munich Agreement of 1938 that ceded the Sudetenland also forced the resignation of President Beněs. More importantly, the cessation of the Sudetenland to Hitler's Germany changed the social, political and economic status of Czechoslovakia's remaining Germans.[25]

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[20] Ibid, 15
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Turnwald, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans: Introduction*, XII.
[24] Ibid, 19.
[25] Ibid, 19.

After resigning from office on October 5, 1938 Beněs went from Prague to Chicago, where he became a "politically active" professor at the University of Chicago traveling the United States and speaking at universities to intellectual elites and at political events to prominent American politicians before traveling to London on July 12, 1939, in order to establish himself within the Czechoslovakian political exile community.[26]A similar community of Czechoslovakians in exile in Paris established the Czechoslovak National Committee on October 17, 1939.[27] In response Beněs petitioned the British and French foreign offices and argued that a Czechoslovakian government in-exile would be best for the Czechoslovakian people, Europe and also the British and French governments.[28] On July 21, 1940, the British government recognized the Benes-led London faction of Czechoslovakian exiles as the official Czechoslovakian Provisional Government.[29] Not surprisingly the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile consisted entirely of Czechs and Slovaks but there was also a *Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratiche Partei (Sdp)* contingent in London under the direction of party leader Wenzel Jaksch.[30] The *SdP* made it clear to the Czech government in-exile during negotiations in London from 1939 to1943 that they wanted the Sudetenland to be part of a postwar Czechoslovakia but as an autonomous "provincial government" that would be part of a

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[26] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Sudeten German Issue*, 19, 31; Eduard Beněs, *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beněs: From Munich to New War and New Victory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954), 62-63; 81.
[27] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Sudeten German Issue,* 32.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid, 33.
[30] Ibid.

Czech-Slovak-Sudeten German federation.[31] From the perspective of the Sudeten Germans, such an arrangement would protect them "against blind revenge" and prevent "radical groups" from being involved in Czech politics.[32] Knowing that within Czechoslovakia there was full support for the removal of Germans as a form of retribution after the war, Beněs made it clear to Jaksch in late 1942 that neither Fascist nor anti-Fascist Germans were going be part of a postwar Czechoslovakia.[33]

> From this my dear friends we can draw but one calm, but stern conclusion: A just retribution for all direct and indirect, active and passive war criminals as a lesson for the future and-complete separation! Otherwise after this dreadful war, an unheard of massacre will ensue between our two races! We can and must prevent this by our complete separation! Only this way will we be able to meet again later-when the present sufferings are forgotten-as neighbors and live each in his new home without bitterness and in peace, separated, side by side with one another.[34]

The role played by the German population of Czechoslovakia, and more importantly the Czech and Slovak perception of that role during the war, provided the impetus for the policy of expulsion. Although the exclusion of Sudeten Germans from the Czech Provisional Government was a product of popular sentiment during the first year of the war Beněs believed that Czechs, Slovaks and Germans could possibly cohabit in Czechoslovakia after the war, but as the war trudged along both public and political opinion grew increasingly anti-German.[35] From 1940 on, Beněs committed himself to

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[31] Wenzel Jaksch, *Europe's Road To Potsdam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 359-360.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Eduard Benes, *Memoirs of Dr. Benes*, 217-221
[34] Ibid, 221.
[35] Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963) 54-57.

seeing the Sudeten German population removed from Czechoslovakia, although he only made his feelings public to the British press in early 1945, shortly before the wild expulsions began.[36] He stated: "The alternative to expulsion would not be humane. It would be a pity if we were penalized for being civilized."[37]

Beněs launched a political and public relations campaign in order to convince British, Russian and American leaders that lasting peace in postwar Europe could only be realized if Czechoslovakia were allowed to rid itself of its Sudeten German minority. Benes believed that even though the removal would mean an extended period of hardship for the Sudeten Germans their expulsion would provide for a better and more humane solution than inhumane massacres spurred by revenge that would cause the "continuation of nationality struggles" in East-Central Europe.[38] Beněs presented the idea of German expulsion as an act that would show Czechoslovakia to be a nation of "democratic and human values" and an agent of European social change.[39] As president of the Czechoslovak government in-exile Beněs sought to stress to the Allies, especially the United States, that the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia following the war would make for a peaceful and secure Europe. Most of all Beněs knew that the key to a Czechoslovakia free of Sudeten Germans rested on the approval of the United States and the Soviet Union.[40]

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[36] Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfers in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007), 95.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Eduard Beněs, *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beněs* (Boston: Houghlin Mifflin), 222.
[39] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Story of Czech-German Relations,* 225.
[40] Ibid.

The actions of the German military inside Czechoslovakia during the war contributed greatly to the achievement of Beněs's goal of ridding Czechoslovakia of all Germans, German occupation policy centered on the "Germanization" of the Czech people. The process intensified after Reinhard Heydrich of the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) became Reichsprotektor of what had once been Czechoslovakia in 1941.[41] Heydrich immediately "intensified" the German implementation of martial law within the protectorate, and by late November nearly 400 Czech citizens had been executed by Heydrich's use of terror tactics to bring about "Czech compliance to German laws."[42] By itself the word Germanization sounds harmless but in reality Germanization was a euphemism for "selecting Czechs for assimilation, deportation or extermination."[43] Reinitiated with a new-found fervor by Heydrich in October 1941, the process of Germanization classified Czechoslovakian citizens into one of three racial-political categories: those deemed as being racially hostile and recently politically active against the German Reich were designated for expulsion; those determined to be racially reliable and politically loyal were to be assimilated or Germanized; and those Czechoslovak citizens seen as being non-supportive of the Germans were executed.[44]

Heydrich's terroristic reign and implementation of Germanization within the Czech protectorate achieved two things. First, the brutal actions of the Nazis in occupied

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[41] Benjamin Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 16.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*, 190-191.
[44] Ibid, 191, 219.

Czechoslovakia did not go unnoticed by Czechoslovakians or by the world, especially by the Western Allies where the "anti-German" sentiment increased exponentially in reaction Heydrich's strategy of terror.[45] Second, the actions of Heydrich proved successful in hindering the effectiveness of the Czech resistance movement on the ground, which resulted in the core of Czechoslovak "political activity" and power being confined to Beněs's Czech government in-exile in London.[46] With the resistance effectively neutralized by the terror tactics of Heydrich the Czech government in-exile approved a covert operation to achieve his assassination.[47] Aggressive actions by the Germans against Czechoslovakians in the protectorate led Czech resistance leaders to vehemently request the assassination of Heydrich be postponed indefinitely and suggested the Czech government in-exile choose another "target" of lesser importance.[48] Nevertheless, Beněs viewed the assassination plan as an act that would benefit Czechoslovakia's postwar interests by demonstrating to the international community that a postwar Czechoslovakia would not be a passive nation in the arena of global affairs.[49]

On May 27, 1942 two Czech resistance members assassinated Reichsprotektor Heydrich as he traveled by automobile to Prague.[50] The German response targeted the small village of Lidice as the epicenter of retribution because German officials believed the citizens of Lidice had provided assistance to the assassination team.[51] There was no

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[45] Ibid, 232.
[46] Ibid, 221.
[47] Ibid, 209.
[48] Frommer, *National Cleansing*, 37.
[49] Ibid, 19.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

proof that the citizens of Lidice had provided such assistance.[52] Such complicity is unlikely because the area around Lidice was a productive industrial region that produced 10% of the "Nazi Reich's industrial output" and Czech workers there were better compensated and received larger food ration allotments than Germans who did the same work.[53] The SS decided to make an example of the small mining village of Lidice and its inhabitants in order to send a message to the whole protectorate.[54] In the ensuing carnage the SS executed 199 villagers (192 men and 7 women) and many residents of the surrounding area.[55] They rounded up the women and children, deporting the former and sending the children to concentration camps such as the one at Chelmno.[56] Those children the SS deemed to be of Aryan racial stock were adopted by German families.[57] Once the SS was done there was nothing left of Lidice, the village had been burned to the ground, families split apart and people executed despite the fact that there was no proof that anyone from Lidice had assisted the Czech resistance in the assassination of Heydrich.[58] The events at Lidice put Czechoslovakia on notice.[59] German leaders "ordered all Czechoslovakians to report to special offices to have their identity cards stamped" and

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[52] Douglas, *Orderly and Humane,* 22.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Luza, *Transfer of the Sudeten Germans:*, 210.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid. Frommer, *National Cleansing*, 19-20.
[58] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*210.
[59] Ibid, 209.

those who refused were executed on the spot as collaborators in the assassination of Heydrich.[60]

As a strategic measure, the thorough and brutal attack on Lidice by the German SS proved successful and struck fear throughout the ranks of the Czechoslovak resistance, many of whom decided that participation in "armed resistance was not a viable option" in the effort to remove Germany from Czechoslovakia.[61] For the Czech government in-exile and President Edouard Beněs, Lidice did two things that made the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia inevitable after the war in Europe ended. First the razing of Lidice by the SS only intensified Czech and Slovak hatred for Germans in general and played a large role in the decision to expel Germans by the Czechoslovakian government after the war.[62] Second, the Lidice massacre was noticed by the Western Allies (USA, UK), who became aware of the repressive and inhumane German occupation of Czechoslovakia, and became more responsive to demands from Beněs that the German population be expelled in order to establish lasting peace in Europe.[63] American reaction to the German assault on Lidice made it clear that Nazi tyranny would be defeated. On June 12, 1942 Secretary of State Cordell Hull called the Lidice massacre an act of "mass terrorization" so vile and ruthless that such acts were below "savage tribes."[64] Hull went on to explain that through the senseless murder and

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[60] Ibid.
[61] Frommer, *National Cleansing,* 20.
[62] Luza,*The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, 232.*
[63] Ibid.
[64] "Hull Denounces Slaughter," *New York Times*, 13 June 1942;

torture of "innocent women and children" Hitler managed to further enrage the world through a horrible display of the cruel inhumanity he and Nazi Germany stood for.[65] The American stance on Lidice was reinforced by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox who spoke before 15,000 people at a United Nations rally in Boston as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's representative on June 14, 1942 , and declared that the Allies would "fight until the Nazi butchers were swept from the face of the earth."[66] Knox also stated that Lidice would once again emerge and "the Nazi ideas of degradation and enslavement would be crushed."[67] As sympathetic as the United States government was to the victims of the senseless slaughter that occurred at Lidice, there was no desire or readiness to "resort to measures of retaliation such as indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations in enemy countries."[68] Although the massacre at Lidice was a domestic nightmare for the Czechoslovak people, it turned out to be a strategic asset in the Czech government in-exile's campaign to rid itself of an unwanted German minority after the war. Brutalities committed by the Nazis against the villagers of Lidice made the Czechoslovakian strategy for the expulsion of its German minority more justifiable in the eyes of the United States and its junior ally Great Britain.[69]

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[65] Ibid.
[66] "Knox Pledges Nazi Doom," *New York Times*, 15 June 1942.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), 1184.
[69] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Sudeten German Issue*, 34.

Although the Lidice massacre virtually guaranteed that the German minority population of Czechoslovakia would be expelled once the war ended, the idea of expulsion was not new. As mentioned earlier Czech President Edouard Beněs knew soon after the Munich Agreement had been completed that the Sudeten German minority of Czechoslovakia had to be transferred out of Czechoslovakia if the nation were to be safe and secure after the war. Beněs had first proposed the idea in 1940 when he suggested it was crucial that a million Sudeten Germans be transferred from Czechoslovakia in order to restore the pre-Munich borders.[70] There was support in the "newly radicalized Czechoslovakia" for the idea of forcibly transferring the Sudeten Germans and Beněs knew that in order for the transfer to occur he had to portray it as essential to "Allied postwar plans for Europe" specifically establishing a lasting peace.[71] Much to Beněs's advantage the aftermath of Lidice saw the Western Allies more inclined to listen to the Czechoslovak leader's claims that peace in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe would only come about through the expulsion of Germans from the region.[72]

The summer of 1942 proved to be very important to Beněs's pursuit of Allied approval for his plan to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia. On June 9, 1942 Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Union had never recognized the Munich Agreement of 1938 and also approved of the forced transfer of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.[73] Molotov put the United States and Great Britain in a

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[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans* 235.

very precarious situation regarding the expulsion of Germans. Soviet support of Beněs's transfer plans heavily influenced Great Britain's policy pertaining to the German question in East-Central Europe.[74] British officials justified support of the transfer process by stating it was an "endeavor, which would make Czechoslovakia homogenous from the standpoint of nationality."[75]

In late 1942, Beněs received notification that United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt "requested" that he make an official visit to Washington D.C. in 1943.[76] His official visit to the United States was to focus on the discussion of "Allied war problems," but Beněs saw it as an opportunity to gain American support for the expulsion of Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority.[77] Although the Soviet Union had given verbal support to the expulsions in the summer of 1942 Beněs needed official support from not only the Soviets but also the United States and Great Britain.[78] He decided to make his official visit to America the first leg in a journey that would take him to the Soviet Union and then back to Great Britain in a quest to procure support from all three Allies.[79]

Prior to his departure for Washington D.C., Beněs authored an article in the American foreign-policy journal *Foreign Affairs,* which was designed to present to American politicians and intellectuals his ideological and political justification for the

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[74] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-1955*, 60.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Beněs, *Memoirs of Dr. Edouard Beněs*, 181.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.

expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.[80] Although the piece discussed postwar Europe it also addressed the European minority question and declared it to be a "large part of Czechoslovak policymaking."[81] Beněs made the claim that the minority question centered around the German threat to the nations of East-Central Europe in particular.[82] He argued that the German threat to Czechoslovakia and the other nations of the region was the result of the German attempt to colonize central and eastern Europe by sending German settlers as "agents of expanding German interests" throughout the region[83] Germans who had moved into nations such as Czechoslovakia and Poland were in effect a "cultural" and political "fifth column" of the German assault eastward.[84] According to Beněs only one solution could nullify the German threat to Czechoslovakia and the whole of East-Central Europe and that was the "extensive" transfer of Germans out of the region.[85]

Within the pages of *Foreign Affairs,* Beněs explained to his American audience that "the protection of minorities" within a nation such as Czechoslovakia was an impractical burden upon the state.[86] Beněs admitted that there was "no ideal solution" regarding the German question but justified his transfer plans by mentioning the population transfers undertaken after World War I.[87] Beněs explained that it would be

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[81] Edouard Beněs, "The Organization of Postwar Europe," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 20, No. 4 (1942): 235.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid, 236.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid, 237.

better for "national minorities" such as the Sudeten Germans to have the right to live with their "native population" which would also serve the best interests of Czechoslovakia's Czech and Slovak majority.[88] Thus the case for expulsion was packaged and presented to American politicians and the American public in a way that made Czechoslovakia's plan to transfer Sudeten Germans look as if it benefited the Sudeten Germans as much as the majority Czechoslovak population.

Beněs knew he needed American approval of the proposed transfer of Sudeten Germans, but he did not know where the United States stood on the issue and requested that the Czechoslovakian Information Service conduct a study of United States policy regarding the plan to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia.[89] The study was based on discussions conducted by Czechoslovak diplomat J. Hanc along with fifteen Czechoslovakian political and foreign policy experts who studied United States policy.[90] Information garnered for the report revealed that the United States was likely to support pre-Munich (1938) frontiers, limited minority rights and possibly the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, if it would bring peace to the European continent.[91] Although American support for the transfer of Germans was not ironclad Beněs had a couple of aces in the hole. Before he left for Washington he met with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in April of 1943, who declared that if the transfer of

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[88] Ibid, 23-239.
[89] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in Government and the Sudeten German Issue,* 64.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.

Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia was "deemed necessary" to achieve peace in Central Europe Great Britain would support it.[92] Beněs already knew he had tentative Soviet support for the transfer of Sudeten Germans before his discussions with President Roosevelt began.[93] Before he ever arrived in Washington he therefore knew that American approval of the transfers was a possibility but with both Great Britain and the Soviet Union in favor of the Czechoslovak transfer plan the chances of garnering American approval of the transfers increased exponentially.

While in Washington in early June 1943, Beněs played a high stakes diplomatic game leading FDR to believe that he had Soviet support for the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia before it became official.[94] President Roosevelt and Benes discussed the Sudeten German situation twice and both times Benes led FDR to believe he had the full support of the Soviet Union by letting it be known that the Czechoslovak government had conducted talks with the Soviet Union concerning the Sudeten German issue.[95] After listening carefully to Beněs on June 7, 1943 FDR indicated that the United States approved of the transfer of Germans from East Prussia, Transylvania and Czechoslovakia.[96] Once he secured President Roosevelt's support for the Sudeten German transfers Benes asked FDR to "clarify again" his support for the forced removal

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[92] Ibid, 63-64.

[93] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans, 239-240.*
[94] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Sudeten German Issue*; 64.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Benes, *Memoirs of Dr. Edouard Beněs*, 187.

of Germans from Czechoslovakia.[97] A June 15, 1943, memorandum by Harry N. Howard of the Division of Political Affairs concerning the German-Czechoslovak border stated that the United States favored the restoration of Czechoslovakia's 1937 pre-Munich border with Germany, which Beněs desired greatly.[98] In addition to the restoration of Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich borders the report noted that the "German character" of the area returned to Czechoslovakia "could be transferred without economic or strategic injury" through the return of nearly 2.3 million Germans to Germany.[99]The removal of Germans from the German-Czechoslovak border area would remove the "strategic value" of the area as far as Germany was concerned.[100] Although Beněs stated in his memoirs and elsewhere that Roosevelt had approved of the transfer of Sudeten Germans there are no written records of the meetings that took place between Beněs and Roosevelt in Washington between May 8 and June 9, 1943, in the State Department files or the FDR Library in Hyde Park, New York.[101] There may be no eyewitness verification of Roosevelt's discussion with Benes concerning the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans but

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[97] Ibid, 195.
[98] Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard, of the Division of Political Affairs, June 15, 1943, Germany-Czechoslovakia: Territorial Problems: German-Czechoslovak Boundaries, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec* (Washington: GPO, 1970), 749-751. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Memorandum by Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, March 15, 1943, in U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. III: The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East,* (Washington: GPO, 1943), 15. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945v03.

documents exist that rove Roosevelt had given the German minority question some thought. Special assistant to the President Harry L. Hopkins wrote in a memorandum dated March 15, 1943, that Roosevelt had discussed the postwar fate of Germans in East Prussia at a dinner with himself, Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the night before.[102] Hopkins's memorandum quoted Roosevelt as saying:

> The President said he thought we should make some arrangements to get the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey, which this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace and that, the Prussians cannot be trusted.[103]

This conversation took place in March, three months before Beněs reportedly received Roosevelt's approval of his plan to transfer the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, and it reveals that Roosevelt believed the German minority Population of East-Central Europe was a threat to the post-war peace and security of Europe.

The trip to Washington had been a success in more than one way. Not only did Beněs secure United States approval of the transfer of Sudeten Germans while in America, but he also received word that the Soviet Union had agreed to make its support of the Benes transfer plan official shortly thereafter. Beněs met his objective and had received the support of the Big Three Allied powers but in actuality the Soviet agreement to support the Czechoslovak transfer of Germans was significantly more important than

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[102] Ibid, 15. Manfred Kittel and Horst Möller, "Die Benes Dekrete und die Vertreibung der Deutschen Im europäischen Vergleich," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitsgeschichte* 54, no. 4 (2006): 558.
[103] Memorandum by Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, 15 March 1943, *FRUS, 1943, III*, 15.

American approval. First, Benes wanted the approval of all three Allies so as demonstrate that Czechoslovakia was willing to deal with the Sudeten German issue in accordance with any international postwar peace agreement. Second and more importantly the procurement of the Soviet Union as an official supporter of the Czechoslovak transfer plan gave Beněs a powerful regional ally who could be used to counterbalance any amount of power and influence the Western Allies could exert over Czechoslovakia's policy of population transfer.

In mid-December 1943, Beněs traveled to the Soviet Union and later that month the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation."[104] The treaty provided for "mutual assistance" between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia during the war against Germany accentuated by "promises of mutual noninterference in internal affairs" of one another."[105] After a few meetings with Soviet leader Josef Stalin, Benes met with Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, to whom he presented a memorandum that presented a ten-point plan to transfer the Sudeten Germans out of Czechoslovakia over a five-year period with most of the transfers occurring during the first two years of implementation.[106] In response Molotov gave a guarantee of Soviet support by stating that the Sudeten German "transfer was a minor problem and would be easily completed."[107] While in the Soviet Union Beněs also received additional support for the transfer of Sudeten Germans from leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist party

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[104] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile and the Sudeten German Issue, 65.*
[105] Luza *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*, 242.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile and the Sudeten German Issue,* 66.

in-exile in Russia who agreed to support Benes in the endeavor of ridding Czechoslovakia of its Germans.[108] Beněs's success in procuring Soviet support for the expulsions came to fruition, in part, from his stressing to Soviet officials that the expulsion of Sudeten Germans would be part of a larger Communist-friendly social revolution. [109]

The "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was vital to Beněs. Beněs viewed the Munich Agreement of 1938 as evidence that the Western Allies would never totally commit themselves to the defense of Czechoslovakia and this was the main reason he looked to the Soviets for friendship and security.[110] Also the Soviet Union had displayed loyalty to Czechoslovakia in 1938 by not recognizing the Munich Agreement, an action that had been admired by Czechoslovakian citizens.[111] Thus, not only was the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" popular with the Czechoslovak public but it would also serve as a guarantor of the existence of Czechoslovakia by establishing "the Soviet Union Alliance as a natural response to the problem of German expansion."[112] Czechoslovakian independence would be guaranteed and the relationship with the Soviet Union would "supplement relations with the West" which meant all angles were covered and the relationship with the Soviets might be used to extract cooperation from the Western Allies regarding future

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[108] Ibid.

[109] Kittle and Horst Möller, "Die Benes-Dekrete und die Vertreibung der Deutschen im europäischen Vergleich," 572.
[110] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans,* 241.
[111] Ibid, 241.
[112] Ibid.

Czechoslovakian security, including the German population transfer plan.[113] And with Moscow being the wartime headquarters of the Czechoslovakian Communist party, Soviet approval of the expulsions brought with it the approval of Czech communist leaders.

As President of Czechoslovakia, Beněs's only major policy goals for the immediate postwar period were the reinstatement of pre-1938 borders, the removal of the troublesome Sudeten German minority from within his nation's border and security agreements with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In a radio message broadcast to the Czechoslovakian people from the Soviet Union in 1943 Beněs declared Czechoslovakia to be a republic for the first time and stated that Czechoslovakia had the right to do whatever it wanted in relation to the Sudeten German issue.[114] In essence Beněs was telling his nation and the world that the Czechoslovakian Republic would be a homogenous national state devoid of any significant minority populations.[115] While mostly focused on the removal of the Sudeten Germans, Beněs also saw the Hungarian minority of Czechoslovakia as problem. By the end of 1943, Beněs had coaxed the Allied powers of the east and west into possibly supporting his plan to transfer the Sudeten German population of Czechoslovakia to their ethnic homeland of Germany and had done so in a very calculated manner.[116] Full support of the expulsion of Germans

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[113] Ibid.

[114] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Sudeten German Issue;* 65.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.

by the United States came in the summer of 1944 when the Post War Policy Committee, a branch of the Division of Central European Affairs in the State Department, communicated to Czechoslovakian leaders that the United States would be interested in pursuing transfers of Germans if they were well timed and logistically manageable.[117] Although sympathetic to Czechoslovakia's desire to divest itself of a troublesome minority population, the Committee on Post War Policy explained to American and British representatives of the European Advisory Committee (EAC) on August 5, 1944 that the transfer of Sudeten Germans was a means by which to combat the effects of National Socialism and bring stability to East-Central Europe.[118]

Once he received approval from FDR for the transfer of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia Beněs published another article in *Foreign Affairs* in October of 1944. This second piece explained why the Sudeten Germans had to be transferred out of Czechoslovakia. However, this essay intentionally targeted American intellectuals and politicians and was used by Beněs as a trial population transfer proposal.[119] Beneěs explained that the Western sponsored Munich Agreement of 1938 had seen the "last bastion of Central European democracy surrendered" and Czechoslovakia had been given away to Hitler.[120] Beněs explained that there would be no return to "pre-Munich conditions" and there was no choice but to transfer those Germans out of

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[117] Detlef Brandes, *Der Weg zur Vertreibung, 1938-1945: Pläne und Entscheidungen zum,Transfer aus der Tschechoslowakei und aus Polen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), 286.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955;* 61.
[120] Edouard Beněs, "Czechoslovakia Plans for Peace." *Foreign Affairs*, October 1944, 27-28.

Czechoslovakia.[121] Beněs used this article in *Foreign Affairs* as a public relations piece that presented the rationale behind Czechoslovak thinking in regard to the German expulsions. On November 23, 1944 the London-based Czechoslovakian government in-exile presented its "detailed transfer scheme" to the EAC, which consisted of representatives from Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.[122] The document asserted wholesale transference of the Sudeten German minority was the only viable solution to the Czech minority problem because Germans were to be denied any official minority status or rights in a postwar Czechoslovakia.[123]

Both the United States and Great Britain endorsed Czechoslovakia's transfer plans. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered a speech to the House of Commons on December 15, 1944, concerning the transfer of Germans from East-Central Europe, referred to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and explained that population transfers were an "idée fixe" and were the only plausible solution to the "German minority problem in East-Central Europe."[124] He explained British support for the transfer process declaring "a clean sweep will be made, I am not alarmed at the displacement of population" and further explained to parliament that such large population transfers were logistically more possible and efficient in the modern world.[125] Churchill cited the

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[121] Ibid, 36.

[122] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955;* p. 61.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, December 15, 1944, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 406 (1944-1945) cols., 1484-1485. Kittel and Horst Möller, "Die Benes-Dekrete und die Vertreibung der Deutsche im europäischen Vergleich," 558-559.
[125] Ibid.

disentanglement of populations that took place after World War I between Greece and Turkey that were largely successful and led to "friendly relations" between them in the years after the conclusion of the transfers.[126] He then explained that the population exchange between Greece and Turkey had not been without difficulty but he believed that the "disentanglement" of population it solved problems which had before been the cause of immense friction, of words and rumors of wars."[127] As a result Churchill saw no reason why the transfer of German populations could not solve the German minority problem in East-Central Europe.[128] While Churchill's comments focused on the transfer of Germans from territory that was to be occupied by Poland his words were applicable to Czechoslovakia as well. The American response to the Czechoslovak transfer plan was more practical simply because the United States was the only Allied power willing and able to feed and house the expelled populations once they arrived in the planned American zone of occupation in Southern Germany. According to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius the United States would assist, police and administer the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland as part of a process that was to be conducted under international supervision.[129] American officials knew the transfers were going to occur and subsequently replied to Czechoslovak transfer plans by making it clear on December 18, 1944 that it was the responsibility of the United States to prevent the

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[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans,* 249.

spread of disease and control the flow of expellee traffic during the transfer process once they entered Germany so that the transferees would not impede military traffic.[130]

Beněs campaigned hard in the United States for Allied approval of the transfer plan for Czechoslovakia's German minority. At the same time he was also preparing the Czechoslovak homeland for the mass expulsions.[131] While he was espousing "equality and international law" and the desire of the Czechoslovak government to follow the transfer guidelines of an international peace agreement to the Western Allies, Benes was simultaneously seeking to transfer the Sudeten Germans in accordance with Czechoslovakian needs and desires.[132] Beněs relayed instructions to the Czechoslovakian resistance that directed the creation of conditions that would bring about the exodus of Sudeten Germans and create a *fait accompli* before any international agreement could be brought into existence.[133]

For Beněs 1945 was to be very different from 1944 with regard to the American and British position on the transfer of Germans from East-Central Europe, the parameters of the transfers were to be more restrictive than he previously thought. Beněs was "disturbed" that the United States (followed by Great Britain) started to add conditions to the transfer process such as linking the number of Sudeten Germans to be transferred to

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[130] "U.S. Reply to Czech Transfers, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, December 18, 1944, Subject: Responsibility for Assembly Centers for Displaced Persons and Refugees," NARA II/RG 331/E1/B88/F5.
[131] Raska, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans*, 69.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.

the exact placement of the western Polish border.[134] The British conveyed to Beněs that the transfer plans had been carefully studied and that nothing would become final until other powers, namely the United States, had been consulted.[135] American officials explained to Beněs that the transfers would occur only as a part of an "international agreement" and were to be done at a "gradual" pace not unilaterally by the Czechoslovakian government.[136] On January 3, 1945, the United States expressed to Czechoslovak officials that it was "aware" of the harm inflicted upon Czechoslovakia by Germany and the German minority and the problem was under examination by American officials so as to bring about a "satisfactory solution" for the region of Central Europe and Czechoslovakia.[137] Above all else American officials expressed a desire that the expulsion of all Germans from the region should occur gradually under the auspices of an international peace agreement that would allow large groups to be transferred and thus eliminate the unilateral transfer of people by the Czechoslovak government and the attendant logistical problems for areas receiving an influx of refugees.[138]

On January 11, 1945, a memo from the United States Department of Central European Affairs set forth recommendations how the expulsion of Germans from East-

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[134] Raska, *The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue*, 73.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Luza, *69.*
[138] Ibid.

Central Europe should be approached and handled.[139] The memo stated United States officials should approach the transfer of Germans with extreme caution due to the fact that some ten to twelve million Germans resided in Czechoslovak and Polish territories.[140] It also suggested that the transfer of Germans be strategically addressed in accordance with what was best for the region rather than individual nations. The situations facing Czechoslovakia and Poland during the German occupation were unique to each nation and the United States was sympathetic to both.[141] But, the state department recommended that population transfers should be handled by the Allies in conjunction with an international peace agreement.[142]

Poland and the Transfer of Germans

Whereas the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia was based upon the Czech and Slovak majority's desire to be rid their nation of a troublesome German minority whereas the expulsion of Germans from the newly-recovered territories of Poland after World War II was the result of wartime geopolitics. At the end of World War II the borders of Poland had changed drastically from 1939, the Soviet Union had annexed the eastern half of Poland.[143] In return for land that it lost in the east to the Soviet Union the

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[139] Memorandum by the Division of Central European Affairs, Summary Czechoslovakia, January 11, 1945, in U.S. Department State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. IV: Europe, (*Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 420. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711d.1/FRUS.FRUS1945v02

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Kersten, "The Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish Society in the Postwar Period," 87.

Western Allies decided to compensate Poland with German lands that bordered it to the West.[144] Included in the Westward expansion of Poland were the industrial and fertile agricultural lands of East Prussia, Western Pomerania, and Upper Silesia and the free city of Danzig, which the Allies thought would make Poland a stronger and more self-sufficient nation that would be better equipped to fight off foreign intruders.[145] Within the newly acquired Polish territories that were once part of Germany resided millions of Germans who would have to be moved in order to accommodate Poles who had been displaced from their homes by the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland.[146]

American government agencies and officials assessed the expulsions and how they would impact American interests and the stability of Europe. On August 5, 1944 the American government released a report by the Postwar-Committee working in conjunction with the EAC titled *The Treatment of Germany: Long-Term Interests of the United States* which acknowledged the plans of Czechoslovakia to transfer approximately 3.2 million Sudeten Germans and the intention of Poland to transfer an unknown number of Germans from their newly acquired Western territories.[147] The American report to the EAC Postwar Committee concluded that the transfer of the region's German minority to Germany would in all probability "contribute to the tranquility of the countries

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[144] Ibid.
[145] Uta larkey," New Faces, New Identities: The (Ever) Changing Concept of Heimat," *German Politics & Society*, 26 no. 2 (2008): 34-35.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs, The Treatment of Germany, August 5, 1944, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. I: General,* (Washington D.C. GPO, 1966), 310. (http://www.digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1944v01

concerned" but many problems would arise from the transfer process and its aftermath.[148] One obvious difficulty was the lack of assurance and prospect of a future home or employment for the expellees after they settled in Germany.[149] Germany would have to undergo land reform so that approximately one million of the transferees could pursue agricultural employment.[150] However, the reality of the situation dictated that most of the transferees "would have to enter urban life" which would place the German economy under considerable stress unless "there was an increase in foreign trade."[151] Not only would the German economy be stressed by the transfer of population but the economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland would also suffer from the loss of skilled industrial laborers and productive agricultural workers of German descent.[152]

The American assessment of the transfer of Germans from East-Central Europe concluded that the United States government should oppose "the mass transfer of these peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities" but did acknowledge that the Sudeten Germans and *volksdeutsche* who had assisted the Nazis in the occupation of Poland and in the "National Socialist penetration of Europe" would be prime candidates for transfer.[153] The selection process for those deemed eligible for transfer would have to be determined after the establishment of an Inter-Allied Committee that would plan and

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[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.

organize any population transfers that were to occur after the war.[154] The study conceded that the transfer of Germans by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments after the war would bring peace to the region, but with peace would come economic and social difficulties for all nations involved.

Poland's German problem was more complicated than the one that faced Czechoslovakia because of the unknown finality of Poland's Western border and the large population of Germans who resided in former German territory that now belonged to Poland.[155] Most of the ten to twelve million Germans in the newly acquired Polish territories resided between the western Oder and eastern Neisse Rivers.[156] Polish officials knew that the Germans of the western territories would be very hard to incorporate into a new Polish nation as a result of the horrific German occupation of Poland during the war, which left in its wake widespread anti-German sentiment among Poles.[157] Six years of German rape and pillage of Poland's people and natural resources made compulsory transfer of the German population of the western territories a solution that would rid the Polish government of what it deemed to be a very serious threat to its internal stability.[158] Forced transfer was made a stronger possibility because Germans and "local *Volksdeutsche*, transferees from Germany and Reich Germans" were detested by the peasant population of Poland who vowed during the six long years of occupation that

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[154] Ibid.
[155] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 123.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.

they would exact revenge upon the Germans for the suffering Polish citizens endured during the war.[159] Expulsion of Germans was seen as one way to exact some revenge.

Poland and the Polish people had been subject to exploitation, brutalization, humiliation, and mass murder by their German occupiers during the war, and not surprisingly the Poles sought revenge against their former oppressors.[160] Following the war there "was a deep and natural hatred that was part of society" within Poland and was recognized by the United States (and the other Allies) as being a threat to long-term peace in the region if something were not done to relieve tensions between Germans and Poles.[161] British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt in January of 1944 that the Polish Government-in-exile made it clear that it wanted to be a strong independent nation after the war and that the Allies could contribute to their strength and independence by guaranteeing that they would "assist in expelling the Germans from the new territories assigned Poland."[162] Churchill also expressed concern about the formation of a new a Polish government in Warsaw backed by the Soviet Union that would "raise issues in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to the close accord of the Three Great Powers" that the future of the world so depended.[163] Then on February 5, Churchill conveyed to Roosevelt comments made by Josef Stalin during an

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[159] Schechtman, *Postwar Populations in Europe, 1945-1955,* 181.
[160] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 122.
[161] Ibid, 126.
[162] Prime Minister to President Roosevelt C-557, London, January 28, 1944, in *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence vol. II: Alliance Forged,* ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 686-688.
[163] Ibid, 688.

"interview" with Great Britain's Ambassador to the Soviet Union Archibald Clark Kerr that guaranteed not only would Poland be an independent nation but "she could count upon all he help she needed in expelling the Germans."[164] In November of 1944, President Roosevelt made it clear that if the Polish people and government "in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state" sought to "bring about the transfer to and from the territory of national minorities" the United States would not object as long as the transfers were a valid and practical solution to the problem of national minorities in Poland.[165] On December 19, 1944 United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman informed the State Department that both the Polish communist government in Lublin and London Polish leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk opposed Germans residing in the newly acquired Polish territories.[166] Harriman noted that the Soviet Union supported the westward expansion of Poland's border to the Oder-Neisse line because it justified the Soviet seizure of territory in Eastern Poland earlier in the war.[167]

The Big Three discussed Poland's final Western border and the fate of its large German minority population at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. President Roosevelt received a list of policy and strategy suggestions that had been agreed upon at

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[164] Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, C-566, London February 5, 1944.
[165] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955,* 185-186.
[166] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, December 19, 1944, in U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. III: The British Commonwealth and Europe,* (Washington D.C., GPO, 1966), 1348-1349.
http://www.digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1944v03
[167] Ibid.

the Malta Conference of 1944 by American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Regarding to Poland's German minority problem, Stettinius suggested to President Roosevelt that the United States "should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities" but if there were no other solution to the minority question transfer should be carried out gradually under international supervision.[168] American policy regarding the transfer of Germans from Poland's newly acquired territories at Yalta was based on pragmatism. On practical grounds, the United States opposed to the transfer of Germans by the Poles or Czechoslovaks, but American officials accepted the reality that the transfers were going to occur anyway and that the transfer of population was the only long-term solution to Poland's German minority dilemma.[169] As for the Western border of Poland American officials favored "the Curzon Line in the north and center and the southern border along the eastern line of Lwow province."[170]

Minutes from the February 6, 1945, Third Plenary Meeting of the Yalta Conference reveal that President Roosevelt declared the United States preference for the Curzon Line as the permanent western border of Poland.[171] Churchill echoed the American suggestion by stating that "after what Russia had been through the Curzon line

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[168] The Secretary of State to the President, Memorandum of Suggested Items for the President, February 2, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), 568. http://www.digital.library.wisc.ed/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945

[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Third Plenary Meeting: The Polish Question, 6 February 1945, *FRUS, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 667.

was not a decision of force but one of right."[172] Churchill went on to explain that the Polish "frontier was not of vital importance" to the British government which was more concerned with the "government structure" of postwar Poland.[173] Stalin disagreed, arguing that for the Soviet Union the location of the border was a strategic matter because Poland had been used many times as a corridor for attack on Russia with the most frequent aggressor being Germany.[174] Poland had been historically a weak nation and Stalin emphasized that the existence of a strong, independent and "democratic" Poland would ensure the security of the Soviet Union from a geographic standpoint.[175] Stalin solemnly stated it was a "question of Russian honor, life and death" and to accept the Curzon line would make Stalin himself less than Russian.[176] Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union needed the boundary of Poland to be extended farther west to the Oder-Neisse region, an idea both Great Britain and the United States opposed. [177]

Even as the Yalta Conference was underway, the Soviet Red Army was in the process of advancing westward to the Oder River, and a considerable portion of the German minority of Poland (and also many Poles) had fled west out of fear of a Red Army looking for vengeance.[178] In some cases however, members of the mistaken German minority returned to their ancestral homes rather than fleeing in the belief that

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[172] Ibid, 668.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid, 668-669.
[175] Ibid, 669.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955,* 186.
[178] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 124.

they had survived similar situations "for centuries" and chose to face the brunt of Soviet occupation.[179] Stalin assured the Allies that millions of Germans would flee the region out of fear of the Red Army as it entered the Oder-Neisse region which would necessitate very limited population transfers, if any at all.[180] At Yalta, therefore, the "Big Three" agreed that Poland should "receive substantial" territory in northeast Germany for suffering at the hands of Germany during the war and for land taken by the Soviet Union in the east.[181] The main point of disagreement amongst the Allies was over how far west the Polish border would be located.[182] The final press release of the Yalta Conference revealed the Allies agreed on the following:

> The three heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive to substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should therefore await the Peace Conference.[183]

FDR was preoccupied at Yalta with the American war effort in the Pacific and "found the Polish issue irritating."[184]He never really addressed the differences between the "Big Three" about Poland and instead focused on what was agreed upon by the

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[179] Ibid.
[180] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955,* 186.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Briefing Book Paper: Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, *FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, 230; Debra J. Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War* (Praeger: Westport, 2003), 19.
[184] Ibid.

Allies.[185] Historian Debrah Allen claims that FDR focused on the points of agreement regarding Poland in order to "give the appearance of Allied unity" on the issue.[186] Despite FDR's attempt to frame the Yalta Conference as a success back home, the truth of the matter was that the only decision made at Yalta that concerned the final position of Poland's western border was a decision to delay discussion on the matter until a final peace conference could be scheduled. The Yalta agreement was presented as a success by the FDR administration so as to avoid the United States being seen as weak or having given in to the Soviet Union. Far from being a success the Yalta agreement was fundamentally an agreement by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to discuss the final location of Poland's western border at a future peace conference and there was no guarantee that a final resolution could be reached at all. It was the decisions not made at Yalta that allowed the wild expulsions of spring and early summer of 1945 to transpire as they did.[187]

Czechoslovakian President Edouard Beněs's proposal to expel the Sudeten German minority from that nation does not make him solely responsible for the largest episode of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century.[188] Beněs had three accomplices in Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.[189] Stalin's support of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and especially the new Polish territories is

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[185] Ibid, 17.

[186] Ibid, 18.
[187] Ibid.
[188] R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 37.
[189] Ibid.

understandable, as was Churchill's considering the geopolitical situation during and after the war. But United States approval of the expulsion of Germans is both explicable and inexplicable. It was explicable in that the expulsion of Germans was probably going to happen whether the U.S. was involved or not and by being a part of the process the U.S. had some control over when, where and how the expulsions were to take place but not total control of the situation. United States approval of the expulsions was inexplicable and it seemed as though the removal of large swaths of Germans from their historic homelands countered the ideological base of morality and justice on which the United States was founded upon and ran counter to why American soldiers were sent to Europe. War and its immediate aftermath however, is a place where reality and ideology collide, and the attainment of peace is more complex than the onset of war.

CHAPTER IV

FROM WILD EXPULSIONS TO ALLIED SANCTIONED ETHNIC CLEANSING

This chapter describes and examines the transition from the unorganized wild expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories that began in the spring of 1945 to the Allied-regulated expulsions that began in January 1946. The most significant thing about the transition is that, despite the beginning of Allied oversight of the expulsions and the orderly and humane decree contained in Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement the expulsions continued to be disorganized and brutal. The Potsdam Agreement only improved the efficiency and decreased the brutality of the expulsions to a limited extent. The post-Potsdam expulsion process continued to be characterized by the inhumane destruction of deeply rooted distinct historical cultures in the heart of Europe

The delayed decision on Poland's final western border at Yalta provided the Czechoslovakian and Polish Governments with a brief period in which both nations could expel as many of their German minority populations as possible to present a future peace conference with a *fait accompli* and prevent the Allies from stopping or regulating the

expulsions.[1] This first phase of the post-World War II population transfers lasted from approximately May through August 1945 and became known as the period of wild expulsions.[2] On August 2, 1945 Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement declared that all population transfers would henceforth be administered and regulated by the Allied Control Council (ACC) and stipulated that all transfers be conducted in an orderly and humane manner. Article XIII ushered in the second phase of population transfer, the "organized expulsions" of early winter 1946 through 1947, and was followed by sporadic expulsions that continued into the 1950s.[3]

The Wild Expulsions

Several months before the wild expulsion of the Sudeten German population of Czechoslovakia began, Czechoslovakian President Edouard Beněs claimed "I have discussed this matter with leaders of the Russian and British Governments, and I am determined that these Germans must go."[4] Beněs was referring to the 2.8 million Sudeten Germans who resided in Czechoslovakian territory. Even though he spoke of their transfer from his nation in terms of legality, humanity and international cooperation the chaotic conditions at the end of the war provided him with an opportunity to expel a large portion of Czechoslovakia's German minority before the United States and the Western

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[1] Eagle Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947," In *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 205.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] John MacCormac, "Sudeten Germans Must Go, Benes Says, Or Czechoslovakia Will Be Torn by Civil War," *New York Times;* 22 *February 1945, 18.*

Allies could react by implementing international guidelines and regulations for the expulsion process. In Czechoslovakia the wild expulsions began after the capitulation of the German army in spring of 1945 and continued through early August.[5] During this chaotic period, the Czechoslovakian government and independent organizations at the local level such as military local branches of the Czech National Guard and county administration offices issued deportation orders and random groups of Czech vigilantes, with full support of the Soviet Union, and expelled approximately 750,000 Sudeten Germans.[6] Although the Western Allies did not approve unilateral expulsion of the Sudeten Germans they did make it clear that they supported expulsion in accordance with international guidance as approved at a peace conference.[7]

As the Soviet Army headed west toward Germany many Germans fled the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia fearing the worst whereas others decided to stay in a stubborn refusal to leave their historical *heimat.*[8] The disintegration of the German army combined with the appearance of Soviet and United States troops created a "political void in Prague" that contributed greatly to the ruthlessness and chaotic atmosphere in Czechoslovakia.[9] Even though the Beněs government arrived in Prague on May 13, 1945 to assume power, there was still no real central authority in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1945 and this vacuum was particularly evident in the Sudetenland.[10] New

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[5] Alfred De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans* (London: Routledge Keegan & Paul, 1978), 90-93.
[6] Ibid, 205
[7] Ibid, 80.
[8] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,* 268.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 203.

Czechoslovakian authorities and patriotic organizations such as the Czechoslovak Army (CSR), District National Committees, National Security Corps (NSB), and various paramilitary groups, exerted control on the ground in the Sudetenland and "wanted revenge on any Germans they could find."[11] Despite the fact that the Czechoslovak government had power in name only at this point, President Beněs made it easier to expel the Germans when he issued the Benes Decrees on May 19, 1945. These decrees stripped the Sudeten Germans of their official minority standing in law and required them to wear white armbands at all times to identify their place as outsiders in Czechoslovakian society.[12] The Sudeten Germans received smaller food rations, were forbidden to use public communication, had restricted shopping rights, could not visit public places of amusement, had their German language schools closed, and were subject to conscription as laborers on farms and factories to repair "Czech infrastructure destroyed during the war."[13] Already hated thanks to the brutal German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans were no longer citizens of their own nation and no legal protections remained to shield them from whatever atrocities might be meted out.

Most Czechoslovakians wanted the Sudeten Germans gone as quickly as possible, which helps to explain the wild expulsions.[14] They occurred under "very harsh conditions" and those expelled from their homeland were only made aware of their fate a

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[11] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,* 269-270.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.

few hours before they were to be gathered for transport by train to the Soviet zone of occupation.[15] The only Sudeten Germans allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia were the few who had acquired Czechoslovak citizenship or who could prove they had never committed a crime against the Czechoslovakian people.[16] As the wild expulsions progressed all ethnic Germans were deemed collectively guilty for German acts of brutality committed during the wartime occupation.[17] Consequently "some local members of the Czechoslovak Army" and members of "local revolutionary committees" planned and ordered the removal of Germans from "towns and villages" in June and July of 1945.[18] Conducted with brutal indifference the wild expulsions were accompanied by a complete absence of mercy.[19] While rounded-up for deportation many Germans were randomly murdered. [20] Some were hung by their heels from trees, soaked with gasoline and set on fire by their Czechoslovakian countrymen.[21]

Another method used to expel the Sudeten Germans was the use of death marches such as the one that occurred on May 30, 1945, when the entire German population of Brünn (Brno), which numbered approximately 30,000 people (all of the German citizens of Brünn), were gathered by Czechoslovakian authorities and marched approximately forty-five miles to makeshift camps located near the Austrian border where they awaited

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[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, 270-271.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid, 272; Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 115.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

final expulsion.[22] An estimated 1,700 Germans perished during various inhumane marches from their historical homes into a future of harsh uncertainty.[23] From the moment the Sudeten Germans were forcibly removed from their homes they were subject to seizure of property and personal belongings, vigilante and mob violence, imprisonment, torture, starvation and rape in the case of women and young girls. [24] Martha Zatschek along with her daughter and father were expelled from their residence in Brünn on May 30, 1945, when a group of seven men gave notification that they were to leave immediately.[25] After refusing to sign her property over to the Czechoslovakian government Zatschek and her family were told not to bring along too much luggage as they would be walking to their destination.[26] Russian soldiers confiscated jewelry, currency and other items of value during the march to Eichorngasse, where the expellee's certificates of domicile were processed.[27] Upon departure from Eichorngasse the expellees' were urged to travel faster as the slow were beat with whips and machine gun fire gave further warning to the slow afoot to pick up the pace.[28] Strangely enough the expellees were frequently searched for cameras during the trek that ended at a camp near

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[22] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred,* 119.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Benjamin Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 54-55.
[25] Theodor Schieder, ed., *Documents on the Expulsion of Germans from Eastern-Central Europe, Vol. IV: No. 97 Report of the Experience of Frau Martha Zatschek of Brünn*, trans. G.H. de Sausmarez (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1960), 477-478.
[26] Ibid, 478.
[27] Ibid, 479-480.
[28] Ibid, 480.

Pohrlitz in order to keep pictures of the brutal ordeal from leaving Czechoslovakia.[29] There was little food available at Pohrlitz and many of the elderly and young perished, including Zatschek's father.[30] Eventually, Zatschek and her daughter were notified by camp officials that they were to be sent to Austria where they had relatives.[31] Those without relatives in Austria were to be transported to the Soviet Union.[32]

Most shocking of all was that instead of accepting the fate of expulsion many Sudeten Germans chose suicide after their property had been confiscated by Czech authorities.[33] Approximately 5,000 mass suicides occurred in towns and villages, and in some agricultural areas, the suicides "were well planned affairs with Sudeten Germans adorned in everyday dress, flowers and religious symbols" worn by those who chose to take their lives rather than leave their home and face the uncertain fate of an expellee.[34] As a police doctor in the area around the town of Brüx, Sudeten German Dr. Karl Grimm estimated that there had been 600 to 700 suicides between May and August of 1945.[35] Grimm performed inquests on the bodies of a number of those that committed suicide and attributed the acts to a pre-expulsion "wave of panic fear, desperation and insanity" in

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[29] Ibid, 481.
[30] Ibid, 483-486.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid, 488.
[33] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 117.
[34] Ibid. Chad Bryant, *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 239.
[35] Theodor Schieder, ed., *Documents on the Expulsion of Germans from Eastern-Central Europe, Vol. IV: No. 99 Report of the Experiences of Dr. Karl Grimm, Doctor of Medicine in Brüx*, 489.

response to the uncertainty of what was sure to be a cruel fate at the hands of the Czechs.[36]

Witness to the wild expulsion was the United States Third Army commanded by General George S. Patton, which had moved into the Czechoslovakian region of Bohemia in late April 1945.[37] By May 4, American forces had taken the Egerland but then halted along the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line the farthest points east of the U.S. occupation.[38] As a result, American forces only occupied the area of Southwest Bohemia because Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to avoid conflict with Soviet forces, which occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.[39] American soldiers who entered Southwest Czechoslovakia in late April of 1945 were an "indifferent well-disciplined force" that had no opinion on Czech-Sudeten German relations.[40] Once U.S. troops witnessed the ruthless Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans, however, they developed a negative attitude toward "the liberated Czech people" and dropped their shield of "neutrality" regarding Czech implementation of the wild expulsions.[41] The Sudeten Germans called on American troops to "intervene" in many instances during the brief occupation of

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Alfred De Zayas, *A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of East-European Germans, 1950-1944* (New Tork: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 89.
[38] Ibid.
[39] The Ambassador in France (Caffrey) to the Secretary of State. May 6, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Vol. IV, Europe,* (Washington, D.C: GPO. 1968), 447-448. Http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUSv04
[40] Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 203-204.
[41] de Zayas, *After the Revenge,* 90.

Bohemia.[42] Nevertheless, not all Americans were sympathetic to the plight of the Sudeten Germans Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Laurence A. Steinhardt criticized American troops for being too friendly toward the Sudeten Germans.[43] He asserted they were protecting the Germans from Czech brutality, which was not the job of an American soldier.[44]

Most American soldiers and diplomatic officials became disturbed at Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans that they witnessed as the wild expulsions gained a cruel momentum.[45] The Czechs on the other hand wanted the American military to leave so that the Soviet Red Army would occupy Bohemia, which would mean that the Sudeten Germans could lose their protection from acts of Czech viciousness.[46] The United States military did protect the Sudeten Germans from Czech violence but the American occupation force also participated in the transport of Sudeten Germans into Germany and Austria in an unofficial capacity.[47] During a June 1-2, 1945 reparations conference held between the Czechoslovakian Ministry for Protection of Labor and Social Welfare and representatives of the United States Third Army, the Czech Government requested American assistance in the transfer of 2,500 repatriates back to Czechoslovakia from locations in Austria and Germany, and asked that the Americans carry Sudeten Germans

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[42] Ibid.
[43] Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 203-204.
[44] Ibid.
[45] MacAlister Brown, "The Diplomacy of Bitterness: Genesis of the Potsdam Decision to Expel Germans from Czechoslovakia," *The Western Political Quarterly* 11, No. 3 (September 1958): 623.
[46] Frommer, *National Cleansing,* 44-45.
[47] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955,* 70.

with them on the return trip to Germany.[48] Evidence of the American participation in the actual expulsion of Sudeten Germans is contained in a June 17, 1945 *Washington Post* article that reveals that the Fifth Corps of the United States Third Army had been complicit in the removal of approximately 1,000 Germans per day from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia.[49] The Germans were transferred by the truckload to "points beyond the Danube River" from where the trucks returned with Czech, Russian and Polish occupants who had been selected for repatriation.[50] Czech historian Tomas Stanek also cites the involvement of United States forces in the deportation of Germans from Czechoslovakia in June 1945 from the accounts of Czech military leaders.[51]

In fact, the role of American occupation forces in the transfer of Sudeten Germans remained ambivalent. At the same time that some American troops were transporting Germans out of Czechoslovakia others were preventing the transfer of Sudeten Germans by blocking roads leading to Germany from the American occupied zone.[52] The Third Army closed these in order to prevent the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from creating operational difficulties for the U.S. military caring for Germans in American-occupied Germany.[53] Ivo Ducháchek, private secretary to Hubert Ripka an influential advisor of Edouard Benes, complained to Third Army officials about the road closures

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[48] Ibid.
[49] Edward Angly, "Germans Still Big Czech Worry, " *Washington Post*, 17 June 1945.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Tomas Stanek, *Verfolgung 1945: Die Stellung der Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schliesen: Aßerhalb der Lager Gefängnisse* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2002), 72.
[52] John MacCormac, "U.S., Britain Block Sudeten's Exodus," *New York Times*, 17 June 1945.
[53] Ibid.

halting the expulsions, but the complaint was summarily ignored and the Sudeten Germans enjoyed a brief respite.[54] American military policy in the expulsion of Germans was unauthorized, based upon the needs of the Army in relation to situations presented at various locations throughout American-occupied Czechoslovakia, and was not inline with any United States government policy, which had yet to be configured.

There was no official United States policy concerning the wild expulsions, which is revealed by the words American Chargé d' Affaires in Czechoslovakia Edward Klieforth's answer to the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs James W. Riddleburger's inquiry into the course of United States action concerning the expulsions.[55] Klieforth reported to Riddleberger that because there was no international agreement regarding the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland, nothing should be done to stop them, and the United States would not act to deter the Czech objectives of population transfer.[56] Klieforth also emphasized that American leaders had made the decision to wait until an internationally agreed policy had been implemented regarding the expulsion of Germans from all of East-Central Europe not just Czechoslovakia.[57] In

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[54] Detlef Brandes, *Der Weg Zur Vertreibung 1938-1945: Pläne Entscheidungen zum, Transfer' der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und aus Polen* (Münich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001.), 381-382.
[55] James W. Riddleburger Chief of Central European Affairs to American Charge' d' Affaires in Czechoslovakia to Edward Klieforth, December 7, 1945, Czechoslovakian Collection, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt Box 47, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[56] Ibid.
[57] *The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Klieforth), July 13, 1945, in* U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945: Vol. II, General: Political and Economic Matters,* (Washington, D.C., 1967), 1264.

July 1945, acting United States Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew told Klieforth that the expulsion of Germans "should be carried out only on organized lines and in accordance with an international agreement."[58] These instructions emanated from Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) William J. Donovan's recommendation to the president that the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia would "best be dealt with by the Allies in the form of a tripartite agreement.[59] Donovan suggested that such an agreement would be advantageous and would enable the Allies to "ease the stress" of the transfers and eliminate many problems they would otherwise present.[60]

Czech vigilantes who now controlled the Sudetenland expelled approximately 660,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia during the wild expulsions.[61] According to Benjamin Frommer, this ethnic cleansing of Sudeten Germans was "more violent and lasted longer" than it should have.[62] Frommer also explains that the wild expulsion of Sudeten Germans was "not the result of the war" but rather the product of decisions made and not made by Czechoslovak President Edouard Beněs.[63] Although the Beněs administration had taken over during a power vacuum he possessed the authority to speak against the expulsions and implement measures that would have at least limited the violence that accompanied them. Instead Beněs did and said nothing and by doing nothing he basically gave approval to the "vigilante violence" utilized by Czechs as a

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[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid, 1256.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Frommer, *National Cleansing:* 31.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

"way to maximize the flight of the Sudeten Germans" out of Czechoslovakia so fewer would have to be deported at a later time.[64] It was the Benes government that "created conditions for anarchy to spread" in the Sudetenland first by policy decisions made in exile and later by the creation of the Beněs Decrees.[65] In all fairness given the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people toward Sudeten Germans and Germans in general. it is highly likely that any government intervention to stop the violence and the expulsions would not have worked and possibly would have caused the Benes government unwanted problems at a time when its power was not fully established.

Change was the predominant dynamic in Czechoslovakia during the time of the wild expulsions as the nation was in the process of transforming itself, under the direction of Benes, "to a national state from a state of nationalities" through the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and Hungarians.[66] The removal of unwanted nationalities conducted by the Czechoslovak Army and patriotic organizations, such as District National Committees and the National Security Corps along with assistance from various paramilitary groups and government officials at the local level faced no political opposition within Czechoslovakia at the time because all of the six major parties supported the expulsions.[67] There was no opposition to the expulsions because the political infrastructure of Czechoslovakia consisted of "a formal coalition of six major

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[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*, 268; Frommer, *National Cleansing*, 28-31.

political parties (four Czech and two Slovak)" that included the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), Social Democratic Party (CSD), National Socialist Party (CSNS), the People's Party (CSL), Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), and the Democratic Party (DS) which was also a Slovakian party all of whom wanted the Germans removed from Czechoslovakia.[68]

German historian Theodor Schieder, a former Nazi and author of the *Polendenkschrift* memorandum that recommended the removal of minority populations in Poland so as to achieve a racially pure Germanic state, asserts that even though "no central authority" had been officially charged with implementation of the expulsion process after the war, the wild expulsions of summer 1945 could not have been executed "without the order and knowledge" of officials in the uppermost reaches of the Czechoslovakian government.[69] By allowing the wild expulsions to occur without formal Czech government interference Benes got rid of an unwanted troublesome minority and deferred the problem to the United States (and Great Britain).

Whereas Czechoslovakia's wild expulsions were all about removing a troublesome minority population from the country Poland's wild expulsions were tied to the final determination of the country's western border. The parameters for Poland's border laid out at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, where the United States

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[68] Ibid.
[69] Glassheim, *The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing*, 217n; Theodor Schieder, ed. *Documents on the Expulsion of Germans from Eastern-Central Europe, Vol. I: The Expulsion of the German Population from Czechoslovakia,* tran. G.H. Sausmarez (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1960), 106.

delegation that included President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), made it clear that the western border of Poland was to be one that would "minimize future points of friction, possible irredentism" and reduce the number of "minority groups which would have to be transferred" as a result of the border's location.[70] Going into Yalta the United States favored the "Curzon Line in the north and center and in the south," and the eastern border of Lwów Province which was in line with the 1919 treaty.[71] Stalin so disliked the Curzon Line that he boldly stated: "I prefer the war to last a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany."[72] British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also opposed the western Neisse, which he knew would never be approved by the British War Cabinet.[73] Eventually, the three great powers agreed on the Curzon Line as the eastern border of Poland and that the "final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland" would be decided at a future peace conference.[74]

According to historian Debra Allen the United States delegation to the Yalta Conference, which consisted of presidential advisers and State Department officials, dedicated many hours of preparation to the position of Poland's western border prior to the conference.[75] But once the conference was underway, early talk between the American, British and Russian delegations veered primarily toward the composition of

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[70] Allen,*The Oder-Neisse Line* 15-16
[71] The Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President: Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for the President, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1945: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1955), 568.
[72] Ibid, 680.
[73] Ibid, 898
[74] Ibid, 934.
[75] Allen, *The Oder*-Neisse *Line*, 17.

Poland's postwar government and other matters.[76] The base agreement at Yalta referred only to the postwar Polish Government and contained "no mention of boundaries, a deletion that was pointed out by Churchill.[77] Both Churchill and Stalin thought "Poland's frontiers should be included in the communiqué" a suggestion that Roosevelt, who had a nonchalant attitude toward the border issue, opposed but eventually acquiesced to in the spirit of cooperation and unity[78] Before issues such as border location could be approached, the Allies agreed to establish a provisional government to be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, charged with holding free elections based on the concept of "universal suffrage and secret ballot."[79] The agreement also declared that Poland was to receive ample territory in the north and west and the final delineation of Poland's border was to be discussed at a future peace conference.[80]

Theodor Schieder explains that the decision to expel Germans after the war was a "subsidiary" product of the Yalta negotiations, which focused more on the political makeup of the Polish government than the location of Poland's western border.[81] The

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Richard C. Lukas, *The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941-1945* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1978) 141; Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line*, 19.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Working Draft of the Protocol Proceedings Revised by the Foreign Ministers, Territorial Trusteeship: Poland, 11 February 1945, *FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*: 938.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Theodor Schieder, ed., *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from East-Central Europe, Vol I.: The Expulsion of the German Population from Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line,* trans. Vivian Stranders (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1950), 104.

removal of Germans from the new Polish territories seemed to the participants at Yalta to be a harmless and by no a means inhuman exchange or transfer of population."[82] Schieder also explains that the expulsions became inevitable at Yalta and thus set the stage for the reorganization of the "political and ethnographic" structure of East-Central Europe.[83]

In the months following the Yalta Conference Polish leaders jumped into an "immediate reaction" to "purify" the border area and all of the newly acquired territories of the much-hated Germans.[84] The Polish Worker's Party (PPR) made it clear on May 26, 1945 that it was in favor of all Germans being removed from the new "Western territories" and party official Edward Ochab subsequently stated "we need to think how we will expel these 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 Germans" from the newly acquired territories.[85] Local and regional government officials in Poland supported the removal of Germans from the western territories, which was reinforced by remarks made by the Governor of Upper Silesia, Aleksander Zawodzki who declared "we will drive this little herd to the other bank of the Oder."[86] The proposed expulsion of Germans received fervent support from former Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk who would go on to be a Deputy Prime Minister in the postwar Polish

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[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Stanislaw Jankowiak, "Cleansing Poland of Germans: The Province of Pomerania, 1945-1949," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe,1944-1948,* eds. Philip Therand Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 88.

[85] Ibid, 89.

[86] Ibid.

Government of National Unity.[87] Mikolajczyk spoke very aggressively and militantly about the need for Poland to make ridding itself of a cruel, nasty and unwanted German population from the new western territories a "national act" for the preservation of the Polish nation.[88]

The Polish Army functioned as an impetus for Germans to "voluntarily flee" the new Polish territories.[89] Commander of the Polish Army Naczelne Dowództwo Wojska Polskiego issued an order to Polish soldiers that demanded that the "Germans should be dealt with in the same way they treated us" and suggested that no Pole should ever forget "what the Germans have done to our children, wives, and elderly."[90] As in Czechoslovakia, in Poland the period May through July 1945 was "a time of great flux and uncertainty" that heavily influenced "the Potsdam decision on transfers from East-Central Europe."[91] Before a peace conference could occur the Poles were determined to rid the new territories of as many Germans as they could so as to create a *fait accompli* before the Allies could get involved and administer and control the process as part of an international peace agreement.[92] The period of the wild expulsions in Poland witnessed the ruthless and violent rape of German women as a method of revenge against the

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[87] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 124.

[88] Ibid.
[89] Jankowiak, *Cleansing Poland of Germans*, 89.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Public Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford Univetsity Press, 2007), 94.
[92] Krystyna Kersten, "Forced Migration and the Transformation of Polish Society in the Postwar period," in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948,* ed. Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 87.

Germans for war crimes committed against Poles under the Nazi occupation.[93] As was the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union supported the wild expulsions and received a large number of expellees into their zone of occupation in Germany.[94]

From May through June 26, 1945, approximately 10,000 to 40,000 Germans a day were expelled from the new western territories of Poland along the Oder-Neisse Line, primarily from Brandenburg, Danzig, Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia.[95] Germans in these areas had resided there for hundreds of years and it was very difficult for them to grasp the reality that they were to be expelled from their historic homeland forever.[96] When the time for expulsion came Polish officials gave the Germans only minutes to gather personal belongings and allowed them to carry only twenty kilograms (44 lbs.) of luggage.[97] The process varied from region to region and even from town to town because these expulsions were improvised by local and military officials.[98] In the newly acquired territories the Second Polish Army did most of the dirty work "in accordance with the Ministry of Public Administration" which oversaw the expulsions in a very disorganized way.[99] In Silesia Germans were expelled by armed escorts and many Germans disappeared during the process of expulsion.[100] In Neumarkt a town located west of

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[93] Ibid, 89.

[94] Ibid, 90.
[95] Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 234-235.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid, 235.
[99] T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945-1960* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 53.
[100] Lieberman, *A Terrible Fate*, 235.

Breslau, the Polish militia tore down doors and told the Germans to be prepared to leave within two hours, and the victims were then taken on a long march and abandoned by their military escort.[101]

Three characteristics of the wild expulsion of Germans from the newly acquired Polish territories are of note. First, even before the convening of the Potsdam Conference, the new Polish leaders of the former German territories possessed a steely resolve to expel Germans as expediently as possible by utilizing "systematic pressure and repeated demand" along with military force.[102] Second, the expulsions were unorganized and truly wild and violent in nature. Finally, the Polish wild expulsions were much less well documented by governmental agencies of the Western Allies than the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. As a result, the final total of Germans expelled by Poland from the new territories during the wild expulsions is unknown because no official statistics were compiled by any of the parties involved or those who monitored the situation from a distance such as the United States and Great Britain.[103] Historian Stanislaw Jankowiak notes that Polish researchers assert some 200,000 to 1,300,000 Germans were expelled from the New Polish territories whereas a German study claims approximately 250,000 Germans were expelled by the Poles.[104] The only certainty is that

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[101] Ibid.
[102] Schieder, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe: Vol. I,* 108.
[103] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1945-1955*: 206-207.
[104] Jankowiak, "Cleansing Poland of Germans," 89.

there are no definitive numbers on how many Germans were expelled. European historians still hotly debate the total number of Germans expelled in the summer of 1945.

The Poles' *modus operandi* was identical to the Czechs' in that they were all about revenge against the Germans for what had been done to Poland during the occupation and ridding it of Germans in order to make Poland a homogenous nation before the Allies could react. There was however one striking difference between the Czech and Polish cases, which was that the American military occupied the region of Southwest Bohemia in Czechoslovakia, but there was no U.S. presence whatsoever inside Poland during this process. Despite being occupied by the Nazis for the duration of the war, Czechoslovakia emerged intact without any loss of territory. With no outside interference in the spring and summer of 1945, and the wild expulsion of Germans "over fulfilled expectations of Polish authorities by allowing them to rid Poland of more Germans than they thought realistically possible."[105]

The Quest for Order

The atmosphere at the July-August Potsdam Conference was quite different than it had been at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Unlike Yalta Potsdam focused on the intertwined issues of "Poland's western border and the treatment of Germany.[106] Harry S. Truman was now President of the United States, Germany had capitulated and the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity had been instituted.[107] Thus

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[105] Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Polands1945-1950,* 53.
[106] Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line*, 21.
[107] Ibid.

"differences among the Allies that had been ignored became more and more evident" at the onset of the Potsdam Conference.[108] These differences were enhanced by the Soviet Union's placing German lands that were to be part of the Soviet Zone of Occupation under Polish administration, which was done out of "military necessity" and justified by the Soviets under the addendum of the Yalta Accord pertaining to the Polish acquisition of German territory.[109]

Going into the Potsdam Conference the main objective of the United States was to "avoid decisions on territorial issues" and defer them for discussion at future peace conference.[110] Whereas Great Britain preferred to deal with territorial questions at Potsdam, the United States wanted to delay territorial discussion and pursue "joint policies for the conduct of the war in the Far East and to foster preparations for a peace conference."[111] However, the placing of German territory in East Prussia up to the Oder-Neisse line and the Free City of Danzig under Polish administration by the Soviet Union forced the United States and Great Britain to deal with territorial issues at Potsdam.[112] The U.S. delegation believed that the Soviet transfer of territory to Poland was an "infringement" of the Yalta Accord and the Allied agreement pertaining to Germany.[113] By adding such a large swath of "German territory" to Poland "the transfer of some"

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[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1960), 155-156.
[111] Ibid, 156.
[112] Briefing Book Paper, Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, *FRUS 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), I*: 743.
[113] Ibid, 743-744.

8,000,000 to 10,000,000 Germans became a real possibility, but more importantly, Poland would become dependent on the Soviet Union "for protection against German irredentist demands and in fact might become a full-fledged Soviet satellite."[114]

New American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wanted to implement measures at Potsdam that would slow the transfers so as to make them less haphazard and violent in nature.[115] Byrnes was a pragmatist and realized that the expulsion of Germans was never going to be halted completely but could at least be monitored by the Allies so that the focus of the Czechs and Poles would be on the expulsion the Germans, not the pursuit of revenge for war atrocities committed by the Nazis.[116] Soviet leader Josef Stalin represented the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments at Potsdam and explained to the United States and Great Britain that the expulsions were a *fait accompli* and the Czechoslovaks and the Poles were "powerless to stop them."[117] On July 25, 1945, Stalin proposed the Oder-Neisse Line be set as the permanent position of Poland's western border, which would effectively cede East Prussia, Upper Silesia, the Free City of Danzig and Pomerania to Poland as compensation for suffering and territory lost in the east to the Soviet Union during the war.[118] Stalin preferred the Oder-Neisse Line because it would reduce the size of Germany and increase the buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union. Stalin so influenced Poland's new government that Poland and the Soviet Union

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[114] Ibid, 743-744.
[115] Curp, *A Clean Sweep?* 53
[116] Ibid.
[117] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*: 279.
[118] Debra Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line*: *The United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 22.

were basically two nations run by a common leader during the early postwar years. Internally Soviet and Polish leaders knew that they had to rid the newly acquired territories of their German minority population and replace them with Polish citizens, an act that would strengthen Poland by shedding itself of a loathed and troublesome population making Poland an ethnically homogenous state.[119]

The Soviet Union wanted Poland's western border to extend to the Oder-Neisse line in part so the Poles would more easily accept the loss of territory in the east.[120] United States officials desired a "less radical solution," one that focused on achieving "permanent peace and tranquility in Europe."[121] In order to achieve this the U.S. State Department pursued a strategy at Potsdam that recommended Poland be awarded the Free City of Danzig, most of East Prussia, a small portion of German Pomerania "west of the so-called Polish Corridor" so that Poland would possess a larger sea coast and the predominantly Polish region of Upper Silesia[122] This would decrease the geographical size of Poland and also minimize the number of Germans that would need to be transferred.[123] The Western Allies opposed the Oder-Neisse line and proposed that the Western border of Poland extend to the Oder River and no further because there was no

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[119] Ibid.
[120] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. I, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), Briefing Book Paper: Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960), 745.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid, 146.
[123] Ibid.

"historic or ethnic justification for the cession of this area to Poland" and it would create geopolitical, economic and demographic problems.[124]



Figure 2 The Oder Neisse Line[125]

It was imperative for the State Department that the United States and Great Britain present a united front on the boundary issue so that they did not "work for cross purposes" and in order to prevent the Soviets presenting them with a *fait accompli* on

[124] Ibid, 754: De Zayas, *After the Revenge*, 85.

[125] Wikipedia Commons.

Poland's western border.[126] But above all, the U.S. did not want to "acquiesce to the Soviet interpretation" of Poland's western boundary, which included the area between the Oder and Neisse rivers, and if a final border solution was to obtained the U.S. would assist the Poles in the orderly transfer of their German minority.[127] However, a final solution concerning Poland's western border was neither expected or desired by the United States, which wanted the border issue to be decided at a future peace conference[128] Therefore the big accomplishment at Potsdam was that the Oder-Neisse line became the temporary western border of Poland because the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain agreed to reaffirm their opinion that the final position of the western frontier of Poland should await a peace settlement.[129] Even though the United States and Great Britain did not recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the official western border of Poland they did agree to allow the Poles to transfer the German population out of its newly acquired western territories.[130]

Although the United States was wary of the Soviet Union at the time American officials realized that allowing the expulsions to occur was a "satisfactory compromise" to a "chaotic" situation in regions where the United States had no physical control.[131] In

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[126] Briefing Book Paper, Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, *FRUS, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) I*: 746.
[127] Ibid, 747; 782. Brandes, *Der Weg zur Vertreibung, 404.*

[128] Briefing Book Paper, Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, *FRUS, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) I*: 756-757.
[129] James K. Pollock, James H. Meisel and Henry L. Bretton, *Germany Under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents* (Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing, 1949), 22.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line*, 30.

the grand scheme of things United States postwar policy toward the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere was of minimal importance. World War II had been a global war for the United States (and Great Britain) and after emerging from the war as one of the two great world powers (the other being the Soviet Union) the United States had more than just the fate of Germans in East-Central Europe on its plate. As the strongest military and economic postwar western ally the United States had assumed by default the responsibility for rebuilding the infrastructure and the feeding and housing the refugees of most of Europe. Obviously the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland was just one of many policy challenges that faced the United States after World War II. Under no circumstances was the United States about to risk offending the Soviet Union to defend the homes of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia and Germans of Poland's newly acquired western territories because there was no sound strategic reason to do so.

Another factor that contributed to the Western Allies acquiescence to the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories was that the United States and Great Britain underestimated how many Germans were to be expelled, especially from Poland.[132] American sources had informed President Truman that approximately 9,000,000 Germans were located in the Oder-Neisse region to be administered by Poland.[133] Stalin explained at Potsdam that a large number of Germans east of the Oder-Neisse had died or been killed during the war and as a result there were

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[132] de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*, 86.
[133] Ibid.

no Germans present in the new Polish territory.[134] Polish delegates to the Potsdam Conference estimated approximately 1,500,000 Germans remained in the Oder-Neisse region and further explained that they were not permanent residents and would be leaving the area after the fall harvest.[135]

When it came to the number of Germans left in the new Polish territories in the Oder-Neisse region, the Western Allies were at the mercy of the Soviet Union and Poland who used misinformation "subterfuge and fraudulent measures" during the Potsdam negotiations over the expulsions.[136] Such a negotiation strategy was pursued by the Soviets and the Poles because they wanted the Germans gone and feared the Western Allies might refuse to allow the expulsions if they knew exactly how many Germans were to be expelled.[137] Having been deceived by the Soviets and Poles, the United States (and Great Britain) agreed to the expulsions and assumed responsibility to prevent "crowding and starvation" during the expulsion process by the "feeding and housing" of expellees once they arrived in Germany.[138] What resulted from the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies was Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, which allowed for the orderly and humane transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, but more importantly it placed the expulsion process under international administration and regulation.[139] One stipulation of Article

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[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid, 87.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1945-1955:* 75.

XIII was the agreement of Czechoslovakia and Poland to halt the expulsions until the Allied Control Council could implement "time and ration ordinates" that would schedule the transport and distribution of the expellees in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany.[140]

Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement pertaining to The Orderly Transfer of Germans stated that after much consultation the Allies had decided to recognize the transfer of the German populations of the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia to the various Allied zones of occupation.[141] However, any transfers were to be conducted in and orderly and humane manner.[142] The remainder of Article XIII called for the Allied Control council to valuate the situation and put forth specifications for the time, rate and distribution of the transfers in a way that would lessen the economic and logistical burden facing the Allies in Germany.[143]

For the United States and Great Britain, Article XIII was intended to establish some sense of order to an expulsion process which was a much more appealing solution to the German minority problem than the most probable alternatives, uncontrollable chaos or a probable war against the USSR and Poland, a decision the United States "refused to consider after years of fighting a common enemy together."[144] In effect Article XIII legitimized the expulsions that prior to Potsdam were performed with no

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[140] Ibid.

[141] Pollock, James H. Meisel and Henry L. Bretton, *Germany Under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents*, 23.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid.
[144] de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*, 38.

legal basis or consideration as to how such expulsions would impact the European demographic and political landscape.[145] Utilization of the Allied Control Council to schedule and regulate the expulsions made the process an "international undertaking."[146] More importantly, the legitimacy given to Article XIII by the Western Allies gave the act of population transfer by forced expulsion a "certain mantle of legality and respectability" to what was in reality ethnic cleansing.[147] Legality to the Western Allies meant that Czechoslovakia and Poland knew that their "treatment and ultimate expulsion" of their German minorities had to abide by international rules and regulations.[148]

Somewhat Orderly and Somewhat Humane

Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement required the expulsion of Germans by Czechoslovakia and Polish governments be halted until the ACC could find logistical solutions that would assist in making the expulsions as orderly and humane as possible. Officially the Czechs agreed to stop the expulsions until the ACC presented its plan for the expulsions but that failed to stop the inhumane treatment of the Sudeten Germans.[149] Czech cruelty continued as it had during the period of wild expulsions but on a smaller scale.[150] By allowing the disorganized expulsions to occur during the dead period

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[145] Schechtman, *Population Transfers in Postwar Europe*: 58.
[146] Ibid.
[147] de Zayas, *Nemesis At Potsdam*, 89.

[148] Turnwald, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans*, XIII.
[149] Glassheim,"The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 208.
[150] Ralph Parker, "Czechs and Sudetens," *The Nation*, September 29, 1945, 307-309.

prescribed by Article XIII the Czechoslovakian government violated the agreement.[151] The Czechs expelled Germans without allowing the ACC time to evaluate the situation and obtain information, such as the number of Germans to be transferred, their age, sex and occupation of which would aid in smoothing the expulsion process and safeguarding the expellees.[152] American officials knew that the continuation of "certain transfers was unavoidable" but feared unregulated expulsions by the Czechs during the dead period could possibly spur further unregulated expulsions throughout Czechoslovakia and Poland.[153] Subsequently, Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Geneeral Ernest Harmon's XII Corps in the Sudetenlad to protect Germans there and to ensure that the Czechs behaved in the manner intended by the Western Allies under Article XIII.[154]

Altogether, General George S. Patton commanded two divisions of the United States troops (approximately 30,000 men) in the Sudetenland and Eisenhower ordered them to protect the Sudeten Germans from Czech aggression during the moratorium on the expulsions. But this was temporary measure because there was no permanent commitment by the United States to stay in the Sudetenland until all Germans had been transferred.[155] Welcomed by the Germans, American troops were not quite as popular with Czech citizens who could not understand why American troops were sympathetic to

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[151] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1294; Memorandum by the Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Commanding General, United States Forces European Theater (Eisenhower), 16 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV*: 498-499.
[152] Ibid

[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

the Germans.[156] The main reason for American troops' sympathy can be explained by the fact that individual American soldiers knew nothing of the tumultuous historical context of Czechoslovak/Sudeten German relations and were witness only to the postwar mistreatment of Germans by the Czechs.[157] They had not been present during the war to observe the cruel treatment of Czechoslovakians by their Nazi occupiers.[158] What American troops witnessed during the Allied occupation of Bohemia was the Czechoslovakian government and citizens exacting revenge against all Germans not just those who were actually guilty of committing war crimes against Czechoslovakians.

United States military personnel witnessed the ugly reality of expulsion. The German population of Czech villages being had to present themselves "at a given meeting place" after having been evicted from their homes by force and were then typically "stripped of possessions and beaten" if they defied orders.[159] Such scenarios were so widespread throughout United States occupied Czechoslovakia that American military and diplomatic officials such as United States Political Adviser for Germany Robert D. Murphy were fearful that after having witnessed such acts American soldiers would develop a severe anger and even hatred of Czechoslovakian citizens that would possibly result in violent acts by American soldiers against the Czech people.[160] To the average soldier of the United States Army the treatment received by the Czechs from the

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[156] Ibid, 481.
[157] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1294.
[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid, 1286.
[160] Ibid.

Germans during the war did not justify the acts of revenge the Czechs had been exacting against the Sudeten Germans since the war ended.

Relations between Czechoslovakians and American soldiers were further strained due to the presence of Soviet forces, which occupied most of the nation and supported the Czechs in any measures they chose to take against the Sudeten Germans. As a result the American military had very limited influence over the Czechoslovakian government and military.[161] Rather, American soldiers were more socially interactive with the Sudeten Germans than they were with the Czechoslovakian people. Relationships between American soldiers and Sudeten German women were common and such relationships were approved and sought after by families of German women as a means to procure provisions and physical security.[162] Good relations between the Sudeten Germans and the American military were essential to the Germans because American soldiers were the only protection the Sudeten Germans had against Czech acts of revenge against unarmed men, women, children and the elderly.[163] Firsthand accounts of random expulsions and the horrid treatment of the Sudeten Germans at the hands of the Czechs during the dead period led American officials to accuse the Czechoslovakian government of violating Article XIII and executing the expulsions in an "undignified and intolerable manner."[164]

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[161] The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), 12 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1289.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Private Stanley M. Leach 16th Armored Division, Postal Section to Laurence A. Steinhardt, 22 August 1945, Czechoslovakian Collection, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt, Box 47. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[164] "Benes Asks Humane Ouster of Germans," *Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 1945, 11.*

Czech President Eduoard Beněs argued that to compare the Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans to the actions of the Nazis toward the Czechs during the war was a slap in the face that suggested the Czechs were "unworthy of our national tradition."[165] Benes went on to insist that "the Sudeten Germans must go into the Reich and they will go there whatever happens."[166]

There is no doubt that Czech policy and subsequent actions toward the Sudeten Germans during the "dead period" of expulsions was inhumane and brutal just as it had been during the wild expulsions. Not as brutal as the Czech policy, but perplexing nonetheless, was the policy of the United States Army that occupied Southwestern Czechoslovakia. American soldiers had been ordered to protect Sudeten Germans from acts of Czech violence and yet they were instructed to assist the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. According to Dwight D. Eisenhower the Commanding General of United States Forces, European Theatre (USFET), American troops were to protect the Sudeten Germans from "Czech aggression" but ensure the "orderly evacuations" and to prevent Soviet troops from entering the United States Zone of Occupation. [167] As mentioned earlier United States officials knew some expulsions would occur during the dead period of late 1945 and it was never the intention of the U.S. to halt the expulsions but to "slowdown indiscriminate and disorderly expulsions and avoid unnecessary hardships on

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[165] "Benes Asks Humane Ouster of Germans," *Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 1945, 11.*
[166] Ibid.

[167] The Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army Marshall), 17 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, IV*: 498-499.

the transferees" while protecting the zones of occupation from unexpected burdens as established in the Potsdam Agreement.[168]

Nowhere did hatred of the Germans run deeper after the war than in Poland and that hatred drove the Polish government and people to expel the Germans from Polish-claimed land as soon as possible. One problem that presented itself during the dead period on expulsions was that Poland needed Germans to work in order to keep the Polish economy running.[169] Despite the desire to create a "Poland for the Poles," Polish authorities retained some Germans for short-term labor needs, but Polish officials knew that in order for Poland to be a safe and secure nation all Germans eventually had to be expelled from the newly acquired territories.[170] The dead period[171] of August through December 1945 saw the inhumanity towards the Germans continue in Poland.[172] The Polish government confiscated property in conjunction with a plan to train Poles from eastern Poland who were to be resettled to the new territories in the west for jobs formerly performed by Germans so that the Germans could be removed for good.[173]

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[168] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1294.
[169] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*: 131.

[170] Ibid, 131-132.
[171] There was a dead period when a moratorium on the expulsion of Germans was in place from August 2, 1945 until January 25, 1945 when the Potsdam-sanction expulsions began. However the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments failed to abide by the rules of the moratorium and expelled portions of their German minority populations despite harsh criticism and rebuke from the Western Allies.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.

Up to 7,000,000 Poles migrated west to the newly acquired territories in Upper and Middle Silesia and West Pomerania where small family farms and large Junker estates were available.[174] As the migrant Poles moved in "in search of homes and farmsteads" many Germans attempted to leave Polish territory but were forced to await expulsion at railroad terminals or retention camps.[175] Despite Article XIII, Germans continued to beexpelled from Poland during the designated dead period, with the Poles attempting to disguise the expulsions as "voluntary departures."[176] In the moments prior to deportation by train Germans were "forced to sign a voluntary statement in Polish" that transferred all property to the Polish government.[177] In early October 1945 German authorities requested that the ACC use its power to halt German migration west of the Oder-Neisse line.[178] German welfare officials feared the influx of approximately 4,500,000 expellees from Germany's lost eastern region into an area where there were already 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 refugees who had fled from the Soviet Zone of Occupation.[179] Those same German welfare officials suggested that migration west should only continue if each migrant were certified by the ACC.[180] Subsequently the ACC "requested Poland to quit evicting German nationals until a population settlement

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[174] Daniel DeLuca, "Poland Seeks Settlers, But Evicts Germans," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 August 1945, p. 9.
[175] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred:* 128.
[176] Schieder, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe: I,* 111-112.
[177] Ibid.
[178] "Allies Ask Poland to Delay Eviction of German Nationals," *Chicago Tribune*, 3 October 1945, p. 5.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.

program" as declared by Article XIII could be formulated and implemented.[181] Such demands did nothing to temper the expulsion of Germans from the new Polish territories, and neither the Polish government nor the Polish people felt any sympathy toward the Germans who were getting a taste of what they had served up to Poland during six long years of occupation.[182]

For the United States, Poland was much different than Czechoslovakia during the dead period. Whereas the United States had an army of occupation stationed in southwestern Czechoslovakia that provided political leaders and diplomats with detailed firsthand intelligence, there was no American presence in Poland to monitor the situation. Nor were they able to obtain information on Polish treatment of Germans from the OSS, which was unable to get agents in on the ground in Poland.[183] With little to no accurate information concerning the treatment of Germans by the Poles it was difficult for United States officials to grasp the reality of the situation inside the newly acquired Polish territories. Secretary of State Byrnes informed United States Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane of his concern over the Polish transfer of Germans from east of the Oder-Neisse line in violation of the Potsdam prescribed dead period on transfers.[184] Byrnes conveyed to Lane that the United States Government "has been seriously

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[181] Ibid.
[182] Sydney Gruson, "Deportation of Germans Add to Europe's Troubles," *New York Times*, 11 November 1945.

[183] Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower), 16 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, IV*: 501.
[184] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane), 30 November 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1317.

perturbed by reports of continued mass movements of German refugees who appear to have entered Germany from areas east of the Oder-Neisse line."[185] Details of the various transfers were sketchy but they were eerily similar to what had happened to Germans expelled during the wild expulsions.[186] Once removed from their homes the Germans were allowed to carry what property they could secure by hand, but it was a struggle because most of the expellees were women, children and the elderly most of whom were physically unable to carry large loads of personal possessions and those that did were robbed of them during the trip west.[187] Upon arrival in Germany the expellees were exhausted, many had taken ill along the journey and had contacted contagious diseases.[188] American officials were incensed because the transfers violated the dead period set aside by Article XIII and if they continued the "uncontrollable transfers" could hamper the effectiveness of the implementation of schedules and regulations put in place by the ACC.[189]

The United States Political Advisor to Germany Robert Murphy feared that by allowing the transfers to continue the United States could become "party to an act" that caused "large scale human suffering."[190] Murphy was also aware that asking the Poles to discontinue the expulsions of Germans risked the United States looking as if it were

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[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Ibid.

[189] Ibid.
[190] The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), 12 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1289.

taking a soft stance on how Germany and the German people should be punished for their wartime deeds.[191] Although Murphy opposed continuing the transfers in violation of the Potsdam agreement he was concerned that the agreement itself violated established "United States standards of behavior" and further suggested that if the United States allowed compromise on certain principles it may be too easy to sacrifice our own people and severely damage the American way of life.[192] American Ambassador to Poland Lane disagreed. Based on research compiled by his embassy Lane was skeptical of accounts of Poland's ill treatment of Germans.[193] Lane admitted that there had been some suffering early in the expulsion process when the Germans were first evicted from their homes but as the expulsions process wore on there was basically little to no suffering and the expellees were even provided the opportunity to get food during their journey.[194] After observing the Germans during a trip to Warsaw on September 21, 1945, Eisenhower opined that the Germans were not being badly treated in the overall scheme of things in light of the damage that the German military had inflicted upon Warsaw and the rest of Poland.[195]

Secretary of State Byrnes ordered Ambassador Lane to explain to the Poles that the United States deeply understood what the Poles had suffered at the hands of the Germans during the war and that it was in the best interests of the United States to make

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[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane), 30 November1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1317-1318.

[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid.

sure that the details of Article XIII were carried out in an orderly and humane manner in the spirit in which it was adopted.[196] United States officials intended to do little more than talk sternly to the Poles or the Czechs regarding violations of the dead period of transfers and the inhumane treatment of Germans. In fact, the United States was in a position to do nothing but talk to the Czechs and Poles about their dead period violations because the Germans of East-Central Europe were just one of many problem pieces of the postwar puzzle for United States officials in Europe and Asia.

Article XIII declared all transfers be discontinued until the ACC could establish an efficient schedule that included load limits and health and safety regulations so that the transfers could continue in an orderly and humane manner. American policy was based on the idea of orderly and humane and the intent of all nations involved to follow Article XIII to the greatest detail. Of course the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia interpreted Potsdam differently and allowed Germans to be expelled during the dead period despite the ban stipulated by Article XIII. Ambassador Lane wrote to Secretary of State Byrnes that "reports of ill treatment" of Germans in western Poland had been refuted by members of his staff who had traveled through there, and credited such reports to the Germans themselves whom he accused of being whiners upset because they had lost the war.[197] Lane opposed any cruel treatment of the Germans by the Poles, but thought it "understandable" in light of the "systematic destruction of Warsaw" and the

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[196] Ibid. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane), 10 December 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1322.

[197] Ibid.

barbaric Nazi occupation, that the "Poles have not handled the Germans with kid gloves."[198] That said, Lane went on to recognize that Poland was bound to the Potsdam Protocol, but asked Byrnes to allow him to "confine" criticism of Poland's "alleged mistreatment of Germans to an oral statement" for it would convey a lack of understanding by the United States for the inhumanity inflicted upon the Poles by the Germans.[199] Secretary Byrnes approved the idea of an oral statement from Lane to the Poles regarding the transfer of Germans but asked Lane to clarify that such a message was not a "lack of appreciation of what the Poles have suffered at the hands of Germans," and that the statement was made to encourage Polish adherence to Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement and "the spirit in which it was adopted."[200]An oral statement critical of Polish actions was preferable because it would avoid offending Poland or the Soviet Union publicly.[201]

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ethnic conflict consultant for Lerner Publications, acknowledges that even though the population transfers are painful to the evicted party, transfers solve problems when other possible solutions have failed to work.[202] Population transfers "separate combatants, stabilize the situation, prevent future outbreaks of violence and they promote regional peace."[203] For the United States not to pursue an

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[198] The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1318-1319.
[199] Ibid, 1319.
[200] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane), 10 December 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1322.
[201] The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1319.
[202] Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 216-217.
[203] Ibid.

international solution to the German minority question of East-Central Europe would have exposed "millions of people and their children to unnecessary suffering in the generations to come."[204] By adopting population transfers as a solution to the German minority question the United States successfully played both sides as the Czechs and Poles (with assistance from the Russians) got rid of the Germans and the United States was able to implement the least complicated and most convenient of all possible solutions available that would allow American officials to focus on other postwar issues that were deemed more important to American and European security and prosperity. Yet by allowing the expulsion of the German minority of East-Central Europe the United States also participated in the continuation of Hitler's racial policies by allowing ethnic cleansing to occur.

Planned Chaos

On November 17, 1945, after nearly three months of meetings and negotiations the Allied Control Council revealed its "Plan for the Transfer of German Populations" into the four occupied zones of Germany."[205] In actuality the Prisoner of War and Displaced Person Directorate submitted the plan to the Coordinating Committee for approval at their twenty-first meeting held on November 16, 1945.[206] The ACC plan was to oversee the transfer of the entire German population of Poland and some 3,500,000

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[204] Ibid, 286.

[205] Refugees and Expellees, (Allied Secretariat), OMGUS, Prepared by the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, November 17, 1945, in Pollock, James H. Meisel and Henry L. Bretton, *Germany Under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents. Plan for the Transfer of German Populations,* 45.

[206] Ibid.

other Germans who were to be transferred to the Soviet and British zones of occupation.[207] The total German population of Czechoslovakia, some 3,150,000 persons were to be moved from Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary to the American, French and Soviet Zones of Occupation.[208] Tentatively, the plan stipulated 2,000,000 Germans from the Polish territories and 750,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia were to be transferred to the Soviet Zone.[209] The British Zone agreed to accept 1,500,000 Germans from the newly recovered territory of Poland and the American Zone of Occupation was to accommodate 1,750,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and 500,000 Germans from Hungary.[210] The French Zone of Occupation also agreed to accept 500,000 Germans from Austria with the actual entrance of the transferees into the French zone not to start until April 1946.[211] The transfers had been originally scheduled to begin in December 1945 when 10% of the Germans from each nation would be sent to their assigned zone of occupation.[212] In early 1946 the expulsion of Germans would continue at the following levels: 5% in January/February; 15% in March; 15% in April; 20% in May; 20% in June; and 10% in July.[213] Included in the plan was a stipulation that declared changes could be made due to severe weather or transport emergencies.[214] The plan also provided that once more information had been gathered "about the quantity of

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[207] Ibid; *Plan for the Transfer of German Populations (Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons), November 20, 1945:* 46.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Ibid.

population transferred" the transfers could be halted and rescheduled so as to make the transfer process more logistically feasible.[215]

The ACC intended that the organized expulsions from the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia and the newly recovered Polish Territories would begin in December 1945 and be completed by August 1946.[216] The expulsions were unanimously supported by Czechoslovakia and Poland and were seen by the people of those nations and the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union as a convenient "strategic, historic and economic agreement" that solved the German minority question and created economic opportunity for Czechs and Poles.[217] Neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland wanted the Germans within their respective borders, and anti-German sentiment combined with the "desire of the new postwar governments to secure their nations by making them ethnically homogenous" for the welfare and protection of the "dominant nationality" or nationalities created an enthusiasm for the removal of Germans.[218]

To say the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakian and Polish lands were a convenient, efficient and peaceful solution to the German minority problem is misleading. While the expulsion of Germans was the most workable approach for all nations involved, there was also a strong possibility that the arrival of millions of expellees in Germany could cause as many problems as it fixed. For Czechoslovakia and Poland the expulsions were a win-win situation but for the United States the expulsions

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[215] Ibid.
[216] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,* 285.
[217] Norman H. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 137.
[218] Ibid, 136-137.

presented many problems. A 1946 study conducted by the ACC concluded that the influx of expellees into to Germany would create a demographic nightmare that would impact Europe and the world in a negative manner.[219] The ACC harbored fears that the large number of expellees residing in Germany would be looking back to their homelands and become a source of constant political tension, presenting a constant threat to a prolonged European and world peace for many years.[220] Another problem was that upon arrival in Germany the expellees had to be bathed, fed, processed, placed in holding and then provided with permanent housing and employment by the United States and the other Allies in their zones of occupation.[221] Most problematic of all for the United States and the nations of the ACC was that millions of expellees were to arrive and permanently reside in Germany, a nation that saw its agricultural resources greatly reduced by the cession of land to Poland east of the Oder-Neisse line.[222] As the world's great economic power, it was the responsibility of the United States to feed a large portion of the world that could not feed itself after World War II, and the expulsions along with combined the loss of arable land presented many possible problems to American officials.

The expulsions that were to begin in January 1946 were no different than the wild expulsions of spring/summer 1945 as both were acts of ethnic cleansing. During the dead period in January 1946, unnamed United States Occupation leaders met with Czech

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[219] Allied Control Authority Meeting of the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, Study of Economic Reasons for Transfers, March 21, 1946, NARA II/RG 260/B373/F46.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.

Government officials in Prague on January 8-9, 1946 and rescheduled the beginning of the expulsions for later that month.[223] It was agreed that the expellees would be transported in heated rail cars and families to be allowed to travel together as family units.[224] In addition, Czech officials would provide the expellees with enough food to last the trip to Germany and agreed to allow the expellees to take thirty to fifty kilograms of personal property and one hundred *Reichsmarks* with them.[225] Czech officials would make available to United States Occupation officials weekly schedules of expellee shipments that contained the time of expellee train arrival, the number of expellees aboard each railroad car and documentation for each individual expellee who arrived in Germany.[226] Once these last details were taken care of and the weather improved in late January 1946 the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia resumed.

On January 25, 1946 the first transports of expellees left for the United States Zone of Occupation.[227] The first official trainload left from Mariankse Lazne, Czechoslovakia and contained 295 men, 700 women and 214 children.[228] From January 1, 1946, until February 2, 1946 two trains of expellees arrived in the American zone each day until April 1946 when the number increased to four trains a day, with the exception of Sunday.[229] Dr. Karl Grimm a German who served as a police doctor for the

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[223] Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1945-1955:* 79-80.
[224] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,* 284.
[225] Ibid.

[226] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955*, 79-80.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid. 80.
[229] Ibid.

Czechoslovakians in the town of Brüx from May to July of 1945, where he witnessed the wild expulsions firsthand, including the suicidal deaths of acquaintances who could not deal with the reality of the coming expulsion process. After being arrested on August 1, 1945, by Czech officials Grimm was first sent to an evacuation camp at Nieder Georgenthal and then transferred to a punishment facility near *Striemitz* where he stayed for approximately a year.[230] When time came for him to be expelled, Grimm was transferred back to the evacuation camp at Nieder Georgenthal.[231]

Grimm noted that the expellees arrived at the camp aboard large trucks from cities and towns or by horse and cart from rural areas with possessions they had managed to save from being looted.[232] The Germans were then registered by Czech finance officers who made sure that no one exceeded the prescribed fifty kilograms of luggage for the trip while confiscating money, cigarettes and other valuables from the helpless Germans.[233] Registration was followed by delousing, medical examinations and housing assignments to crowded rooms that held forty to fifty people.[234] Once the final evacuation began in January of 1946, families in the camp at Nieder Georgenthal were given evacuation orders by the evacuation committee a few days prior to expulsion.[235] On the day of actual expulsion the Germans carrying their fifty kilograms of luggage boarded one of forty

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[230] Schieder, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe: Vol. IV, No. 99 Report of Dr. Karl Grimm, Doctor of Medicine in Brüx*, 490.
[231] Ibid.

[232] Ibid.
[233] Ibid, 490-491.
[234] Ibid, 491.
[235] Ibid, 493.

railroad cars that housed thirty individuals each for a total of 1,200 people per train on a fourteen-day journey to Bavaria, with trains leaving Czechoslovakia every ten to fourteen days.[236]

For many, the expulsion process was more spontaneous and disorganized than the detailed description offered by Dr. Grimm. Many of the expellees were "forcibly driven from their homes by the appointed administrators and given no time to collect their possessions" and thus many of those being evacuated from Iglau left their homes with less than fifty kilograms of luggage.[237] To make matters worse many of the men of the *Iglau* transport had just been released from labor camps and were void of any possessions and a number of women were being expelled without their husbands who were still in labor or internment camps.[238] Most inhumane of all was the expulsion of eight year- old Frank Zaboj without the accompaniment of his parents who were being detained at the district prison of *Iglau* for subversive actions.[239] However, it was the denial or lack of opportunity to secure the prescribed fifty kilograms of travel luggage that rankled expellees from Bohemia and Moravia after their arrival in Bavaria where they filed formal complaints to American officials, which contained instances of American soldiers at receiving stations who disputed expellee claims that they arrived with too little luggage.[240]

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[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid, 502.

[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.

Even though these transfers were organized and regulated by the ACC in conjunction with Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement, Germans were still being treated inhumanely in many instances by Czechs and Poles, but this time they were being expelled as per the requirements of an international agreement.[241] These post-Potsdam transfers were legitimized by a formal agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union, which set a precedent for future episodes of ethnic cleansing. Czechoslovakian and Polish politicians and citizens cared nothing about the expulsions international legality because they saw the transfer of Germans as the start of new homogenous nations for Czechs and Slavs.[242] Whether this was achieved by international law or their own unilateral action did not matter.[243]

The organized expulsions that followed the Potsdam Agreement were conducted in a shroud of mystery at the point of departure because local officials in Czechoslovakia frequently procrastinated when making the decision on the destination of each individual trainload of expellees departing Czechoslovakia.[244] Coordination of the expulsions was very difficult for Czech officials due to the points of departure being located at many different railheads.[245] Final "destinations" of the expellees were commonly last minute decisions on whether individual shipments of expellees were to go to the American or

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[241] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955, 80.*
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid.

[244] Laurence A. Steinhardt, Prague, to Francis T. Williamson, Chief of European Division, Department of State, May 1, 1946, Czechoslovakian Collection, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt, Box 96, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[245] Ibid.

Soviet Zone of Occupation.[246] In some instances, trains were ordered to go to both the American and Soviet zones.[247] As a designated destination for expellees the Soviet Zone of Occupation was a source of many headaches for the ACC during the organized expulsions.[248] Many of the expellee trains were refused by the Soviets and rerouted to the United States zone because the Soviets did not want to feed or house the expellees.[249]

The spur of the moment nature of the expulsions presented political and public relations problems for the United States. After the conclusion of the war Sudeten Germans were able to correspond with relatives in the United States via telegrams and letters and informed them of their impending expulsion from their homeland to either Germany or the Soviet Union.[250] In reaction to this information, American relatives of the Sudeten Germans brought forth many inquiries concerning when and where the expulsions were to take place.[251] In response, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Laurence A. Steinhardt instructed diplomatic and military officers responding to these inquiries to explain to the American relatives that a majority of the expellees from Czechoslovakia were to be sent to the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany, but there were no guarantees.[252]

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[246] Ibid.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid.

As before, Czech officials criticized the American military treatment of Sudeten Germans as being too soft. Czech civilians, politicians and members of the military could not understand how the soldiers of the United States Army could fight a war and kill Germans for four years and then after the war treat the Germans as friends.[253] Unlike the Czechs the United States did not have a long history of hatred towards the Sudeten Germans (or any other Germans) and when that mindset was exposed to the harshness and inhumanity of the expulsions process, it was therefore not surprising that American soldiers were friendly and sympathetic toward the Sudeten Germans. In contrast the Czechoslovaks saw the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as an act of national preservation through ethnic homogenization. An unidentified Czechoslovakian official explained the Czech stance on the expulsion process and the perception of Czechs as being cruel and inhumane by stating "we are attempting to do a cruel thing in the most humane way."[254]

On October 30, 1946 the *Christian Science Monitor* reported "the biggest organized migration of human beings ever witnessed in modern times" ended when the final shipment of Sudeten Germans departed Karlovy Vary for their assigned destination in the United States Zone of Occupation.[255] Since the beginning of 1946 approximately

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[253] Laurence A. Steinhardt, to Francis T. Williamson, Chief Central European Division, Department of State, March 13, 1946. Czechoslovakian Collection, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt, Box 96, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[254] Ernest J. Pisko, German Tide Ebbs Back Across Czech Frontier," *Christian Science Monitor*; 25 July, 1946, 14.

[255] "Mass Transport of Germans from Czechoslovakia Ends, *Christian Science Monitor,* 30 October, 1946.

1,415,135 Sudeten Germans had been expelled to the American zone and somewhere in the neighborhood 750,000 Sudeten Germans were expelled to the Russian zone.[256] Not all the Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian government deliberately retained nearly 311,000 Germans because their skills were needed to keep the economy of Czechoslovakia from collapsing.[257] How the Sudeten Germans were treated during their voyage depended upon whether an individual was to be transferred to the American or Russian zone. American officials conducted the transfer process at a slow pace "in order to guarantee decent rail service and transportation conditions" and provided the expellees with "housing and food upon arrival" in Bavaria where the expellees were processed and evaluated before being assigned permanent residence.[258]

The Allied authorities terminated the compulsory transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia under the Potsdam Agreement at the end of 1947.[259] From 1947 on, all further transfers of Germans to western Germany were done on a "unilateral basis" by the Czechoslovakian government without Allied regulation or participation, with the exception of the reunification of expelled families.[260] Czech President Edouard Beněs summed up his view of the removal of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in a May 9, 1947, speech in which he proclaimed emphatically "if someone should get the

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[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred,* 118.

[259] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: 1945-1955,* p. 93.
[260] Ibid.

idea that this question has not finally been settled. We should resolutely call the nation to arms."[261] Victory had been declared by Czechoslovakia and the German problem had been solved from a Czechoslovakian perspective.

Although Allied leaders declared the expulsion of Sudeten Germans complete by the end of 1947, in reality they continued. In 1948-1949, the Czechoslovakian authorities shipped 34,985 Sudeten Germans illegally from Czechoslovakia to Bavaria with no advance warning.[262] The United States led the Allied effort to reunite Sudeten Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia with relatives who had been expelled. In July 1949 the Allies announced throughout Czechoslovakia that Sudeten Germans with relatives in Germany qualified for transfer so they could be united with families that had been separated during the wild or organized expulsions of 1945 through 1946.[263] The July 1949 announcement resulted in 55,000 Sudeten German applications for 30,000 transfer passes that were distributed at a rate of 1,000 per day.[264]

More Sudeten Germans were to be united with their families in the spring of 1950 after the Allied High Commission on West Germany signed an agreement with the Czechoslovakian government to transfer 20,000 Sudeten Germans to the residences of relatives in Germany.[265] The transfers began on March 17, 1950 and those being transferred had to be approved by the West German Government and would become the

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[261] John MacCormac, "Most Germans Out in Sudeten Exodus," *New York Times,* 10 May, 1947.
[262] Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: 1945-1955*, p. 94.
[263] Ibid.

[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.

sole responsibility of the receiving family once they arrived in West Germany; they received no assurance of employment or other benefits from their new homeland.[266] In practice, only 16,832 of the intended 20,000 Sudeten Germans were transferred to West Germany because of the transfers being canceled by the Czechoslovakian Government on April 21, 1951 without reason, but probably because there was a shortage of skilled labor.[267] The transfers continued periodically into the 1960s, but most of these were instances of voluntary migration from Czechoslovakia to West Germany of the very old and were monitored by organizations such as the Red Cross of West Germany.[268] These later transfers represented an effort by West German social welfare policy to reunite families fractured during the earlier phases of the wild and organized expulsions.

The Polish government viewed the post-Potsdam organized expulsions as an opportunity to solidify the Allies acceptance of the newly recovered territories and the recognition of Poland's western border as the Oder-Neisse line.[269] Polish leaders wanted to demonstrate that the newly recovered territories were "truly Polonized and integrated into a new Poland" which meant that Poland would be more than happy to cooperate with Article XIII in order rid itself of its German population.[270] Both Polish politicians and citizens wanted nothing more than to de-Germanize Poland so as to rid themselves of a

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[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Ibid. Dr. Heinrich Weitz of the West German Red Cross negotiated the voluntary migration of 160,000 people most of whom were Sudeten Germans to West Germany. Weitz did not know how many would leave on their own accord.

[269] Naimark, *Fires of Hatred,* 132.
[270] Ibid, 132-133.

minority population that had caused Poland nothing but trouble in the past and would also be a prospective source of conflict as long as they were allowed to reside within Polish borders. Poland wanted rid of its German population so it could solidify and legitimize its western border in order to strengthen national security and to exact a good measure of revenge for the inhumane occupation suffered by Poland at the hands of Nazi Germany for six long years during World War II.

The post-Potsdam expulsions of Germans from the newly recovered territories of Poland, "Operation Swallow," began in February 1946 under management of the British army [271] The original plan called for 1,500,000 Germans to be transferred to the British Zone of Occupation in Germany but only approximately 500,000 actually made it across the German border in the six months between February and September.[272] American officials in Europe monitored the operation from afar. Once underway in late February the transfers were anything but humane a fact that raised the ire of the British Parliament, which feared that by accepting Germans into the British zone Great Britain would be seen by the Poles as being the protectors of the Germans.[273] In fact the immediate post-Potsdam expulsions differed little from the wild expulsions of 1945, in that the German expellees were herded to assembly centers where they were robbed, physically abused then crowded onto train box cars and shipped to Germany where they arrived "in a state

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[271] Frank, *Expelling the Germans,* 245; 248.
[272] Ibid, 245.

[273] Ibid, 248-249.

of physical and spiritual deprivation."[274] However conditions did begin to improve in the summer of 1946 after ACC regulations had been fully implemented.[275]

Operation Swallow was supposed to accomplish the transfer of Germans from the newly recovered territories of Poland, but the process did not always go according to British plans. Numerous "non-Germans," most notably Jews from Russia began to arrive in the British Zone in May of 1946 with the aid of various Jewish organizations that provided them with forged identification papers.[276] A few trainloads of expellees were exclusively Jewish.[277] Jews with false identification papers were not the only problem. Local political leaders throughout Poland authorized the release of many elderly, mentally and terminally ill citizens so that they could be put aboard Operation Swallow transport trains.[278] The presence of "750,000 economically unproductive expellees" only worsened the situation for the expellees and the British by causing food, housing and health crises that led the British to cut the number of expellees that arrived daily from 9,000 to 5,000 on 15 July, 1946 without any communication with the ACC.[279] After a few starts and stops, and numerous reductions in the number of transports the British would accept on a daily basis, Operation Swallow came to an end in July 1947.[280]

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[274] Schieder, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe: Vol. I*, 113.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Frank, *Expelling the Germans,* 253.
[277] Ibid.
[278] Ibid.

[279] Ibid, 253-254.
[280] Ibid. 256.

On March 3, 1949, the last 125,000 Germans were to be expelled from the western territories by Polish authorities with 25,000 headed for East Germany and the other 100,000 to be resettled elsewhere in the Soviet Zone of Occupation where they would be forced laborers.[281] An unnamed Allied official addressed the expulsions in a matter of fact way when he stated "within a year there will be no Germans left in East German provinces recovered by Warsaw."[282] The first trainload consisted of 689 Germans to be followed by future increments of 800 to 1,200 until all 25,000 had been removed from Poland.[283] Those Germans expelled from Poland's new western territories in the 1950s largely consisted of physicians, engineers and businessmen who had been deemed necessary to the functioning of the Polish economy and were not included in the earlier wild or Potsdam transfers.[284] Once their services could be performed by Poles, officials decided to cleanse themselves of what had become unwanted and unneeded German skilled laborers.[285]

Although the expulsions eventually wound down, Poland's Western border continued to be a point of contention for the United States for the duration of the Cold War. In late November 1950, Poland and East Germany approved "an agreement" that

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[281] "Poland Begins Expulsion of the Last Germans," *Washington Post*, 4 March 1950, p. 11
[282] Ibid.
[283] Poland Expelling Last 125,000 Germans: Oder-Neisse To Be Cleared In A Year," *New York Times*, 4 March 1950.
[284] Ibid.

[285] Ibid.

made the "Oder Neisse Line the permanent border between the two countries."[286] Approval of the Oder-Neisse line by the United States as the permanent western border of Poland did not occur until after the Cold War when a 1990 peace treaty between Germany and Poland (The Treaty of Gorlitz which became final on November 14, 1990) made American recognition of the border official.[287] The United States handled the Polish border question in a way that never drifted from decisions made at Potsdam in 1945 that called for the American recognition of Poland's western border (wherever the final location was) only after the issue had been negotiated and agreed upon at a peace conference.[288] What the American approach to the Polish border question reveals is that the expulsion of Germans was not the center of American foreign policy by any means. Issues such as the scheduling of a peace conference, the political and economic structure of Germany and the composition of reparations took precedence over territorial issues.[289] Hence the issue of the expulsions was intertwined with issues that proved to be of far greater regional and global importance to the United States.

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[286] "Poles and Germans Agree on Frontier," *Christian Science Monitor,* 29 November 1950.
[287] Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line,* 1, 289.
[288] Ibid, 289.
[289] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 68-69.

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GERMAN EXPULSIONS

In the spring of 1945, when the wild expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe began, the average American citizen stayed informed on world events through daily newspapers, popular magazines and niche publications tailored to political and religious interests. During this period, various forms of print media were not only a means by which to stay informed of world events, but also a source of entertainment, public service and personal communication. This chapter will examine the coverage of the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe utilizing newspapers, periodicals, scholarly publications and publications of intellectual organizations. The newspapers examined in this chapter are the *Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor*, *New York Times* and the *Washington Post.* Although each of these newspapers possessed their own political slant, as evidenced in both their editorials and reportage, they were selected for use in this chapter because they were the most prominent daily publications in the United States. The *Chicago Tribune* was very anti-New Deal and isolationist and this came through its criticism of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman's actions at Yalta and Potsdam respectively. The *Christian Science Monitor* approached the expulsions from a perspective that was more informative and humanitarian than political with its middle-of-the road attitude toward the situation in East-Central Europe. Traditionally more liberal in scope the *New York Times* focused more on the

humanitarian tragedy of the expulsions and criticism the role of the Western Allies' involvement in the expulsions. The *Washington Post* relied upon a more analytical style regarding the expulsions. Even though the political perspective of each publication was not the basis of selection for this chapter, this knowledge does help to understand why each covered the expulsions the way they did. Periodical publications chosen for this chapter include the mainstream publications *Time* and the *Saturday Evening Post* and the more intellectual and politically oriented *American Mercury, The Nation* and *New Republic*, along with the religious periodicals *Catholic World* and *Christian Century*. These periodicals were chosen not for their political or social ideology, but because they were among the very few publications to present insightful opinion and analysis on the expulsions. This chapter will demonstrate that discussion of the expulsions within the American print media failed to generate an awareness and fervor among the American public and thus the policy regarding the expulsions never changed as a result of public scrutiny. Inconsistent coverage of the expulsions combined with the reality that those mostly writing about the expulsions composed a niche group of Czechoslovakian, Polish and German political exiles, diplomats, immigrants and American clergy and intellectuals. It was not so much the lack of information but rather the indifference of the American public looking forward to peace that assured any words written about the expulsions fell upon deaf ears.

American Press Coverage of the Expulsions

The first really detailed mention of forced population transfers occurred when both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* included articles on February 22, 1945 that warned the American public of Czechoslovakia's intent to expel its Sudeten German

minority. European correspondent for the *New York Times* John MacCormac wrote of Czechoslovakian President Edouard Bënses's intended removal of Sudeten Germans as revealed at his press conference in London prior to his triumphant return to his homeland.[1] MacCormac explained that Beněs's comments were the most "definite" statement that had yet been made about Czechoslovakia's plans for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans.[2] Various Czech governmental officials made it clear that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans would not be a big ordeal because many of them had already left Czechoslovakia voluntarily before the war ended.[3]

Whereas the *New York Times* article warned of the intentions of Czechoslovakia, an editorial that appeared in the *Washington Post* on the same day was quite different. The editorial approached Czechoslovakia's intent to expel Sudeten Germans from an analytical perspective. It suggested the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia would only be the start of the expulsion of the millions of Germans who resided in East-Central Europe.[4] It also asserted that the expulsions would solve Czechoslovakia's German minority problem but would endanger the stability of Germany and Europe.[5] Even though the *Washington Post was* sympathetic toward the liberated nations and the unique problems their individual minorities presented them, it also stated

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[1] John MacCormac, "Sudeten Germans Must Go, Benes Says, Or Czechoslovakia Will Be Torn By Civil War," *New York Times*, 22 February 1945, 18.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] "Transfer of peoples," *Washington Post;* 23 February 1945, 6.
[5] Ibid.

that the Allies should not allow the unilateral expulsion of Germans by any nation.[6] Therefore the paper questioned the validity of Beněs's argument that the expulsion of Germans was "justified on grounds that the Germans themselves, through their wholesale deportation of conquered peoples," had set a precedent that could be followed by Czechoslovakia and Poland in the removal of Germans from their respective nations.[7] In conclusion the article suggested that Europe's German minority problem be subjected to extensive international analysis.[8] This would be necessary before any binding international agreement regarding the fate of the Germans could be reached, and subsequently such an agreement among all the member nations of the United Nations should be humanitarian in manner and not be implemented through unilateral decisions by individual nations.[9]

Once the wild expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia began in the late spring of 1945, very little factual information was available to the American press because they had few correspondents on the ground in Czechoslovakia. That changed some when General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army occupied Southwest Czechoslovakia (Bohemia). By June of 1945 the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia was well underway and causing major logistical problems for the American military stationed in the Sudetenland, where large numbers of German

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.

expellees were clogging roads, hampering the functioning of occupation forces.[10] The *Chicago Tribune* explained that Great Britain, once a proponent of the expulsions, now stated that the fate of the Sudeten Germans would be decided by the four major Allies who opposed the Czech policy of unilateral "mass deportation" and had made that clear to the Czech government.[11] Also on June 17, John MacCormac of the *New York Time,s* who had followed the American military into the Sudetenland, wrote of the human tragedy and political hypocrisy that characterized the wild expulsions.[12] MacCormac reported that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia had begun and women and children had been "forced to leave in oxcarts with only the bare essentials of living."[13] He also observed that the Czech government was prepared for "radical unilateral action" in order to solve the German problem, but President Benes preferred that the "German question" be dealt with in an agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.[14]

As a news story the expulsions were never a daily fixture within the pages of the leading American print media. Rather they were covered sporadically and never received the same prominent daily exposure as other postwar events. On June 23, 1945 an unattributed article in the *New York Times* described the inhumanity of the situation of expellees in Czechoslovakia with a report that the Czech government had confiscated

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[10] "British Protest Sudeten Deportations," *Chicago Tribune,* 17 June 1945.
[11] Ibid.
[12] John MacCormac, "U.S., Britain Block Sudeten's Exodus," *New York Times,* 17 June 1945: 12 C.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.

270,000 farms and corporations from German and Hungarian owners without compensation under the authority of the Benes Decrees.[15] Property confiscation was the first act in a strategy to remove all Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia permanently.[16] The *Christian Science Monitor* expanded upon the *New York Times* article by reporting that the Czechs were expelling the Sudeten Germans with the approval of the Soviet Union.[17] The article revealed that as Czech Under Secretary of State Vlado Clementis put it, the "cleansing of Germans from Czech lands was being carried out energetically."[18] Although much remained unclear about what was going on inside Czechoslovakia, American correspondents in Europe reported the situation in Czechoslovakia as best they could and presented it to the American public in a concise but thorough way.[19] Thus any lack of action or concern toward the plight of the Germans by the American people was not due to a lack of information, even though information from East-Central Europe during the expulsions remained limited.

Benes wanted to expel as many Germans as possible before the Potsdam Conference, reported the *Chicago Tribune,* but he also knew that Sudeten Germans could be removed more efficiently and in larger quantities if the expulsions were regulated and supervised by the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union.[20] With American

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[15] "Czechoslovaks Seize 270,000 Properties From Germans, Hungarians and Traitors," *New York Times* 23 June 194,: 4.
[16] Ibid.
[17] "Czechs Seize Nazi Farms in Sudeten Area," *Christian Science Monitor,* 23 June 1945, 8.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] "Benes wants Three Million Aliens Ousted," *Chicago Tribune*, 15 July 1945, 13.

(Allied) involvement in the expulsion process soon to be a certainty Benes revealed that no fewer than two million Sudeten Germans and 400,000 Hungarians would be expelled and added there would be no attempts to "compromise" with the Germans as there had been in 1939.[21] The article noted that Benes desired the Allied-regulated expulsions be quick, trouble free and "executed as humanely as possible."[22] Also on July 15, the *New York Times* captured Benes's enthusiasm for Allied participation in the expulsions in his own words when he stated "the whole project of cleansing Czechoslovakia in this radical manner can be undertaken only with wholehearted Big Three approval and cooperation."[23] Ironically Benes called for the expulsion of Germans to be done humanely under the auspices of international cooperation while in reality he allowed Germans to be expelled from Czechoslovakia unilaterally and inhumanely.

American Public Opinion and Public Persuasion

Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement made the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe official Allied policy on August 2, 1945. The last paragraph of Article XIII ordered the suspension of "further expulsion" of Germans by the Czech and Polish governments until Allied occupation officials had "thoroughly" examined the situation that faced their respective zones of occupation in Germany.[24] Both the American and British occupation zones had been inundated with expellees, displaced

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[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] "Benes Seeks Speed In Germans' Shift," *New York Times*, 15 July, 1945.
[24] Alfred de Zayas, *Nemesis At Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans* (Boston Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 94.

persons and refugees and subsequently Allied officials placed a moratorium on expulsions to keep from having to deal with a flood of millions more expellees.[25] This was done because Allied leaders needed time to increase the food supply in order to be able accept the German expellees into their respective zones of occupation in order not to exacerbate an already critical food shortage in postwar Germany.[26] American occupation officials feared that an immediate influx of German expellees into Germany would increase the population to nearly 20,000,000 immediately and foster the rapid spread of disease and civil disorder.[27] The Potsdam moratorium on expulsions would allow the problems of food and housing to be dealt with before the expellees entered Germany in the winter of 1945-1946.[28]

Despite the official suspension of expulsions many expellees still entered the Allied occupied zones of Europe. According to a September 24, 1945, *Time* magazine article, "the unwanted children of enforced marriages of nations" that no longer existed were forced from their homes by the Czech and Polish governments and sent to West Germany.[29] There was no concern on behalf of the Czechs or Poles concerning where the expellees were headed. Czech Premier Zdenek Fierlinger proclaimed that the movement of Sudeten Germans into Germany was "as an Allied problem."[30] Sydney Gruson of the

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[25] Ibid.
[26] "U.S. Faces Care of Two Million More Germans," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 30 October 1945.
[27] Ibid.
[28] De Zayas *Nenesis at Potsdam*, 96.
[29] "Germany: The Unwanted," *Time.com*, September 24, 1945. http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,886546,00.html (Accessed October 10,2010).
[30] Ibid.

New York Times explained that the expulsion of Germans from Polish administered territories east of the Oder-Neisse was justifiable because the Germans had shown the people of Poland no quarter during the wartime occupation.[31] Gruson therefore supported the expulsion of Germans in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement because they would not be a unilateral act of revenge like the wild expulsions had been.[32]

A *Chicago Daily Tribune* article addressed the postponement of the indirect expulsions by the Allies. The Allied Control Council (ACC) strongly urged Poland to halt the eviction of Germans until a detailed "resettlement program" compatible with Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement had been worked out.[33] This was requested of the Allies by German welfare officials who specifically wanted an extended pause in "German migration west from the new Polish frontier along the Oder-Neisse rivers unless each migrant had been certified" by ACC officials.[34] As appeals to temporarily halt the expulsions until after the "winter of 1945" had been ignored by the Czechs and Poles, Allied officials had no other choice but to speed up plans to implement organized expulsions.[35] Not only would the "orderly transfer of Germans" prevent conditions from deteriorating too quickly in the American and British occupation zones, but organized expulsions would also bring about an "element of predictability" in relation to when,

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[31] Sydney F. Gruson, "Deportations of Germans Add to Europe's Troubles," *New York Times*, 18 November 1945.
[32] Ibid.
[33] "Allies Ask Poland To Delay Eviction of German Nationals," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 10 October 1945.
[34] Ibid.
[35] de Zayas, *Nemesis At Potsdam*, 101.

where and how many expellees were to be allowed in the American and British zones at a given time.[36] Although coverage of the indirect expulsions by American print media outlets was anything but voluminous, the reports that did reach American readers made it clear that "the moratorium called for in Article XIII of the Potsdam Protocol had been a total failure."[37]

Heinz Eulau the German and assistant editor of the liberal publication *The New Republic,* explained that even though the Big Three had delayed the transfers to make them more orderly and humane they knew the transfers "had to happen" and were the price of "power politics."[38] Eulau added that the supporters of population transfers could not "deny the terrible hardship, human misery, and cruelty" that characterized such a process but, the Germans also posed "minority problem number one" to East-Central Europe and had to be dealt with in order to sustain peace in the future.[39] The expulsion of Germans, Eulau warned, could create "the emergence of a new form of irredentism and chauvinism" that could only be prevented by the creation of a "decent standard of living" in Germany by the Allies.[40]

Princeton Seminary Professor Otto A. Piper, who had been expelled from Germany in 1933, criticized the Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions and their delay from August through January until they could be carried out under orderly and humane

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid, 10.
[38] Heinz Eulau, "Population Transfers," *New Republic*, August 1945, 215.
[39] Ibid, 16-17.
[40] Ibid, 17.

conditions.[41] Piper believed such delay allowed the "partisans" and other groups to operate independently of the authority of the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments and perpetuate violence and cruelty toward the expellees for far longer than should have been allowed.[42] Through sanction of the expulsions the Allies violated their own interpretation of international law according to Piper who explained that western democracies supported the "right of emigration of individuals, and even large groups of minorities could select" the geographic location and "political conditions they deemed best."[43] Piper fully sympathized with and understood reasoning behind the Czechoslovakian and Polish hatred of German minorities in their respective nations whom they believed had supported their Nazi oppressors.[44] That said, he saw the expulsions as "not a spontaneous act of emotional overexcitement," but as a "deliberate and premeditated policy" allowed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that would set a new precedent on how minorities and population transfers would be handled under international law.[45]

By allowing the expulsions to occur as prescribed at Potsdam Piper explained, that the United States and Great Britain violated Christian moral law, stating that nations are not guided by Christian principles "and have no moral obligation toward its

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[41] Otto A. Piper, "Behind the Population Transfers," *Christian Century*, November 14, 1945, 1250.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid,1251.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.

subjects."[46] To the governments of nations, including the United States and Great Britain, human life was of no value and their approval of the expulsions totally ignored Christian natural law and meant that they had chosen to adhere to policies in line with the "philosophy of unlimited power."[47] Piper believed it was then the responsibility of churches throughout the United States to expose the "anti-Christian philosophy of Potsdam".[48]

Gruson, Eulau and Piper possessed different perspectives on the expulsions. Eulau was pragmatically in favor the expulsions, as was Gruson, but Piper opposed them on moral grounds. Even so, there were similarities in their thinking. All understood the feelings of hatred and the need for revenge that resonated in Czechoslovakia and Poland and were sympathetic to the suffering of both nations during the Nazi occupation. The difference was that Eulau viewed sympathy and revenge as justification for the expulsions and Gruson saw them as the less troublesome path, whereas Piper did not. Writings penned during the moratorium obvious differences in opinion regarding the expulsions exist, but they each author understand the origins of the desire for revenge that existed in the hearts and minds of the citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Overall, the American print media covered the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments during the August-January 1945 moratorium very sparsely. Which is surprising because the United States Military had a presence in

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[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid, 1251-1252.
[48] Ibid, 1252.

the Sudetenland of Southwestern Czechoslovakia where almost all of Czechoslovakia's Germans resided and the press had access to the area and the American soldiers as well. Such access should have led to more frequent coverage of the expulsions. American soldiers in the Sudetenland had been eyewitnesses to the forced eviction of Germans in October 1945, during the moratorium, and had observed the merciless treatment of Germans at the hand of the Czechs.[49] American soldiers deployed in Czechoslovakia were sympathetic with the Czech people and what they had been through but questioned the harsh methods used by the Czechs in their deportation of the Sudeten Germans.[50]

One newspaper report from the same time period contradicted American military accounts about how the Czechs treated the Sudeten Germans. Godfrey Lias a reporter for the *Christian Science Monitor,* toured the Sudetenland extensively and was allowed access to locations that had been unobserved by the international press. He reported that, according to Czech leaders, once the Potsdam Agreement became official the expulsion of Sudeten Germans had been curtailed immediately.[51] The problem with Lias's portrayal of the Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans was that it may have been somewhat biased.[52] Lias had authored a biography of the Czechoslovakian leader-in-exile Edouard

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[49] Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, October 16, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. IV,* (Washington, D.C.: GPO,1968), 502. http:///digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945v04

[50] Letter to Steinhardt from Private Stanley M. Leach, 16th Armored Division: Postal Section, August 22, 1945, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt Box 47, Library of Congress.

[51] Godfrey Lias, "How the Czechs Rule the Germans," *Christian Science Monitor,* 9 October 1945.

[52] Ibid.

Benes in 1940 *Beněs of Czechoslovakia*, and had been named Director of the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office in Czechoslovakia in 1944. Lias's accounts of how the Sudeten Germans were treated by the Czechs ran counter to eyewitness accounts of American soldiers.[53] Although Czech acts of cruelty were acknowledged to have occurred during the wild expulsions, Lias described the post-Potsdam treatment of the Sudeten Germans as strict but fair and humane.[54] He described the Sudeten Germans as well fed, well housed and as content as could be expected despite being prisoners in internment camps while they waited to be sent west to Germany.[55]

During the Potsdam-imposed moratorium on the expulsions, the American print media focused on Czechoslovakia's justification of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Newspaper and magazine articles during this time period focused more closely on why Czechoslovakia wanted to expel its Sudeten Germans than the fact of continuing expulsions of Germans from Czechoslovakia. The press explained that the Czechoslovakian expulsion plan was not a reactionary or retaliatory measure of revenge but rather a well contemplated strategic decision made with the future domestic and regional stability of Czechoslovakia in mind.[56] The absence of the Sudeten Germans

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[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ernest S. Pisko, "Benes, Transfers of Non-Slavs a Must," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 September 1945.

from Czechoslovakia would remove the possibility of "outside intervention" in Czech affairs.[57]

American journalists explained that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was an "issue of national importance" to the Czech government and its citizens who wanted the Germans gone and the destination did not matter.[58] Ralph Parker Moscow correspondent for *The Nation*, *London Times* and the *New York Times* during the war, had been a member of the British Foreign Office's Czechoslovakian Intelligence Office before the war which gave him a familiarity with and sympathy towards the Czech government and people.[59] In 1939, Parker had been a correspondent for the *New York Times* in Prague and was assigned to Belgrade in 1940 during which time his wife was killed.[60] After her death Parker became romantically involved with a Russian secretary whose influence tilted his political ideology toward a "pro-Soviet perspective," which also influenced the content of his writing to such an extent that his editors were cynical in relation to any reports he made that had been approved by Soviet officials.[61] After the war Parker observed that the German wartime occupation had changed the national character of Czechoslovakia from being tolerant of the German minority to being near fanatical in the insistence that the

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Sydney Gruson, "Czechs Ask Haste In Exiling 2,000,000," *New York Times*, 6 September 1945.
[59] Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 274.
[60] Laurel Leff, *Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America's Most Important Newspaper* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 171.
[61] Ibid.

Germans be expelled.[62] "The once tolerant Czechoslovak heart had hardened" and the removal of the Sudeten Germans was clearly a much-needed major "surgical" procedure that would make Czechoslovakia a more secure nation in the future.[63] Reports from Czechoslovakia during the Potsdam moratorium described the Czechs as having no other choice but to expel the Sudeten German population from their country. In reporting the expulsions from Czechoslovakia the American print media gave affirmation to the orderly and humane doctrine and United States approval of the expulsion of Germans in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.

Once the transfer of Germans formally resumed after January 25, 1946 the American print media covered the expulsions much differently than before. Eyewitness reporters viewed conditions the expellees had been forced to endure and as a result reports were more critical of the expulsions, which gave the average American citizen a vivid picture of the expulsions. The reporting of *New York Times* European correspondent Anne O'Hare McCormick best exemplifies the descriptive and analytical media coverage of the post-Potsdam expulsions. McCormick explained that although the Potsdam Agreement called for the transfer of Germans to be conducted in an orderly and humane manner, the reality of the situation was somewhat different.[64] Expellees might have received orderly and humane treatment after they arrived in Berlin or Munich according to McCormick but the trek through Czechoslovakia and the new Polish

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[62] Ralph Parker, "Czechs And Sudetens," *The Nation*, September, 1945, 307-309.

[63] "Czechoslovakia: Revolution by Law?" *Time,* October 22, 1945. 35.

[64] Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Abroad," *New York Times,* 4 February 1946.

territories occurred under terrifying conditions void of "international supervision or any pretense of humane treatment."[65] To McCormick the treatment of the German expellees by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was akin to the wartime atrocities committed by the Nazis.[66]

In Czechoslovakia Allied approval of the resumption of the expulsions meant the removal of the Sudeten Germans and the beginning of a new ethnically homogenous Czechoslovakia comprising only Czechs and Slovaks.[67] It sounded simple and straightforward. Czechoslovakia would remove approximately three million Germans from its borders and all would be fine. In reality all was far from fine. Czechoslovakia was expelling Germans but most of those expelled were women, small children and the elderly who were of no value to the Czechs because they could not perform manual or skilled labor and would do nothing but drain food and housing resources.[68] Hal Foust of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* reported on the retention of skilled and manual German laborers by the Czechs and pointed out that the "absence of able-bodied men arriving from Czechoslovakia" indicated the Czechs were utilizing Sudeten Germans as slave labor until industry and agriculture could be fully Czech restored.[69] Not only was the Czech retention of able-bodied German men criticized by Allied occupation leader

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] "Shift of Sudeten Germans To Reich Back In High Gear," *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 January 1946.

[68] Hal Foust, "Assails Czechs For Retaining Sudeten Slaves," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 8 May 1946.

[69] Ibid.

General Lucius D. Clay, the German *Landerat* strongly suggested to the Americans that families not be separated during future transfers.[70] The Germans made it clear that if able-bodied men were not included in the expulsions then the Allies would have to send the women and children back to Czechoslovakia because they wanted to keep families together, and families without male providers would also be a financial burden.[71] Just a few weeks later, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* reported that after a serious rebuke from American military leaders the Czechs had formally requested that they be allowed to retain "skilled workers" until those positions could be filled by Czechs.[72] The Czech government detained a total of 311,000 Germans, because their skills were needed while the labor base of the Sudetenland was being replenished with Czech citizens and their presence would prevent the Czech economy from collapsing.[73] Media reports brought the reality of the expulsions and the cruel aftermath of war home to the American public, but most Americans were more fixated on other things, such as demobilization and wartime reconversion at home, tensions with the USSR abroad, and the rebuilding of Japan.

The transfer of Germans from the newly recovered Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line was the responsibility of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The British accepted 1,500,000 expellees into their zone of occupation from February 1946

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] "Charges Czechs Expel Germans and Seize Land," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 19 May 1946.

[73] "Mass Transport of Germans from Czechoslovakia Ends," *Christian Science Monitor,* 30 October, 1946.

through July 1947 in what was called Operation Swallow.[74] As with the transfer of the Sudeten Germans, the American media had unlimited access to the arriving Germans in the British zone. A *Christian Science Monitor* report told of Germans *en route* by train through "Polish administered Silesia" being guarded by Soviet and Polish soldiers so as to prevent Polish civilian hostility toward the Germans from turning violent.[75]

Poland's expulsion of Germans from its new territories was linked to the final location of Poland's western border. At the behest of the Soviet Union, Poland assumed administration of German territory east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, an idea that was unacceptable to the United States, which preferred Poland's border be located further east at the Curzon Line. Thus, the transferred Germans posed a substantial threat to the future stability of East-Central Europe, which according to J. Emlyn Williams of the *Christian Science Monitor* was ironic because the expulsions "were crowded out of the news" by what were considered more relevant matters.[76] American citizens, politicians and media entities were more concerned with the rebuilding of Germany and Japan and of course the spread of communism all of which were more pressing and newsworthy than the fate of Germans whom many held responsible for starting World War II. Williams reported that Poland wanted the expulsions to be over and done with as soon as

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[74] Frank, *Expelling the Germans,* 245; 248.

[75] "Poles Ousting German Group," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 February 1946.
[76] J. Emlyn Williams, "Poles Scan Border in Ousting of Germans," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 September 1946.

possible so that the Allies would not re-evaluate the situation and the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line.[77]

Germans were being expelled by Poland in order to resettle Poles in the German lands of East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania who had been displaced from their homes in the parts of eastern Poland that had been ceded to the Soviet Union. Joel Cang another *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent, who visited the newly recovered Polish territories twice after the war, reported that Poland had been awarded approximately 61,000 square miles of eastern German territory as compensation for the nearly 104,000 square miles of Polish land seized by the Soviet Union during the war.[78] Extension of Poland's border as far west as the Oder-Neisse line meant that Poland would acquire territory that possessed a well-developed industrial base, fertile agricultural land and abundant deposits of minerals that would replace what had been lost and that could sustain the Polish people.[79] In November 1947, Polish officials insisted to the United States and Great Britain that Poland had no choice but to annex German land to the west because without that land "the Polish economy would be unbalanced and be unable to provide food and work for more than two-thirds" of the Polish people.[80]

Editorial analysis and criticism of the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe by the American print media did not begin in earnest until several months after

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[77] Ibid.

[78] Joel Cang, "West Poland Wipes Out Reich Traces," 16 November 1947 *Christian Science Monitor*.
[79] Ibid.
[80] "Poles Fix Grip on Reich Lands," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 November 1947.

the resumption of the expulsions in January 1946. The cruel and inhumane nature of the expulsions received most attention. The expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments were, in the opinion of McCormick of a magnitude never seen before and were without a doubt "a crime against humanity" that would impact Europe's future for many years to come.[81] John Fisher of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* explained that the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland had been anything but orderly and humane as mandated per the Potsdam Agreement.[82] Fisher quoted the Office of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) representative James K. Pollock who conveyed that the rules set down at Potsdam had yet to be followed.[83] Soviet control over the entrance of expellees into eastern Germany made information on the traveling conditions hard to obtain, but their condition upon arrival revealed much.[84]

The United States and Great Britain were not involved in the actual expulsion of Germans because they only dealt with the expellees after they arrived in Germany. Fisher's editorial does not openly state it, but it does suggest that by only being involved in the arrival and not the actual gathering and transport of the expellees, the western Allies facilitated the violation of the orderly and humane requirement of Potsdam, and in doing do so violated it themselves. Former United States Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on the other hand was open and direct in his criticism of the Allies

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[81] Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Abroad," *New York Times*, 23 October 1946.

[82] John Fisher, "Red Satellites Push Germans Into U.S. Zone," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 23 August 1946.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

handling of the expulsions. He articulated that the expulsions had not been humane and should have been regulated by the United Nations (UN) and that the Allies would delay future effectiveness such as the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) for years because of their poor handling of the expulsions.[85] Welles was not exactly opposed to expulsion because he had long supported the transfer of minority populations as a means by which to prevent "minority disputes."[86] He favored population transfers as a means by which to deal with minority threats to "international peace" but he opposed the Potsdam Agreement because like other post World War II agreements it "would increase rather than diminish, the danger already existing."[87]

John MacCormac of the *New York Times* leveled further criticism against Potsdam by comparing the treatment of minorities after World War I to the Allies' actions after World War II. He noted that the principle of national self-determination was used to redraw the map of Europe after World War I because Europe's races had been scattered throughout "like trees in a forest."[88] Minorities were a big focus of the post World War I peace process but national self-determination took precedence over minority issues after World War II in that the desires of nations as a collective whole were more important than those of each distinctive majority or minority group.[89] Potsdam prescribed

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[85] Sumner Welles, "The Minorities: Peace Conference Ignores Justice," *The Washington Post*, 4 September 1946.

[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] John MacCormac, "New Pattern Is Set for Minorities," *New York Times*, 20 October 1946.
[89] Ibid.

the movement of peoples not the movement of boundaries, in what MacCormac referred to as a "drastic ethnic rearrangement" of Europe.[90] MacCormac stated that this was not so much the idea of any one government but a trend that originated with the ethnic political policies of Adolph Hitler before and during the war.[91]

Samuel von Valkenburg a professor of geography at Clark University also referred to the practice of altering the population to fit set boundaries as a "post World War II trend in map-making" to fit the political situation of various nations, and the expulsion of Germans by Czechoslovakia and Poland did just that.[92] MacCormac and von Valkenburg's sentiments were echoed by the *Christian Century,* which condemned the post war policy of pushing populations to "fit" boundaries as a "savage policy" that ignored the welfare of the expellees and exposed them to horrible conditions.[93] The only interest nations regulating and physically implementing this policy had in regard to the expellees was to "get them out of where they are."[94] The previous assessments demonstrated that the media perspective resonated with a concern for the fate of the people and downplayed the geopolitical realties facing the Allies at the time.

The total lack of attention to the human side of the peace process at Potsdam provoked a response from global religious leaders, such as the "Resolution Regarding the Transfer of Populations," from the World Council of Churches (WCC). The resolution

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[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.

[92] "Politics, Not Race, Drawing Europe's Maps," *Washington Post*, 30, December 1946.
[93] "Displaced Persons Are No Accident," *Christian Century*, March 5, 1947, 292.
[94] Ibid.

was response to the orderly and humane decree issued at Potsdam that the WCC deemed to be a failure and thus demanded the postponement of the expulsions so that the time and rate of transfers could be examined and adjusted to make the process less horrific.[95] Nothing but "hardship" sickness and death had been perpetuated by the expulsion of Germans, especially upon children, women and the elderly, which offended the "Christian conscience."[96] Leaders of the council knew that "some aspects" of Potsdam had to be recognized but asked the Allies and the new United Nations Organization (UNO) that relief be provided those in distress, and in accordance with the orderly and humane decree that decent transportation, protection and sufficient food supplies be provided during the trip[97] In addition the WCC requested that the UNO make plans to find a permanent destination for the expellees before they entered Germany.[98] The WCC demanded a re-examination of the Potsdam Agreement on the grounds that it allowed for the "starvation or death" of minority populations in order to reduce their numbers so that they "fit the new frontiers" of Czechoslovakia and especially Poland, which would "bring ruin not only upon Germany but Europe" as well.[99] The WCC also declared that the expellees were "guilty of no crime" and should be awarded the rights of asylum as political refugees by the Allies and the UNO, along with guarantees that they would not be "repatriated against their will."[100]

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[95] "Resolution by the Council of Churches," *New York Times*, 24 February 1946.
[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.

Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn a Catholic Austrian aristocrat and political philosopher, pronounced the Potsdam Agreement to be a threat to a shaky world peace and that it violated the principles of Christianity and Catholicism.[101] Von Kuehnelt-Leddhin explained that Catholicism forbade "punishment of persons not guilty of a crime'" and the expulsion of Germans punished the innocent.[102] Catholicism also refuted "moralizing" on the uniqueness of one group over another and thus various "nationalities" did not actually exist an the expulsions violated this principle.[103] This was a "catastrophe" that he thought had to be studied and analyzed by historians that possessed no preexisting ideas regarding the expulsions.[104] Although von Kuehnelt-Leddhin espoused the Catholic virtue of the equality of groups of individuals he was very aware of differences among the people who composed the various regions of Germany and criticized the United States for failing to understand that until 1933 that regional identification preceded national identification.[105] Meaning that the people of Germany saw themselves as Prussian, Saxon, and Bavarian and not as Germans.[106] Thus, the failure to recognize that nearly two-thirds of the expellees were Prussian meant that the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union accomplished what the Hohenzollerns never did, the Prussianization of Germany.[107] By feeding, sheltering and finding

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[101] Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "What are they doing to Germany?" *Catholic World*, May 1946, 107.
[102] Ibid,108.

[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.

employment for the expellees and other regulatory acts the Western Allies would transform Germany from a "semi-capitalist state to a socialist state."[108]

Von Kuehnelt-Leddhin predicted that the quality of life for the German expellees would disintegrate so far until "death becomes preferable to life," which would lead to years of unrest created by the expellees and "their children" would be dehumanized by the expulsions.[109] The hatred and irredentism generated by the expulsion process could propel the expellees to invade Bohemia and Moravia, where they "might slaughter, gas or cremate every single man, woman and child" out of revenge against the expulsion policy of Benes.[110] He also wrote of those expelled from eastern Germany returning to Polish territory and committing acts of violence so vile they would make Nazi war atrocities seem like "a humanitarian love feast."[111] Such actions were possible because, he claimed the immediate aftermath of the war was not an age of morality anchored by an ethical God but an era of "enlightened self-interest" that would hopefully pass as quickly as the enlightenment did.[112] He also believed that the expellees would be the catalysts for the onset of World War III, and that even though the United States provided assistance to the expellees the German problem was far from being solved and would probably "occupy Western Civilization for decades to come."[113] Godless and immoral was how von Kuenhelt-Leddhin portrayed the expulsions and their impact. He believed that the

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[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid, 113.

[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.

German expellees epitomized the uncertainty and misery that hung over East-Central Europe after the war.

The condemnation of the expulsions within the American religious community pointed to the Allied adherence to the Potsdam Agreement as anti-Christian and inhumane in principle. But in Czechoslovakia, Protestant clergymen saw the expulsions as a safety measure as long as they were implemented orderly and humanely.[114] Robert Root of the *Christian Century* quoted American religious leader Reinhold Niebuhr describing the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia as an example of "man's inhumanity to man."[115] However, Czech Protestant leaders did not quite see it that way.[116] They adamantly exclaimed that the expulsions were not an act of revenge.[117] Instead the expulsions were a measure of "national self-defense against a fifth column" of Germans who posed a future threat to Czech security.[118] The example used by these Protestant leaders to convey that threat was Nazi atrocities of the recent past, such as the Lidice massacre and how Sudeten Germans "willingly accepted Hitler" and in doing so chose Germany over Czechoslovakia and should therefore go there.[119] The justification given by the Czech clergy was that they knew the Germans and the German mentality.[120]

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[114] Robert Root, "Are the Czechs Being Christian?" *Christian Century*, 20 March 1946, 366.

[115] Ibid, 367.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid.

Root pointed out that there was a European predisposition toward nationalities and that Europeans "pigeonhole" other ethnicities more frequently and nonchalantly and with less bigotry than "Americans."[121] He claimed Czech Protestant leaders "sound like southern or western bigots who insist that they really know the colored peoples," and stated that there was no racism in their minds or hearts when they said they knew the Germans and supported the expulsions but wanted them carried out with a "minimum of cruelty."[122] Czech religious leaders believed their support of the expulsions to be the essence of Christianity in that it would prevent future armed conflict in the heart of Europe. Whereas American Christian leaders opposed all suffering and heavily criticized the Western Allies, Czech religious leaders saw the orderly and humane edict of Potsdam as a Christian solution to Czechoslovakia's German minority problem.

Almost as fervent as American Christian leaders in their opposition to the German expulsions were two members of the British media, F.A. Voigt and Walter Knopp who voiced their criticism of the expulsions and the approval of the Potsdam agreement by the Western Allies to the American people. Voigt, who was editor of the British intellectual publication the *Nineteenth Century and After,* penned an editorial in the *American Mercury* a highly provocative, anti-establishment magazine. According to Voigt "has been and is being done this time not by war-makers but by peace-makers."[123] These expulsions could not be rationalized as were "retributory wrongs which may have a

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[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.

[123] F.A, Voigt, "Oppression in the Sudetenland," *American Mercury,* May 1946, 617.

certain wild justice and are condoned as naturally understandable," because an impartial solution was attainable, especially in the case of the Sudeten Germans whose expulsion from Czechoslovakia did nothing but add "wrong to wrong."[124] Voigt explained that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans effectively placed collective guilt on an innocent group of people and was nothing more than "mimicry of German wrong."[125] He pointed to Potsdam as the root cause of and creator of all of the misery the Sudeten Germans had experienced and suggested that it would end only if those Americans who witnessed the situation returned home to tell their story and inform the American people on what was happening.

Even though the *Saturday Evening Post* was a nationalistic mainstream publication, criticism of the Allied handling of the Polish border situation at Potsdam graced its pages. Werner Knopp a German-born British citizen, former newspaper editor and European political expert, explained that the hunger and displacement of the expellees made a joke of the orderly and humane declaration of Potsdam.[126] The cession of eastern Germany to "Soviet dominated Poland" ensured that the United States and Great Britain would become the permanent benefactors of Germany since Knopp believed it could not survive without the east, and without Western Allied assistance the "Sovietization" of Germany was possible.[127] The real crime committed at Potsdam was

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[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid, 619.

[126] Werner Knopp, "Are the Russian Brewing Another German Deal," *Saturday Evening Post,* April 12, 1945, 24.
[127] Ibid.

that Germany was relieved of its eastern "grainlands" that fed the entire nation and was then forced to accept millions of expellees after that.[128] Of course the Western Allies fed the German people but they were responsible for creating the situation. Although more of a niche publication, the *Catholic World* echoed Knopp's assertions by editorializing that at Potsdam a "full fifth of the Reich was handed over to Soviet Poland for administrative purposes and the orderly deportation" of the eight to ten million German inhabitants that accompanied it created a starving, homeless underclass.[129] The only way for Germany to continue to exist and prevent "the bolshevization of the heart of Europe" would be financial support from the United States, which would in all likelihood be for an indefinite period of time.[130] The aftermath of Potsdam in the opinion of the *Catholic World,* would be the "most humiliating defeat of all ideals Americans have died for in World War II."[131]

With the exception of Robert Root editorials of the post moratorium expulsions criticized the orderly and humane aspect of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement as the abandonment of the innocent for the sake of geopolitics. The United States was accused of violating the principles of freedom and humanity the basic beliefs for which the war was fought in the minds of many. By allowing Germans to be expelled the United States and Great Britain unleashed a starving homeless mass upon a helpless German nation and by doing so they imitated the policies of Hitler.

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[128] Ibid.
[129] "Germania Deserata" *Catholic World*, April 1947, 18.

[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.

The post-1947 expulsions were an afterthought to American citizens even though stories pertaining to them appeared in major print media publications. The Potsdam sanctioned expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the newly acquired Polish territories came to an end in late 1947 but the expulsions continued well into the 1950s and even into the 1960s. Poland expelled 125,000 Germans (100,000 to the British Zone and 25,000 to the Soviet zone) in early March of 1950 as part of an agreement with the Western Allies and West Germany that was not a part of the Potsdam Agreement.[132] These transfers consisted of doctors, engineers, business management experts and others who possessed unique skills needed to keep Poland operating during the transition period after the expulsions had been completed. By 1950 the world had moved on and few outside of East-Central Europe cared about the plight of the expelled Germans with the exception of those American citizens of German, Czech and Polish heritage. An analysis of post-1947 expulsions and the expulsions in general appeared in the *Washington Post* penned by journalist Agnes E. Meyer, who asserted that allowing the expulsion of Germans to occur had brought western civilization to "an all-time, inhuman, unchristian, barbaric low" that endangered the future stability of Germany and Europe.[133] Meyer explained that the expulsions were in a sense an act of Germans invading Germany, which produced nothing but unemployment and hunger.[134]

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[132] "Poland Expelling Last 125,000 Germans: Oder-Neisse Area To Be Cleared In A Year," *New York Times*, 4 March 1950.

[133] Agnes E. Meyer, "Germany's Nemesis: The Expellees and Refugees," *Washington Post*, 25 January 1951.

[134] Ibid.

Biased Opinions

It has been a long tradition in the United States for citizens to voice their opinions on domestic and foreign affairs by writing letters to editors of newspapers and magazines. Such letters written during the period of the expulsions were unique, as the majority of letters were written by American citizens of Czechoslovakian and Polish heritage, politicians from the region of East-Central Europe stationed in the United States, and eyewitnesses to the aftermath of the expulsions in Germany and politicians in exile. As far as can be ascertained, Americans not of East-Central European ancestry wrote very few letters–to-editors and voiced little opinion for or against the expulsions. Even though Germans were being inhumanely expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland, German-Americans remained silent, maybe out of indifference, or because they identified themselves as Americans and did not want to seem sympathetic to a German nation that started the war. The lack of written protestation by German-Americans suggests both.

At times the debate over the expulsions transformed into a campaign of public persuasion due to the participation of Czech, Polish and German politicians who resided in the United States (and elsewhere) and who wrote letters to newspapers and magazines that voiced their nation's strategic stance on the expulsions. Broader public opinion concerning the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe was nearly non-existent during the period of wild expulsions in the spring and summer of 1945. But once Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement became official in early August of 1945 it did not take long for various opinions pertaining to the expulsions to appear within the pages of popular print media vehicles. Letters of justification for the expulsions by Czechoslovakian officials stationed in the United States and Czechoslovakian Americans

for the most part explained that Czech government officials had tried very hard to get along with the Sudeten German minority. The letters conveyed that Czech President Benes had made many attempts to make the Sudeten Germans a prominent social and political force within the nation of Czechoslovakia.[135] Some of the letters suggested that Czech citizens were anything but intolerant and had even thought of the Sudeten Germans as fellow Czechoslovakian citizens. The prime example given was that of German writer Thomas Mann who had been denied citizenship by the Nazis and Sudeten German towns throughout Czechoslovakia but was granted citizenship by a town that was administered by citizens of Czechoslovakian ancestry.[136]

Czech opinion within American popular media consistently argued that the Sudeten Germans were not innocent victims but a disloyal minority who did not respect the democratic principles of Czechoslovakia.[137] For the global Czech diaspora the Sudeten Germans represented a privileged minority within Czechoslovakia and claimed that for Czechoslovakia to be a truly democratic nation such a minority should not exist. Vlastimil Kybal a former Czechoslovak Ambassador to places such as Argentina, Brazil, Portugal, Italy, and Mexico and an intermittent guest lecturer at Columbia University from 1944 to 1948, wrote a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* on September 25, 1945, that expounded on the Sudeten Germans as a privileged minority within

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[135] V.S. Hurban, "Question for Benes," *Washington Post*; 26 September 1945, 6.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Vlastimil Kybal, Sudeten Transfer Discussed: Loyal Sudetens and Austrians Are Not Involved in Movement," *New York Times*; 8 September 1945, 14.

Czechoslovakia.[138] Kybal contrasted the pre-war privileged Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia to the status of minority groups in the United States none of whom possessed a privileged position within American society.[139] In order to insure that the Sudeten Germans did not regain their privileged status within a democratic postwar Czechoslovakia there was only one workable solution, the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.

Similarly Jan Papanek head of the Chicago-based Czechoslovak Information Service and a Czechoslovakian United Nations representative from 1946 to1948, solidified the Czech stance on the removal of the Sudeten Germans in a December 1945 letter to the *New York Times.* He stated that the expulsions would be an "act of self-preservation" for Czechoslovakia.[140] Papanek also explained that expulsion of the Sudeten Germans would "settle once and for all the minority problem and eliminate the danger that might undermine" Czechoslovakia for years to come.[141] Most harsh on the Sudeten Germans was Czech Minister to the United States V.S. Hurban who told the *Washington Post* that by being expelled from Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans would "reap what they themselves by their conduct" had sown.[142] Hurban also explained that Sudeten German support of the Nazis during the German wartime occupation of

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[138] Vlastimil Kybal, "Action by Czechs Upheld: Treatment of Minority Here Viewed as No Parallel," *New York Times*; 25 September 1945, 21.
[139] Ibid.

[140] Jan Papnek, "Case for Czechoslovakia: Minister Gives Case for the Against Sudeten Germans," *New York Times*; 22 December 1945, 18.
[141] Ibid.
[142] V.S. Hurban, "Questions for Benes: A Communication," *Washington Post*; 26 September 1945, 6.

Czechoslovakia could not be totally "forgotten and forgiven."[143] Hurban also mentioned that every Sudeten German could, under law be charged with treason and executed but instead Czech citizens and government officials were "willing" to transport them back to Germany the land from which they had migrated to the Sudetenland hundreds of years before.[144] It is not the chronology but the message of Czech officials that is important. Following the finalization of Article XIII at Potsdam in August 1945, Czech officials stationed in the United States utilized American newspapers and magazines to present the Czech position on the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Letters to editors and other pieces authored by Czech officials and Czech Americans were an attempt to justify the expulsions to American officials, intellectuals and civilians.

Allied-regulated expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia began in late January 1946, but reaction to the expulsions did not appear in the form of letters or opinion pieces to newspapers and magazines until midsummer 1947. Letters written to popular media vehicles were characterized by a pervasive anti-German sentiment. One D. Siskind wrote to the *Washington Post* on July 29, 1947 that the Sudeten Germans saw themselves as an innocent minority who were being "unduly persecuted" by the Czech government.[145] The Czechs held the Sudeten Germans collectively guilty for occupation atrocities according to Siskind, who also stated that most Czechs believed that the Sudeten Germans wanted to be part of a Greater German Reich.[146] Siskind refuted claims

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[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

[145] D. Siskind, "Sudeten Germans," *Washington Post*; 29 July 1947, 8.
[146] Ibid.

by those who believed the expulsion of Sudeten Germans was cruel punishment when he quoted the opinion of unidentified neutral observers who stated that Czechs and Poles were not intentionally cruel to the Germans but were merely "humans handling a nasty situation" the best they could.[147]

Former secretary of the American Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, Frank J. Rosner penned a letter to the *Washington Post* that took anti-German sentiment to a new extreme.[148] "How could any intelligent person defend the so called Sudeten Germans?" Asked Rosner who went on to explain that the Sudeten Germans had wanted for nothing as Czech citizens as they had German language schools, and more money had been spent on social and infrastructure programs in German areas of Czechoslovakia than in Czech and Slovak areas of Czechoslovakia.[149] In addition, the Sudeten Germans had been well represented within the democratic Czech parliament, and there were also several Sudeten German ministers who had served in the Czech government before the war.[150] But it iwas the existence of German as an official language and German speaking schools before the war that created a perspective of privilege and, more importantly, German ungratefulness and treason in the minds of Czechoslovaks such as Rosner.

Once Hitler and Nazism became a powerful force, the fate of the Sudeten Germans was sealed because the cession of the Sudetenland in 1938 solidified the collectivization of Germans into one menacing threatening group in the minds of

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147 Ibid.
148 Frank J. Rosner, "Sudeten Germans," *Washington Post*, 11 August 1947, 8.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.

Czechoslovakians, which intensified during the German occupation and manifested itself in the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans who were viewed as a permanent threat to Czech democracy. Instead of being part of a democratic nation the Sudeten Germans gave their loyalty to Germany and according to Rosner by being expelled the Sudeten Germans were getting what they always desired which was to be sent back to Germany "which they were loyal for, and where they would cause no harm."[151]Rosner made it clear that what happened to the Sudeten Germans was nothing like what they had done to the Czechs "during seven dreadful years of terror and oppression" when many "men, children and women were murdered in cold blood."[152]

Throughout the time period of the expulsions (1945-1947 and beyond) alternatives to the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish government appeared in the opinion pieces and letters-to-editors pages of American newspapers. Such letters did more than offer solutions they were an attempt to make Americans aware of what was actually happening to the Germans of East-Central Europe. A letter written by H.F. March to the *New York Times* on September 1, 1945, asserted that the Sudeten German question had been presented from a predominantly Czech perspective within the American press.[153] March contested that World War II had been fought to end tyranny but that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans represented a continuation of that

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[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] H.F. March, "Question of the Sudetenland," *New York Times*, 1 September 1945, 10.

tyranny.[154] According to March, one viable solution would have been the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and allowing the Sudeten Germans to reunite with Austria.[155]

Father W. Martin Haertwig wrote a letter from Marktredwitz, Germany on July 26, 1945 that appeared in the *Chicago Tribune* but was not published until September 5, 1945.[156] Haertwig sought to inform the American public about the expulsions and present possible alternatives to the forced transfer of people from their homeland.[157] Haertwig wrote that the American people needed to know that there was no word in the English language to describe what was happening to the Germans expelled from Pomerania, Silesia and elsewhere.[158] Millions of Germans were being forced to leave homes located in the newly recovered Polish territories and were exposed to unfathomable hardship at the hands of the Poles.[159] For Haertwig the alternative to the expulsions and the best guarantee of world peace was the restoration of land in East-Central Europe to its rightful owners, which meant that the Germans should be allowed to move back to their native land.[160] Not only would world peace be achieved.[161] The restoration of land to its original

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[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.

[157] Father W. Martin Haertwig, "Voice of the People," *Chicago Tribune*: 5 September 1945,
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.

German owners would save American taxpayers money on food and raw materials that would otherwise be required to feed and rebuild Europe.[162]

Whereas Father Haertwig was witness to the end result of the expulsions from his base in a truncated Germany, German-born journalist and professor Alexander Boker of Taos, New Mexico declared that the expulsion of Germans from the new Polish territories represented the de-Germanization of the affected territories.[163] Boker's October 6, 1945 letter to the *Christian Science Monitor* explained that the Polish government had implemented a strategy of de-Germanization that included the removal of all characteristics of German culture from the newly recovered territories via the expulsion of Germans and removing German names from cities and streets replacing them with Polish names.[164] Boker opined that the expulsion of millions of Germans was a "contradiction to the democratic and humanitarian and Christian principles for which the United States have fought."[165] He also believed the Allies responsible for the tragedy had "acted" no differently than Hitler.[166]

Nine former German Reichstag members in exile in the United States wanted the American people to know that the United States supported a policy of border change that would create mono-racial states that would result not in a lasting European peace but

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[162] Ibid.
[163] Alexander Boker, "Deportations: A Fearful Precedent," *Christian Science Monitor*; 6 October 1945, 18.

[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.

certain conflict in the future.[167] They believed that awarding land in Eastern Germany to Poland and expelling the German occupants was an "impediment to the free flow of men, merchandise and ideas" that characterized a democratic world.[168] The exile group proposed that despite the "devastation" Germany had "unleashed on the world" it was time to give the German people a chance to be peaceful and productive European citizens.[169] The letter co-signed by the nine exiles appeared in the January 13 issue of *Time* and formed a portion of a declaration that had previously been sent to various United States governmental officials that protested American led Allied policies of frontier change and expulsion.[170] To the nine exiles, such policies were acts of vengeance that would never bring about lasting peace.[171] In their opinion the only way durable peace in East-Central Europe could be achieved was not through border shifting and forced population transfer but rather through "understanding and reconstruction."[172]

American Intellectuals and the Expulsions

Scholarly analysis of the expulsions did not start appearing until the beginning of 1946. Not all such pieces appeared in academic publications; some were published independently by groups of intellectuals who sought to express their particular opinion on

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[167] Siegfried Aufhauser et. al., ""A Declaration for Germany," *Time,* 13 January 1947. Other members of the group who signed their name to the letter were Dr. Fritz Baade, Gustav Ferl, Hugo Heimann, Marie Juchaz, Emil Kirschenmann, Gerhart Seger, William F. Sollman, Friedrich Stmpfer and Dr. Hans Staudinger.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.

the forced removal of Germans from East-Central Europe. Although there were few scholarly works regarding the expulsions, much of it expressed strong opinion and criticism of the great powers for embracing convenience and disregarding humanity when it came to their policy regarding Europe's German minority following the war.

Sidney B. Fay, an American historian of the liberal school and professor at Harvard from 1929 to 1946, criticized the policy of the United States and Great Britain and portrayed the German expellees as the unnecessary byproduct of the political machinations of great powers. He wrote in the March, 1946, edition of *Current History* that a vast array of Germans were being forcefully removed from their homes to a truncated and economically depressed Germany.[173] Fay explained that the Allies had officially classified individuals uprooted from their places of residence due to the circumstances of war as displaced persons (DPs) or refugees.[174] In addition to the DPs and refugees, he noted there was a third group of individuals made home homeless by the consequences of war, and that group was the German minority population of eastern, southern and Central Europe that Allied policy had forcefully expelled from their historic homes.[175] Fay explained that the German minority populations had been expelled from Silesia, East Prussia, the Free City of Danzig the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and South Tyrol.[176] Some of the expellees had been Germans

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[173] Sidney B. Fay, "Displaced Persons in Europe," *Current History*, 56, no. 4 (March 1946): 204-205.

[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.

repatriated by Hitler to eastern Germany and western Poland during the war but were expelled back to Germany once the war ended.[177] Most of the expellees, however, had been "forcefully expelled from their ancestral homes" so as to make nations such as Czechoslovakia and Poland mono-ethnic nation-states.[178] Most importantly Fay explained that the Germans expellees were not "classified" as either DPs or refugees and thus received "no protection or assistance" from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRAA) and were "distributed among villages and towns" that possessed little cultivatable farmland and very few "industrial jobs for locals much less the expellees from the East."[179]

In April 1947, Fay wrote that DPs and refugees were an unavoidable result of the war but the German expellees of Europe were not.[180] The expellees, most of who came from East of the Oder-Neisse line or the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia were "victims of human measures" after the unconditional surrender of Germany.[181] A German expellee experienced a "living death" characterized by starvation, near enslavement, exposure to cold temperatures due to lack of shelter, and separation from family members.[182] Fay blamed the hopeless reality of the expellees on American and British officials who at Yalta in February 1945 conceded German territory to Poland and the Allied approval at

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[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.

[180] Sidney B. Fay, "Europe's Expellees," *Current History*, 12 No. 65 (April 1947): 323.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid, 321.

Potsdam of orderly and humane population transfers of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the newly recovered Polish territories.[183]

Poland's expulsion of Germans from its newly-gained territory was tied to the location of Poland's Western border, which had the potential to impact Europe geographically, economically and politically for decades. Isaiah Bowman an American geographer, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and advisor to the State Department during World War II, pointed to the expulsions as evidence that the "idea of tolerance" had disappeared and the "goal of orderly and humane" was unachievable.[184] Bowman asserted that the cruelty of the expulsions would open a "bank of hatred" that would create the "need to separate the good people from the bad people" throughout Europe and the consequences would be "eternal."[185] Polish officials felt themselves able to handle the consequences of their expulsion policy because evicting the Germans would remove a serious threat to Poland's future security from within Poland and would also free up land for those who had been similarly uprooted from what had previously been eastern Poland.[186] Bowman believed that the adoption of a policy of "recognized fairness" that would include the evaluation of past history and the current situation along with the establishment of a future ideal for dealing with Poland's minority problem and border issue, would best assist the United States in the prevention of inhumane acts that

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[183] Ibid, 323-324.
[184] Isaiah Bowman, "The Strategy of Territorial Decisions," *Foreign Affairs*, 24 no.2 (January 1946): 189.

[185] Ibid, 189; 194.
[186] Ibid, 186.

accompanied the expulsions in the future.[187] He warned, if the United States did not follow the strategy of waiting for a more peaceful environment to make Poland's western boundary "stable by international agreement" the most democratic nation on earth would "confirm the injustice of an arbitrary or careless decision."[188] The failure to confront the Soviet Union immediately after the conclusion of the war concerning Poland's Western frontier represented Allied confirmation of an unjust, inhumane and arbitrary policy of expulsion implemented by the Polish government.

Like Bowman, Sidney B. Fay pointed to United States policy that demanded Poland's permanent Western border be decided at an undetermined future peace conference as one of the main reasons why the Poles treated the Germans so cruelly.[189] Hatred of Germans and revenge for occupation atrocities were obvious reasons for such an attitude, but the failure to settle Poland's western border status after Potsdam led to Polish treatment of Germans mirroring Hitler's policies in Poland during the occupation.[190] Fay declared that "even with sympathy for Poland the wholesale expulsion of Germans was not right" and the viciousness of the expulsions was proof of Poland's "unilateral, arbitrary and unjust" interpretation of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement.[191] Germany had lost key agricultural and industrial land to the Poles and gained millions in population as punishment for starting the war, but after a period of

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[187] Ibid, 178; 186.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Sidney B. Fay, "Europe's Expellees," 324.

[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.

time, Fay suggested that some agricultural land in Lower Silesia, Brandenburg and Pomerania should be returned to Germany.[192]

Allen W. Dulles, one of the original members of the Office of Strategic (OSS) Services during World War II who served as Berlin bureau chief for a brief period after the war, claimed that Russia's need for a western buffer zone to secure the Russian homeland was a major reason that the expulsions unfolded the way they did.[193] By controlling land as far west as the Oder-Neisse Russia could possibly use the threatened restoration of "Germany's ancient eastern border" as a way to guarantee future Polish compliance with Russian policy wishes.[194] Dulles believed that immediate United States involvement in the placement of Poland's western frontier was a much better strategic policy than waiting to address the border issue at a future peace conference.[195] The point made by Dulles was a valid one, in that immediate international settlement of Poland's western border would possibly have made the expulsion of Germans from the Oder-Neisse region a bit more orderly and humane, in that a U.S. military presence would have decreased violent and abusive behavior against the expellees. It would also have sent a message to the Soviet Union that the future geographic shape of Europe would not be decided without American input.

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[192] Ibid, 328.
[193] Allen W. Dulles, "Alternatives for Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, 25 No. 3 (April, 1947): 426.
[194] Ibid.

[195] Ibid, 427.

One group of intellectuals protested the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and the provisions of Article XIII. This group of mostly northeastern American intellectuals called themselves the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens (AFDS), and members included prominent thinkers such as Roger N. Baldwin, co-founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Oswald Garrison Villard owner of the liberal publication *The Nation* and the *New York Evening Post*, and Robert J. Watt, international representative for the American Federation of Labor (AFL).[196] The American Friends of Democratic Sudetens produced a pamphlet that protested American support of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia titled "The Tragedy of a People: Racialism in Czechoslovakia." The AFDS opposed the United States government's support of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Europe, declaring Article XIII an American submission to "Hitler's spirit."[197] Even though the expulsions had been approved via international agreement the war had effectively been lost because Hitler's racial ideology was now endorsed by the United

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[196] American Friends of Democratic Sudeten, *The Tragedy of a People: Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, (New York: March 1947):
Other members of American Friends of Democratic Sudetens included: George Creel Director of the Society for the Prevention of World War II, Sidney Hook Professor of Philosophy at New York University, Robert M. MacIver Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, Liston Oaks editor of the *New Leader*, A. Phillip Randolph President of the Union of Sleeping Car Porters, Rabbi David Sola Pool of the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue, Mark Stark Educational Director for the International Ladies Garment Union, Norman Thomas Chairman of the Socialist Party, Michel Williams founder of *The Commonwealth*, Matthew Woll Vice President of the American Federation of Labor, Hollingsworth Wood Chairman of the International Rescue and Relief Committee.
[197] Ibid, 1.

States.[198] To back this point up the AFDS noted that in one of his final speeches Hitler had "predicted that even if defeated his spirit would still live on" and they claimed that American policy in favor of the expulsions was ample proof of that.[199] The American Friends of Democratic Sudetens wanted the ugly truth of American expulsion policy to be known and urged the American people to "influence American policy" by raising their voices as individuals and organizations to government officials.[200] It was time for the American people to be heard because even though Potsdam was supposed to "humanize the expulsions from Czechoslovakia" and the newly recovered territories of Poland, it had failed to do so.[201]

To emphasize their point, the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens included evidence gleaned from newspapers, religious leaders, intellectuals and politicians. But the biggest indictment of American expulsion policy came from an unexpected source, an American soldier who had served in Czechoslovakia and witnessed the expulsions firsthand. The unidentified soldier was angered by what had happened to the Sudeten Germans and stated: "I thought I came over here to stop this sort of thing, where on God's earth do our American ideals come in?"[202] He also asserted that even though the Czechs were American allies he "despised them" and really had nothing but positive feelings toward the Sudeten Germans but his hands were tied and could do nothing but

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[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid, 4.
[201] Ibid, 32.

[202] Ibid, 33.

complain about the situation.[203] In closing, the soldier praised the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens for their attempt to educate the American people about what was going on in Czechoslovakia.[204] Such a stirring testimonial by a member of the American military who had witnessed the horror of the expulsion process solidified the introduction of The *Tragedy of a People* which closed by urging all Americans to remember the war had been fought to uphold "principles which we have long accepted in words and so callously flaunted in deeds" as a nation.[205] *The Tragedy of a People* generated next no publicity or press coverage of any kind and, therefore, no policy change by the United States government in relation to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, most probably because of limited distribution to the public but also because the expulsions had largely been completed.

As a solution to the minority problem the Committee Against Mass Expulsion (CAME) saw the expulsion of Germans from the newly acquired Polish territories as an offense to the "basic principles of civilization."[206] The Committee Against Mass Expulsion opposed frontier change and the expulsion of Germans from territory in Eastern Germany awarded to Poland by the Allies after the war. Members of the Committee Against Mass Expulsions were liberal intellectuals from the fields of journalism, higher education, religion and social activism. In fact, many of the

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[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.

[206] Committee Against Mass Expulsion, *Land of the Dead: The Study of Deportations from East Germany* (New York: Committee Against Mass Expulsions, 1947), 4.

individuals involved in the Committee Against Mass Expulsions were also affiliated with the AFDS, but there were a few notable exceptions such as William Henry Chamberlin a socialist journalist for the *Christian Science Monitor*, Varian Fry founder of what eventually became the International Rescue Committee, radio commentator H.V. Kaltenborn and radio and print journalist Dorothy Thompson.[207] These thinkers and activists voiced their opposition to United States policy on the expulsion of Germans by Poland and the question of Poland's western frontier in a pamphlet, *The Land of the Dead: The Study of Deportations from East Germany* published in 1947.

The pamphlet placed responsibility for the brutality of the Polish expulsions of Germans from the new Polish territories squarely on the shoulders of the Truman administration.[208] To CAME, the "wholesale expulsion of the local population" of Germans was a policy perpetuated by the United States at Potsdam that was a betrayal to the American people's standards of truth, justice and humanity.[209] Not only was the United States government responsible for the inhumanity of the expulsions, the failure of the American press to address the matter was disconcerting as well.[210] According to CAME, the Allies were understandably sympathetic to "Poland's suffering" during the

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[207] Ibid, 1. Other members of the Committee Against Mass Expulsions included Roger N. Baldwin, Alfred Bingham, Charles Upson Clark, George S. Counts, John Dewey, Christopher Emmet, Dean Christian Gaus, Arthur Garfield Hayes, Rev. John Haynes Holmes, Rev. John LaFarge, Francis Neilson former member of the British House of Commons, Eustace Seligman, George N. Shuster, Norman Thomas, Oswald Garrison Villard, Dorothy Thompson and Robert J. Watt.
[208] Ibid, 7.

[209] Ibid, 3; 7.
[210] Ibid, 3.

war but Poland should not have been awarded German land.[211] Rather, it should have been given aid for economic recovery and the rebuilding of infrastructure.[212] Instead of dealing with the expulsions in a fair and moral manner the United States chose to protect the "atrocities of our Allies" and assist in the perpetuation of new and old hatreds throughout East-Central Europe.[213] During the expulsions millions of Germans had been exposed to disease, starvation or been executed due to the "attitude of resignation" that characterized United States policy toward the expulsions.[214] A lasting peace would never be achieved because the "rights of man were being replaced by the rights of nations."[215]

Reaction to CAME emanated from organizations opposite in ideology such as the Society for the Prevention of World War III (SPWW3) and the American Friends of Czechoslovakia (AFC). The SPWW3 was founded in 1944 by Rex Stout, author of the Nero Wolfe detective stories, and included such high profile members as First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Albert Einstein and Henry Morgenthau.[216] It functioned to combat "the organized German propaganda" and undeserved sympathy that was widely prevalent in universities, the business world "and all throughout American Life."[217] Most of all, the SPWW3 favored a harsh peace that would prevent another rise in German militarism and "Potsdam seemed to denote that tough terms remained the policy" of American

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[211] Ibid, 4.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Ibid, 13; 30.
[215] Ibid, 3, 8.

[216] Steven Casey, "The Campaign to Sell a Harsh Peace for Germany to the American Public, 1944-1948," *History* 90, no. 1 (January 2005), 67, 88.
[217] Ibid.

leaders.[218] The SPWW3 accused individuals and groups like CAME of being "prophets of doom" who were unduly sympathetic Germany.[219] The difference between the CAME and the SPWW3 was in the depth and breadth of their respective messages; CAME focused on the forcible expulsion of minorities throughout Europe and dedicated itself to exposing the suffering inflicted upon the expellees by the declaration of Potsdam. Possessing a wider focus the SPWW3 favored a harsh peace toward Germany and supported every aspect of the Potsdam Agreement but focused mainly on the economic provisions of the agreement. For them support for the expulsions was just one strategic prong in the SPWW3 mission to combat liberal America's sympathetic stance to all things German.

Like CAME, the AFC also possessed a high profile membership including President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, and President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and adviser to the State Department, James T. Shotwell plus Edouard Beněs as an honorary chairman.[220] The AFC basically published pamphlets about the struggle facing Czechoslovakia during Nazi occupation. *Democracy in Czechoslovakia* written by Brackett Lewis in 1941, expounded on Czechoslovakia being the foundation of democracy in Central Europe and suggested that the Sudeten Germans had possessed more rights than required by minority rights treaties of the day.[221]

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[218] Ibid, 83.
[219] Ibid, 85.

[220] R.M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 295.
[221] Brackett Lewis, *Democracy In Czechoslovakia*, 3rd ed. (New York: American Friends of Czechoslovakia, 1941), 60-65.

CAMES's opposition to U.S. expulsion policy was valid and at the same time cliché. There is substance o the idea that the U.S. should have approached postwar Poland differently than it did by adopting the policy of offering recovery and economic aid to Polish leaders instead of agreeing to award Poland German territory. Yet it must be remembered that the U.S. was part of an alliance and that contained a member, the Soviet Union that had suffered much during the war and liberated Poland, which had also suffered greatly and in the minds of Allied leaders the awarding of territory to Poland made up for massive war losses. The intellectuals of CAME failed to realize that the United States was not working alone and had to take part in the process of collective policymaking with Great Britain and Russia and had to conduct itself accordingly. As CAME mentioned the Potsdam Agreement did legitimize the inhumanity of the expulsions and set the stage for the continuation of old hatreds indefinitely. Liberal in ideology CAME, to a large degree, placed blame for the horror of the expulsions on the Democratic Truman administration, which it also accused of betraying the humane nature of the American people. *The Land of the Dead* made many good points regarding the expulsions but it changed nothing because the expulsions were well underway by the time it was published. Potsdam may not have been perfect but it was the best of many bad solutions and for the U.S. and Great Britain to do nothing at all would have been the ultimate display of inhumanity. To criticize Potsdam and suggest policy changes in midstream as CAME did in 1947 was unrealistic in that the only solution that could have been adopted in that time was the turning back of the expellees by the Americans and the British which would have resulted in genocide throughout East-Central Europe. However, the American support of Potsdam and the expulsions allowed ethnic cleansing

to occur which did run counter to he American principles of freedom and justice. But what the members of CAME failed to realize was that sometimes principles are subject to the pressure of insane realities and the best solution to the German minority question was the worst reality.

The Land of the Dead had a very isolated impact on public opinion concerning the expulsions in the United States. But there was a place where it aroused a great bit of passion, and surprisingly, that place was Germany. From an American historical perspective based upon the fact that Germany was a defeated and downtrodden nation after the war, it would be logical to presume that the German people were silent on the Potsdam Agreement and its future impact on Germany out of the powerlessness and embarrassment of defeat. But, that was not the case; the German people were very critical of the Potsdam Agreement, which generated heated and vociferous debate.[222] The German public believed the Potsdam Agreement would not "last ten years" and its collapse would bring about anarchy and nuclear war.[223] Anti-Czech, Pole and Soviet sentiment throughout Germany that was the foundation for revisionist thinking regarding Potsdam after the publication of The *Land of the Dead* in 1947 fueled disgust with the Potsdam Agreement.[224]

Three versions of *The Land of the Dead* were published and distributed in Germany in 1947. There was the American version published by CAME, another version

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[222] Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn, *Die Vertreibung im deutschen Ertinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 383-384.

[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid, 384.

published in Lippstadt, Nordrhein-Westphalia by Priest Council Georg Goebel with the title translated into German as *Das Land der Toten* and a third version published by the Foreign Policy Committee of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the British Zone of Occupation.[225] The text of the CDU edition was altered to accompany their political goals and ideology that believed the Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions ignored and thus violated the principles of humanity.[226] Not surprisingly, the opinion of the CDU was prevalent throughout Germany, largely due to the CDU presenting the message of the American version of *The Land of the Dead* in a way that represented the concerns of the German people in regard to international law.[227] For the German people, it was not "the skill of the argument but the spirit of how it was written" and that *Land of the Dead* in its various forms demanded that the wrongs of Potsdam be corrected.[228]

German Historians Eva Hahn, a specialist in Bohemian history and her husband Hans Henning Hahn, a professor at the University of Oldenburg and Eastern Europeanist, explain that a "comparison" of the three versions of the *Land of the Dead* discloses that its motivations were not humanitarian but political.[229] Rather, it was an "appeal for the revision of U.S. foreign policy" to revert to its democratic past and abandon the Potsdam Agreement which threatened the basic fundamentals of "civilization which stands on the individual's right to his home."[230] The lack of an attentive American audience for *The*

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[225] Ibid, 285.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid, 386.

[229] Ibid, 385.
[230] Ibid, 387.

Land of the Dead and its widespread acceptance in Germany displays the cold indifference of the American people and American policy toward the not only the expellees but also the people of Germany.

Coordinator of Catholic Affairs in Germany after the war, Bishop Muench of Fargo, North Dakota explained, "the one thing which is perhaps even a greater atrocity than the Allied looting of 12 million people is the conspiracy of silence about it" and he placed blame on the American public and media.[231] To say a conspiracy of silence existed is a bit strong because coverage of the expulsions appeared in newspapers, periodicals, scholarly journals and works published by several interest groups. The problem was that even though the tragedy of the expulsions appeared in newspapers and periodicals they were not mentioned on a consistent basis in reported stories, editorials or in letters to publications. Frank discussion about the expulsions in popular newspapers and periodicals originated from Europe from those who had a vested interest in the expulsions, such as politicians, diplomats and members of the clergy. For the average American, however, the fact the war had ended and the American people were moving on and separating themselves from the tragedies of Europe blinded them to the fate of the German expellees.

Public debate about the expulsions did take place within some clerical, intellectual and scholarly circles. The orderly and humane declaration of Potsdam and the position of Poland's western boundary generated some outspoken opinion most of which criticized policy decisions that seemed to set Europe up for more unrest in the not too distant

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[231] *Catholic World,* "Germania Deserta," 19.

future. Thus, to these critics, the United States and Great Britain seemed to have betrayed the ideology of freedom and humanity for which the war had been fought. And most Americans cared little and seemed content to believe that the war had ended once the shooting had stopped, but in reality it had only just begun.

CHAPTER VI

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLICY AND OPINION

For United States and British officials the transfer of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was just one of many issues of concern during the Potsdam Conference of 1945. In fact, they viewed to be of secondary importance, "especially" President Harry S. Truman who, according to Alfred de Zayas saw the transfer of Germans as "unimportant."[1] In his memoirs, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes admitted as much, explaining that American policymakers believed that other issues were far more critical to the security of Europe, such as setting the date for discussion of a final peace agreement with Germany, the economic and political structure of occupied Germany, the implementation of everything previously agreed upon at the Yalta Conference, and a reworking of how reparations would be disbursed.[2] However, once the expulsions began and details about the violence and hunger that characterized them became known criticism of Article XIII intensified from both American diplomats in Europe and members of Congress in Washington. Although some in the American

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[1] Alfred de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 157.
[2] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 30-31.

diplomatic corps elieved the expulsion of Germans to be justified, some politicians in the House of Representatives and Senate believed the treatment of the expellees ran counter to the humanitarian ideals of the United States.

Loyal Servants but Skeptical Observers

Although low on the list of priorities among the Western Allies, the expulsion of Germans by the Czech and Polish governments could not be completely ignored. The mass movement of Germans possessed the potential to destabilize East-Central Europe both at the point of departure and in the immediate and long-term future after the expellees had settled into German society. While Truman focused his attention elsewhere, American diplomats and military administrators on the ground were acutely aware of these practical problems. American and British diplomats and European officials feared that if the Sudeten Germans were not expeditiously expelled, Czechoslovakian President Edouard Benes might be replaced by a less cooperative leader.[3] Benes had agreed to abide by the provisions put forth in Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement regarding the "orderly and humane" transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia.[4] Although the degree of Benes's adherence to the guidelines of Article XIII could be questioned, he mostly cooperated with Allied administration of the transfers and was preferable to a leader who might exploit the Czech population's hatred of the Sudeten Germans to act unilaterally in solving the Sudeten German problem.

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[3] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Volume I: The Conference of Berlin* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960), 645. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUSv01

[4] Ibid.

Poland represented a different situation as the Polish border had been moved west into what had been Germany before the Allies could react, which made the expulsion of Germans "unavoidable" in the strategic calculations of American diplomats.[5] Regardless, the presence of Soviet forces influenced American decisions in relation to the expulsions more than any other factor.

At the time Potsdam Conference commenced on August 2, 1945 the Soviet Union controlled Czechoslovakia and Poland politically and militarily. Eastern Poland had become part of the Soviet Union and a Polish government heavily influenced by the Soviets administered the rest of Poland. The Russians also occupied most of Czechoslovakia except for the area south of the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line that was under American control. One of the most contentious points of negotiation at Potsdam concerned the location of Poland's western border, which the Western Allies preferred to be located at the Curzon Line while the Soviets preferred the more western location of the Oder-Neisse line. Unable to reach an agreement, both parties pledged to delay discussion of the matter until a peace conference could be arranged. In effect, the temporary boundary of Poland became permanent because the Polish administration of former German territory up to the Oder-Neisse line was under direct control of the Soviet Union.[6] This fact not lost on the Western Allies who knew there was very little chance of

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[5] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt), October 19, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. II, General: Political and Economic Matters,* Washington, D,C.: GPO, 1967), 1294 http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945vo2

[6] R.M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 90.

getting the Oder-Neisse territory returned to Germany at a future peace conference.[7] This is relevant because even though the United States opposed the unilateral wild expulsions that had occurred in Czechoslovakia and Poland, they were likely to continue and prove to be uncontrollable because of Soviet political influence over the expelling nations. Thus, military action to halt the expulsions was never a viable option. The Soviet Union was a wartime ally, however distasteful, and agreements had been made concerning the expulsions with Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders before the war. Thus, the Western Allies believed that the best way to impose some order on the expulsions was to regulate them through international agreement, which the Potsdam Agreement supposedly did, although with varying degrees of effectiveness.

American officials recognized that an unspecified number of Germans were going to be transferred regardless but they hoped that the transfers would not be wholesale in nature.[8] United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes revealed in a post-Potsdam memo in October of 1945 that the United States had no intention to "encourage or commit ourselves to transfers in cases where other means of adjustment were practicable" but other means of adjustment were never considered by Western Allies or the Soviet Union and their communist underlings in Czechoslovakia and Poland.[9] United States Political Advisor to Germany Robert Murphy thought the violation of the "orderly and

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[7] Ibid. the

[8] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt), 19 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1294.

[9] Ibid.

humane" directive of the Potsdam Agreement by Czechoslovakia and Poland was unacceptable and a disgrace to "humanity."[10] Murphy acknowledged that the presence of the United States military in Czechoslovakia had prevented the expulsions from being more inhumane than they were but by allowing the expulsions to occur the United States was a willing accomplice in a crime of convenience.[11] Murphy viewed the United States military's logistical support of the expulsion process as an affront to the "American way of life" and core American beliefs and principles.[12] Secretary Byrnes was less harsh in his assessment because he helped to implement the policy, but he did point out to United States Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane that "such mass distress and maltreatment of the weak and helpless" by the Poles was a violation of the Potsdam Agreement.[13]

Similar doubts and concerns existed in the upper echelon of the United States military administration in Europe. General Lucius D. Clay Deputy Governor of the American Zone of Occupation within the Office of the Military Government of the United States in Germany (OMGUS), believed the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe possessed the potential to create long-term problems within the nations of the region. To Clay the removal of people from their historic homes to a war-ravaged

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[10] The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), and enclosed Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy), 12 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1289-1291.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane), 30 November 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1317.

foreign nation where they were unwelcome and without personal property or resources was an act of heartlessness.[14] Clay pointed out that Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and the recovered Polish territories were being sent to a nation they had been "separated from" for hundreds of years.[15] The expelled Germans spoke a completely different dialect of German and they "no longer shared common customs or traditions nor did they think of Germany as home."[16] Most importantly the German expellees viewed their exile to Germany as temporary and saw their return to their historic homelands as inevitable, making them a group that had the potential to destabilize East-Central Europe.[17] To Clay there was no easy solution to the German minority problem.[18] It was not just a German problem but also a European problem that had to be dealt with effectively in order to ensure lasting peace in Europe.[19]

As Deputy Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation Clay was not only an eyewitness to the plight of the expellees but privy to information concerning their treatment from various special advisors. One such person was James K. Pollock, a political science professor at the University of Michigan, who served under Clay in 1945-1946 where he advised OMGUS on the structure of Germany's postwar government. During his time as an observer and adviser, Pollock worried that the manner in which the expellees had been treated from departure to arrival in the U.S. zone represented a threat

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[14] Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York: Doubleday, 1950), 315.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid, 316.
[19] Ibid.

to long-term social and political stability in Germany after the occupation ended.[20] In a critique of the handling of expellees in the U.S. zone Pollock characterized the settling of expellees "as communities" as unfair to the expellees and the communities where they settled.[21] He referred to the case of Sudeten Germans who had been "settled too close to the Bavarian border" rather than being assigned to Northern Bavaria and elsewhere throughout Germany farther away from the Sudetenland.[22] He worried about attempts by these Sudeten Germans to return home and preventing possible terror attacks emanating from Germany against those who had taken their property in neighboring Czechoslovakia.[23] The two million German expellees who were to eventually inhabit the U.S. zone, Pollock warned, would create food and housing shortages that could prove to be insoluble.[24] Pollock noted in his diary in the spring of 1946 that the "Potsdam decision which has resulted in moving millions of people hither and yon will, in the end, have tremendous international consequences."[25] The crowding, starvation and despair observed by Pollock led to his evaluation that the expulsion and relocation of Germans would have an adverse impact within Germany and throughout the region of East-Central Europe.

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[20] James K. Pollock Occupation Diary: Book I, March 26, 1946: Box 58, Papers of James K. Pollock Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] James K. Pollock Diary of Occupation: Book II, 20 April 1946, Box 58, Papers of James K. Pollock Bentley Historical Library University of Michigan.
[25] Ibid.

Nevertheless, there were other American officials on the ground, who supported the Allied policy of expulsion and saw the population transfers as both a viable solution to the German minority troubles of Czechoslovakia and Poland and as means by which to exact retribution for German acts of violence and oppression during the wartime occupation of both nations. One such person was Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia following World War II.[26] Steinhardt believed that the expulsions were justified by the six-year German occupation of Czechoslovakia and was subsequently shocked that there had been "so little ill treatment of the Germans" expelled from Czechoslovakia.[27] At a December 1947 question-and-answer on Czechoslovakia, Steinhardt pronounced that the transfer of Germans was more humane than anything "carried out in Europe before."[28] He went on to state that the United States Army had implemented and executed the expulsions efficiently, few complaints had been filed, and those complaints that had been filed originated from American officers who had been persuaded to do so by their Sudeten German girlfriends.[29] Steinhardt firmly believed that Czechoslovakia had the right to expel the Sudeten Germans as long as it was done humanely, which he believed had been the case.[30] To Steinhardt, any debate over the morality of the expulsions was a moot point because they had now been

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[26] The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 3 October 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1283.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Laurence A. Steinhardt, "The Current Situation in Czechoslovakia," Presented at the National War College, 15 December 1945, Czechoslovakian Collection, Papers of Laurence A. Steinhardt, Box 68, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

concluded and could not be reversed.[31] Similarly, Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane cited the destruction of Poland during the German occupation as justification for the expulsion and made the cruel treatment of Germans during the expulsion by the Poles understandable.[32] Lane believed that the Poles should be allowed to treat the German expellees as they desired without rebuke.

Criticism from Afar

In Congress, a very small number of Democrats and Republicans expressed strong opposition to the expulsion of Germans. The legislators had not participated in the planning and negotiation of the Potsdam Accords, including the controversial Article XIII. Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) believed that the State Department had not acted in the best interests of the United States in this matter.[33] Wherry decried Poland's expulsion of 40,000-60,000 Germans from the city of Breslau who were forced to endure the inhumanity of being crowded into railroad cars for a trip that was "instant death" for the old and young children.[34] Their unfortunate fate was a direct result of Article XIII, which had been negotiated solely by the State Department without input and approval by Congress.[35] According to Senator Wherry, Article XIII and subsequent population transfers ran counter both to American values and also American interests in Europe.[36]

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[31] Ibid.
[32] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt), 30 November 1945, *FRUS, 1945, II*: 1318-1319.
[33] Cong. Rec., 79th., 2d sess., 1946, 92, pt. 1: 894-895.
[34] Ibid, 900.
[35] Ibid, 894-895.
[36] Ibid.

Congressional criticism of the Potsdam Agreement generally focused on how it violated all that the United States stood for and represented a betrayal of the American people by their leaders. Senator James Eastland (D-MS) called the removal of Germans from the Sudetenland and Oder-Neisse and the hardships that accompanied their expulsion "one of the most cruel chapters in history."[37] According to Eastland Article XIII of Potsdam represented a compensatory give away of territory by the Allies to the Czechs, Poles and Russians that ran counter to the ideas of justice and peace and instead spread hunger and disease.[38] Eastland explained that the United States was bound to prevent the starvation of the expellees both legally and morally.[39] Most bothersome to Eastland was the fact that the American people seemed to know so very little about what was going on in Europe in late 1945, and he charged that American government officials were complicit in a "conspiracy of silence" to hide the cruelty of American policy toward the German expellees.[40] Partial blame for the cruel nature of the expulsion policy, in the opinion of Eastland, belonged to the American people who were not only gullible but also happily uniformed about the plight of the German expellees.[41] By allowing Article XIII to become United States policy and international law at Potsdam Eastland argued that President Truman had failed to bring security to Europe.[42] Eastland had a unique perspective on the expulsion policy having witnessed firsthand the impact of Article XIII

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[37] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 9: 11373.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, 11371-11372.
[41] Ibid, 11371.
[42] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 2d. sess., 1946, 92, pt. 9: 511.

on the expellees and the rest of Germany during a Senate Naval Affairs Committee trip to Europe in 1945.[43] The delegation traveled through cities and towns of Bavaria and into Austria on June 1-2, 1945, during the phase of wild expulsions of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.[44]

Senator Henrik Shipstead (R-MN), an old isolationist also opposed the Potsdam expulsion policy and voiced his concerns at various times. Shipstead claimed that the Potsdam Agreement had transformed international law into absolute rule by the victors of World War II, who strengthened their power in Europe at the expense of helpless millions who had no recourse.[45] It was unfathomable to Shipstead that the American people possessed so little knowledge of the expulsion and starvation of 16 million to 18 million German expellees.[46] Even more unfathomable to the senator was the failure of the United States government to inform the American people of the privation and destitution experienced by the Germans as a result of the expulsions.[47] To Shipstead the existence of 22 million homeless expellees, displaced persons and refugees in Germany was proof that the freedom for which the war had been fought was not coming to fruition.[48]

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[43] Wolfgang Schlauch, "American Policy Towards Germany, 1945," *Contemporary European History* 5, no. 4 (1970): 124.
[44] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 9: 11371-11379; Naval Affairs Subcommittee Trip to Europe, May 25, 1945-June 14, 1945, Log of Military and Naval Affairs Subcommittee Trip to European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation, James O. Eastland Collection, File I, Series 1: Personal/Political Papers, Subseries 14: Trips, Box 1, Folder 1, University of Mississippi: Archives and Special Collections; Oxford, MS.
[45] Cong. Rec. Appx., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 13: A5416.
[46] Ibid, A417.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, 92, pt. 9: 511.

Congressman Charles W. Vursell (R-IL) similarly castigated the Truman administration for not providing sufficient information explaining the substance of Article XIII.[49] Vursell believed that Article XIII ran counter to the Christian principles of the American people and their kindhearted, humanitarian nature.[50] Article XIII served no other function than to sow the seeds of hatred within Germany, and all of Europe. Despite former President Franklin D. Roosevelt's pledge to treat the German people fairly quite the opposite had occurred.[51] If provided factual information regarding the hunger, disease and death that resulted from the expulsions, Vursell firmly believed that the American public would force a change in policy pertaining to the expulsions.[52]

The most fierce and vociferous critic of the expulsions and the Potsdam Agreement was Senator William Langer (R-ND). Langer's interest in the expulsions and the fate of postwar Germany emanated from his German ancestry. His father, Frank J. Langer, had immigrated to the United States from Michelsdorf, located in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia and home to millions of Germans since the 1400s but who now faced expulsion in 1946.[53] In regard to foreign policy ideology, Langer belonged to a group called the old isolationists who believed that for Europe to remain peaceful, an economically and socially strong Germany would be a necessity and could

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[49] Cong. Rec., Appx., 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, pt. 9: A398.
[50] Ibid, A397.
[51] Ibid, A398.
[52] Ibid, A397-A398.
[53] Charles M. Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist: Senator William Langer on the Subject of ethnic Cleansing, March 29, 1946," in *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 395.

be achieved without the United States providing economic support to "half the continent" of Europe.[54] Langer was an isolationist, but he did not object to the application of American military power when and where it was really needed. His isolationism originated from the existence of a large population of Ukrainian and Lithuanian Germans who had immigrated to a fourteen-county area of the Red River Valley in North Dakota in the 1890s.[55] These Germans found themselves unable to "send, food, clothing and farming implements" to family and friends in Germany after the war because of the American policy on "humanitarian aid," that Langer characterized as "totalitarian in nature."[56]

Aside from his German heritage, Langer consistently, championed the underdog and was "always on the side of the poor man, the little man, the under privileged or those who had been neglected by society as a whole."[57] By 1946, there was no more neglected group than the Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories. Langer compared the plight of the neglected in postwar Europe to farmers in North Dakota who saw themselves as a "colonial" possession of Wall Street.[58] According to Charles M. Barber, Professor Emeritus of German-American studies at Northeastern Illinois University and editor of the *Yearbook of German American Studies, Eintracht* and several articles on Langer, it was the exploitation of the people and resources of

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[54] Ibid, 397.
[55] Lawrence H. Larsen, "William Langer: A Maverick in the Senate," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 44, no. 3 (1961): 194.
[56] Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist," 405.
[57] Ibid, 396.
[58] Ibid, 848.

North Dakota and their similarity to other exploited "peoples around the world that gave him a larger sense of moral anger" that he directed to the predicament of the expellees following the war.[59] Langer spoke for those who had been exposed to the inhumanity of war and postwar geopolitics, spoke of the Holocaust and *vertreibung* (the German name for the flight and expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe that occurred after World War II from the spring of 1945 through the end of 1947), and acknowledged that both Jew and German had suffered greatly.[60]

Although the Holocaust and expulsion of Germans had been chronicled on a regular basis by the American media the American people were largely indifferent to the ordeal of the Jews and expellees who were caught up in circumstances beyond their control and had been punished inhumanely for being German.[61] Langer "abhorred the indifference among Christians in the United States to the remnant surviving after Hitler's killing of millions of Jews" and it was to the indifference of the American people and the brutal starvation and uncertainty inflicted as a result of the Potsdam Agreement that he directed his March 29, 1946, Senate speech.[62] Titled "The Famine in Germany," he criticized American citizens and leaders for having accepted the expulsion of Germans from their homes and demanded that the expulsions be suspended until they were, without a doubt, orderly and humane.[63] Langer cited the words of George Orwell, who

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[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid, 400-401.
[61] Ibid, 398.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

believed that the Allies had allowed crimes against humanity to be committed against the Germans as punishment for having started the war or had ignored them because the Germans had angered and frightened the world and for that the world should show them no pity.[64]

Langer declared that politicians had a duty to inform the American people about the horrid conditions in Central Europe, despite the reluctance of the Truman administration to make public information about the expulsions and the overall occupation of Germany.[65] Langer urged his fellow Senators to counter what he claimed to be "almost a conspiracy of silence in the press" concerning the treatment of Germans because they had access to information most Americans did not.[66] Here, Langer referred to classified information possessed by the Truman administration contained in a report by the Russian-created German Central Administration for Health that gave a description of conditions facing the expellees in the Russian zone of occupation.[67]According to the report, conditions were so atrocious that Langer likened them to the period of Black Death that scourged medieval Europe.[68] Langer claimed reiterated that there was almost a "conspiracy of silence in the press" and politicians had a civic duty to inform the American people of events and conditions in occupied Germany.[69]

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[64] Ibid, 399.
[65] Ibid, 399-400.
[66] Ibid, 400.
[67] 399.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.

Contrary to the claims of Langer, there was no conspiracy of silence concerning the plight of the expellees. Stories pertaining to the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe might not have appeared on the front page of major American newspapers but there was enough coverage to nix the idea of a media-led conspiracy of silence. Langer was correct that the expellees were facing a nightmare. However, the horrid conditions that they faced were not exactly a secret even though the amount of press coverage concerning the expulsions in comparison to other postwar events was minimal. Had there been a desire by the American public to learn more about the situation facing the expellees there would have been more press coverage and most likely more questions and involvement by politicians on behalf of the expellees. At the time there was very little sympathy for anything German among the American public. The Truman administration, in Langer's opinion, had disgraced civilization through its support, implementation and enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement, which he thought ridiculous and responsible for having exposed millions to "cruelty unknown to civilizations."[70] Langer believed that this cruelty stemmed from the Western Allies' failure to confront the ethnic cleansing conducted by the Czechs, Poles and Soviets before and after Potsdam.[71]

Nothing irked Langer more than United States food policy in Germany, which was based on President Roosevelt's premise that the Germans "should not have a level of

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[70] Cong., Rec., 79th Cong,. 2d sess., 1946, 92., pt. 3" 2801;2806.
[71] Barber, *The Isolationist as Interventionist*, 402.

subsistence above the lowest level of the people they conquered."[72] Subsequently "a disease and unrest formula" devised and implemented by the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) set the average calorie intake of the German people at 1550 calories a day, which in actuality was somewhat lower in the summer of 1945 at 700-1190 calories per person.[73] Langer vehemently opposed the United States policy of starvation in Germany and heavily criticized the U.S. limitation on humanitarian aid and the failure to get food into Germany as totalitarian.[74] American food policy prioritized the "feeding of non-German displaced persons and liberated Allied nationals" and left the expellees at the end of the food supply chain in Germany.[75] The massive influx of millions of expellees from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories intensified the scarcity of food in postwar Germany, which placed greater pressure on the United States government to feed the German people.[76] Food might have been scarce but the unequal distribution of food by the United States indicates a policy of punishment via starvation, which created a situation in which certain groups of people in occupied Germany were considered more worthy than others.

Government officials joined the criticism of U.S. food policy in Germany. Thirty-four senators signed a petition that demanded that the United States Zone of Occupation

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[72] Richard Dominic Wiggers, "The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians," in *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 446.

[73] Ibid, 451; 457.
[74] Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist," 401; 405.
[75] Wiggers, "The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians," 450.
[76] Ibid.

in Germany be opened to inspection and be serviced by private relief organizations.[77] Public pressure followed during the spring and summer of 1946 when criticism of the American handling of the food crisis in Germany by American humanitarian workers, newspaper and magazine correspondents as well as various "editors and publishers" who toured Germany suggested food assistance was needed in Germany.[78] The United States Military Governor in Germany Lucius D. Clay, warned War Department officials, Secretary of War Howard Petersen and Major General O.P. Echols of the Civil Affairs Division, that hunger in Germany could lead to severe social and political crises if it were not curtailed, but because food policy was controlled by the Truman administration Clay could do little more than issue a warning.[79] U.S. food policy came under such scrutiny that American relief agencies such as the American Friends Service Committee and CARE were permitted by the Truman administration to provide food clothing and miscellaneous supplies from private sources under the umbrella of a government-sanctioned alliance of relief organizations, the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany (CRALOG) in late 1946.[80] The influx of aid represented a much-needed change in U.S. food policy toward Germany, but even with this increased distribution of aid food shortages continued.[81]

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[77] Wiggers, "The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians," 455.

[78] Ibid, 455-456.

[79] Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, Vol. I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 184.

[80] Wiggers, "The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians," 456, 458-459.

[81] Ibid, 458-459.

Langer did not confine his support to the hungry and mistreated. He also spoke out on behalf of the Polish people. He believed that they had also been victims of Potsdam and over the course of six years had been "stabbed in the back not only by Germany, but by Russia, England and the United States."[82] Poland was so unstable and unsafe that there was, in the words of Langer, "no security left for man nor beast."[83] To Langer the "casual American acquiescence" in the transfer of German territory to Poland that not only displaced millions of people but also bequeathed livestock and grain lands to the Poles that could have been used to feed Germans, made no sense, and he did not understand the indifference of American statesman and the public to these circumstances."[84] He believed all of Europe's post-World War II problems were the product of an inept and aloof United States State Department bereft of world experience and therefore incapable of formulating practical policy in Europe or anywhere else.[85] Langer was correct in that United States approval of the cessation of German lands to Poland did contribute to the chaos and hunger of postwar Europe, but he failed to recognize the other half of the equation in Poland and all of postwar Europe, the Soviet Union. With a formidable military and a desire to carve out a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the United States viewed the acquiescence of German land and the transfer of Germans from that territory to be practical and the best of many bad policy

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[82] Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist," 417.

[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid, 418.
[85] Larsen, "William Langer," 191.

options. Practicality, however, led to the perception of indifference and aloofness. Langer's March 1946 Senate speech was important because it brought to light deficiencies in American support for Article XIII and the injustice and inhumanity it inflicted upon Germans expelled by Czechoslovakia and Poland after the war. Langer's speech spoke for the "unwanted of the earth," whether Jews, Poles, German expellees or any other group that suffered indignities from "vindictive" U.S. policies in Europe.[86] Unfortunately his humanitarian views were rather unique and were never taken seriously "by most pundits at the time."[87]

Government Justification of Expulsion Policy

American officials may have supported the expulsions but they wanted to explain that the United States held no direct responsibility for the hunger, chaos and inhumanity they generated, and that American adherence to Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement was a humane reaction to events beyond American control. Hence, the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs empowered a subcommittee to investigate the role the United States played in the expulsion of Germans and the plight of refugees. By commissioning the investigation of the subcommittee Congress looked to differentiate its postwar policies from those of the Soviet Union in these early days of the Cold War. By launching the investigation it was to be proven that American adherence to Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement was an act of humanitarian intervention. The committee was headed by representative Francis E. Walter (D-PA), led the group of fellow

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[86] Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist," 415-416.
[87] Larsen, "William Langer," 196.

representatives on a fact finding mission to Austria and Germany from September 1 through 22, 1949, to investigate the expulsions and gather information pertaining to American responsibility for them.[88] Upon arrival in the United States Zone of Occupation at Frankfurt am Main on September 7, members of the subcommittee held hearings arranged by U.S. Military Governor John J. McCloy where they heard "testimony" and statements from representatives of American military and civilian staffs and German expellee organizations, German government administrators, labor unions, business organizations and leaders of American aid organizations.[89] After the conclusion of the hearings on September 8-9 and a briefing by General Thomas T. Handy of the European Command, United States Army (EUCOM), fact-finding missions traveled to their assigned regions in Austria and Germany, escorted by liaisons of the Central Administration Division of OMGUS, the Central Affairs Division and EUCOM to assess the refugee and expellee situation.[90] Group North, comprising representatives Michael A. Feighan (D-OH), William T. Byrne (D-NY) and Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) traveled through the British Zone of Occupation into refugee camps in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein.[91] Group Central, made up of representatives Frank L. Chelf (D-KY), Josephy R. Bryson (D-SC) and Chauncey W. Reed (R-IL) toured camps and other stations of interest in the Province of Hesse and the cities Limburg, Neustatdt, Marburg and West

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[88] House Committee on the Judiciary, *Expellees and Refugees of German Ethnic Origin*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, H. Rep. 1841, 2.

[89] Ibid, 2.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid, 2-3.

Berlin.[92] Group south made up of representative Francis E. Walter, Chairman of the subcommittee, J. Frank Wilson (D-TX) and Frank Fellows (R-ME), inspected places of interest in the areas of Stuttgart, Munich and rural Bavaria with emphasis on camps located near border of Czechoslovakia.[93]

The real mission of the subcommittee was to correct a "historical error" that had emanated from the "misinterpretation" of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement within the United States and Europe that held the United States responsible for the "expulsion of national minorities of German ethnic origin."[94] The subcommittee issued its findings entitled *Expellees and Refugees of German Ethnic Origin*, known as the Walter Report, on March 24, 1950. The report concluded, that the "indisputable facts clearly show the fallacy of the theory of American co-responsibility for the uprooting of German expellees and refugees."[95] The Walter Report denied American responsibility for the expulsions by ascertaining that a "large proportion of Germans" had been forcibly removed from their homelands prior to the finalization of the Potsdam Agreement in August 1945, and by also citing Josef Stalin's assertion at Yalta that most of the Germans had fled in fear of the Red Army.[96] Furthermore, the subcommittee refuted the idea of American co-responsibility for the expulsions by claiming that the United States only agreed to Article XIII so that the expulsion of remaining Germans would be "more orderly and humane,"

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[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid, 3.

[94] Ibid, 4.
[95] Ibid, 5.
[96] Ibid.

and to save those poised for expulsion to the Soviet "sub-arctic" from a hideous fate.[97] The report went on to cite that the expulsions were going to occur no matter what and that the refusal of the Soviet Union "to do anything about them" had to be taken into consideration when evaluating United States approval of Article XIII.[98] In fact, the subcommittee believed Article XIII reflected the principles of humanitarianism and internationalism that were vital to solving the problem of Europe's "national minorities."[99]

One could call the Walter Report an act of self-persuasion of innocence that concluded the Germans had fled or been expelled before the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement.[100] Not only did the Walter Report deny U.S. responsibility in relation to the brutality of the expulsions, it portrayed the Americans as saviors of the expelled Germans through the implementation of Article XIII.[101] The Walter Report not only denied American responsibility for the expulsions.[102] It assigned responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the Czechs, Poles and Russians.[103]

The Walter Report focused on the origination of the expulsions in the spring of 1945 in Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories, but failed to mention the approval of the transfer of Sudeten Germans by FDR in June 1943.[104]According to the conclusion

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[97] Ibid, 6.
[98] Ibid, 7.

[99] Ibid, 7.
[100] Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 296-297.
[101] Ibid, 1318-1321.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Benes, *Memoirs of Dr. Edouard Benes*, 139-140.

of the Walter Report, Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement was an effort by the United States to bring about an "international solution for the problem of national minorities" in Europe, a problem that President Woodrow Wilson had tried to solve through the creation of "homogenous states" following world War I.[105] Article XIII was a combination of Wilson's self-determination of peoples and the politics of convenience which resulted in a huge inconvenience to anyone of German ethnicity in Czechoslovakia or the new Polish territories. Proof of U.S. culpability in the expulsion of Germans is the fact that many expulsions happened after January 1946 as part of an international agreement negotiated and implemented by the United States that basically made ethnic cleansing an international legal precedent and was anything but "orderly and humane."

Published in 1950 during the early Cold War period the Walter Report was not just a denial of United States responsibility concerning the expulsions but also Cold War propaganda and a rebuke to domestic critics of decisions made by Democratic administrations at Yalta and Potsdam general. Republican politicians thought Roosevelt's foreign policy to be "enigmatic and ambiguous" and believed Truman possessed little knowledge of international affairs and American foreign policy, which allowed some of his advisers to become policymakers.[106] To Republicans Truman's foreign policy was the continuation of Roosevelt's legacy of Yalta that included procrastination, excessive

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[105] Ibid, 7.
[106] Athan Theoharis, "Roosevelt and Truman in Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (1972): 212-213.

executive authority, poorly defined goals, burdensome commitments and softness toward the Communists of the Soviet Union.[107]

Of all the criticism directed at Democratic foreign policy during the early Cold War, the most scathing and consistent emanated from 1948 Republican Presidential nominee Thomas Dewey of New York and fellow Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. During the election of 1948 Dewey criticized the Democrats for their betrayal of Poland and China to Communism at Yalta and Potsdam, which revealed that the United States needed to abandon Truman's foreign policy.[108] Dewey exclaimed that that the Republicans had not been consulted or confided in by the Truman administration either before or during the Potsdam Conference where the United States made territorial and economic concessions to the Soviet Union.[109] According to Dewey, Truman's policies pertaining to the Greek and Turkish problem, China and Palestine were formulated and implemented without consulting the American people.[110] In the early stages of the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin in July 1948, before he agreed to quieten down on the subject, Dewey posited that the problem in Berlin stemmed from policy "assumptions" made at Yalta and Potsdam that failed to identify the rights of the United States in Berlin.[111] Other Republicans such as Senator such as Eugene Millikin of Colorado stated

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[107] Ibid, 225.

[108] Robert Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," *Journal of American History* 59, no. 1 (1972): 100.
[109] Leo Egan, "Vandenberg to See Dewey on Berlin," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 July 1948.
[110] Edward F. Ryan, "Dewey Takes Slap at Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, 2 July 1948.
[111] Leo Egan, "Dewey Describes We Must Not Yield In Soviet Berlin," *New York Times*, 25 July 1948.

that both Yalta and Potsdam were void of Republican approval and participation and represented secret executive agreements had been made that coddled the Soviet Union.[112]

Although Dewey lost the 1948 election to Truman but the criticism of Democratic foreign policy continued. Most vociferous in the denouncement of the Democrats was Senator Taft who stated in May 1950, that foreign policy under Roosevelt and Truman had been secretive and pro-communist at Yalta and Potsdam and had paved the way to World War III.[113] Democratic appeasement at Yalta and Potsdam had made the Soviet Union the dominant power in Central Europe that possessed the potential to "threaten the liberty of Western Europe and the United States."[114] In 1951, Taft again stated that the secret diplomacy practiced by Roosevelt and Truman after the war had "repudiated the wise democratic doctrine of open diplomacy" by not allowing the Senate and House of Representatives to participate in the formulation of foreign policy.[115]

The harshest condemnation of Democratic foreign policy resonated from the *Chicago Tribune*, which on August 8, 1950, argued that Roosevelt's approval of the Yalta agreement that led to the Germans of East-Central Europe being "robbed of their land, homes, and possessions" and being forced to relocate to a strange country.[116] This

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[112] "Foreign Policy Horrible Botch Millikin Tells Industrial Chiefs," *New York Times*, 22 October 1948.

[113] "Text of Senator Taft's Rebuttal to Recent Truman Addresses," *New York Times*, 17 May 1950.
[114] "Taft Charges Administration Helps Build Russia's Might," *Washington Post*, 21 September, 1950.
[115] Geoffrey Matthews, Robert A. Taft: The Constitution and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1953, *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 3 (1982): 512.
[116] Ibid.

policy carried on by the Truman administration.[117] The article concluded that trouble in Korea and western Germany had been caused by the flawed Democratic concessions to the Soviet Union.[118] *The Chicago Daily Tribune* again assailed Roosevelt and Truman on December 25, 1950 claiming that Roosevelt "proceeded to sell out Europe and Asia" to the tyranny of the Soviet Union at Yalta, and that Truman closed the deal by allowing the Soviets to enter Berlin "without a corridor of supply for American forces."[119]

The indifference with which the Truman administration approached the expulsion of Germans exasperated many and generated sparse, but fierce, criticism and outright condemnation. Some, such as OMGUS advisor James K. Pollock, were more reserved than Senator William J. Langer. Despite claims that United States approval of Article XIII perpetuated a grisly, inhumane reality on innocent civilians, the policy toward the expulsion of Germans never changed. Instead it was defended in the pages of the Walter Report, which claimed the expulsions had begun before Potsdam and shifted responsibility from the Truman administration to the Czechs, Poles and Russians. The Walter Report not only defended United States involvement in expulsions, but also served as a rebuttal to domestic criticism from the Republican Party, which blamed the Democratic administrations of Roosevelt and Truman for the onset of the Cold War and expansion of Russian power in Germany and Asia.

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[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.

[119] "Revival of Nationalism Presages Foreign Policy Battle in Congress," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 25 December 1950.

CHAPTER VII

UNIFICATION, COMPENSATION, VICTIMIZATION AND MEMORY

The expulsion of twelve million Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments following World War II, and the death and displacement that accompanied it, guaranteed that both the expellees and expellers would forever be consumed with the past. For the German expellees, their eventual economic and political integration in their new home of West Germany (later he Federal Republic of Germany-FRG) during the Cold War was not enough to keep them from looking back to their historical homelands and discussing the expulsions. Within the expeller nations the memory of the expulsions was controlled in a suppressive manner by the communist governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany (German Democratic Republic-GDR), respectively. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought the memory of the expulsions back from the past and ever since then they have been at, the center of debates on German unification, property rights, human rights, European unification and victimization. This chapter will use English language sources to examine and explain that the post-Cold War era has been one in which the German expellees have sought the acceptance of the idea that they, too, were victims of the Second World War and endured atrocities and indignities as did the citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The exploitation of the expellee diaspora by conservative politicians combined with the expellees' need to be recognized as victims introduced the idea that there were multiple

endings to World War II in Europe, an idea that met much resistance especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Thus it will be demonstrated that the combination of politics and culture in the post-Cold War era has transformed the discourse on the expulsions from discussions about compensation for property losses and suffering to a debate over the definition of victimization and who can be identified as victims of World War II.

The Post-Cold War Era

Once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it did not take long for the expulsions to become a hot political issue within East-Central Europe. The renewal of the expulsion controversy brought back the ghosts of World War II to East-Central Europe, especially in Poland. Expelled Germans represented by the Federation of Expellees (*Bund de Vertriebene-BdV*) saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to pursue some sort of "territorial compromise" with the Polish government.[1] Most West Germans did not want to reclaim territory lost to Poland after the conclusion of World War II, but the two million-member Federation of Expellees saw the unification of Germany as an opportunity to assert its political power within the new nation in an attempt to recover lands confiscated by the Poles during the expulsions.[2] In Poland looming German unification rekindled fears that Germany might want to reclaim territory lost at the end of World War II, and as result Poland feared that its western border was in jeopardy of being moved east.

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[1] Bruce W. Nelson, Kenneth W. Banta, John Borrell and Ken Olsen, "Resurrecting Ghostly Rivalries," *Time*, 29 January 1990. http://www.time.com/magazine/article. [Accessed10 May 2010].
[2] Ibid.

Both older and younger generations of expellees in Germany remained embittered and sought compensation from Poland and Czechoslovakia immediately following the Cold War. Expellees believed they were "a people summarily and illegally uprooted" in an inhumane manner from their historical homeland and claimed that they should be compensated for their loss of property.[3] They saw the pending unification of Germany as an opportunity to obtain such compensation.[4] But, German unification presented problems as well. In 1990, the German border question had yet to be resolved and even though the eastern border of Germany was never really in any danger of ever being moved farther east Poland feared otherwise.[5] Therefore "old tensions" reappeared and the past became part of the present and the Polish people feared territory awarded Poland by the Allies after World War II might become part of Germany once again.[6]

The issue of compensation for land lost as a result of the expulsions was pushed by the politically powerful Federation of Expellees, which possessed a large and politically influential membership base and received millions in West German government funds for operational expenses and cultural activities.[7] Conservative politicians allocated government funds to the Federation of Expellees because they were such a numerous voting bloc, which prompted important German leaders such as

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[3] Serge Schemann. "For the German Expellees the Past is a Future Vision," New York] *Times*, 4 March 1990. http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/04/weekinreview (accessed 10 May, 2010).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Glenn Frankel, "Refugees From Prewar Germany Demand Voice in *Unification*," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1990, A 16.
[7] Ibid.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl to cultivate a very cozy relationship with them expellee organization.[8] Kohl attended many Federation of Expellee functions and served as guest speaker more than once, as did many other German conservative politicians.[9] Federation of Expellee influence within German politics and government was solidified due to the fact that twenty *Bundestag* representatives were federation members.[10] With a treaty on the German-Poland border question under negotiation throughout 1990s the Federation of Expellees insisted to German leaders that there should be no "unconditional Polish border guarantee."[11] The Federation pushed expellees' "rights to their homeland, including the right to move back," plus reparations for confiscated property and assurances that would guarantee the rights of the approximately one million Germans still inside Poland "whose culture was repressed" by Communist Poland during the Cold War.[12]

Given their political clout Kohl approached the negotiations with interests of the expellees as a main priority. He ignored requests by the United States, the Soviet Union and Poland to promise that a unified Germany would not attempt to redefine the German-Polish border.[13] Kohl demanded that Poland waive war reparations from Germany and "guarantee" the rights for Poland's German minority in return for reassurances about the current border.[14] Kohl's negotiating position made it seem as though Germany was

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[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Francine S. Kiefer, "German Expellees Press Demands," *Chicago Tribune*, March 6, 1990.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Serge Schemann, "For the German Expellees the Past is a Future Vision."
[14] Ibid.

attempting capitalize on Poland's fears of a border change.[15] Despite guarantees from Kohl that a united Germany had no plans or desire to move Poland's Western border to the east, Polish leaders were still very skeptical of German statements on the issue.[16] Polish fears were driven by the German linkage of expellee compensation and the border question a negotiating strategy influenced by the political clout of the Federation of Expellees.[17]

On November 14, 1990, the Treaty of Gorlitz finalized the German-Polish border, and thus "settled the last major dispute of World War II" by recognizing Poland's ownership of the 40,000 square miles of Germany's eastern territory allocated to Poland by the Allies after the war.[18] The settlement did not sit well with the expellees in Germany who insisted that the land "was German."[19] Accompanying the treaty, Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki issued an apology for the expulsion of Germans and requested forgiveness stating "one has to speak of the suffering of the German nation that resulted from the movement of Poles from east to west."[20] Despite the apology most Polish citizens were not as forgiving and remembered that one in every five Poles had been killed during the German occupation of Poland.[21]

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[15] Francine S. Kiefer, "German Expellees Press Demand."
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Blaine Harden, "Poland, Germany Agree on Border: Treaty Affirming Oder-Neisse Line Ends Post–WW II Dispute," *Washington Post*, November 14, 1990.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

Those expelled from former German lands in the Oder-Neisse region were not alone in their desire either to be compensated for their loss of property and the pain and suffering that accompanied it or to be allowed to relocate to their homeland and resume ownership of confiscated property. In 1989, the expellees argued that "those other Germans from across the border," not the Sudeten Germans, were responsible for acts of violence during the World War II occupation of Czechoslovakia.[22] The *Sudetendeutsche Landmannschaft (SdL)* an expellee organization founded in 1949-50 in Bavaria by Sudeten German expellees, represented their claims of injustice and demands for an apology and compensation for lost property.[23] The *SdL* sought the repeal of the Benes Decrees, the possible return of Sudeten Germans to their homeland and recognition within Czechoslovakia as a national minority with guaranteed rights and compensation for confiscated property.[24] Leaders of the *SdL* such as President Franz Neubauer knew that the pursuit of such goals would be difficult but also could only be achieved through the symbolic language of human rights and European integration.[25] [26] In essence the *SdL* was a Sudeten German lobby group that sought to achieve "the realization, or at least the very recognition" that the Sudeten Germans "had rights."[27]

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[22] Timothy Burcher, *The Sudeten German Question and Czechoslovak-German Relations Since 1989* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1996) 10.
[23] Ibid, 17.
[24] Ibid, 19.
[25] Ibid.
[26] The *Sudetendeutsche Landmannschaft* (*SdL)* was and still is on of many local and regional expellee organizations that operate under the umbrella of the nationwide expellee organization the League of Expellees.
[27] Ibid, 18.

Czechoslovakia reacted to Sudeten German demands through a political and diplomatic strategy that stressed admission of guilt for the expulsion but also projected Czechoslovakia as a victim of Communism that had been exiled from the West.[28] New Czech President Vaclav Havel issued the first apology on December 23, 1989, but stated that the return of Sudeten Germans "was out of the question, but an apology had to be made in order to keep the evil past from perpetuating itself over and over."[29] Then on January 3, 1990 Havel made the Czech dual strategy of apology and victimization clear when he explained that even though Czechoslovakia wished to "condemn the violence and injustice" of the expulsions, the Czech people were still maimed by the merciless "Nazi Occupation."[30] Havel's apology was hollow even though it recognized the cruelty of the expulsions he inadvertently justified them when he asserted that the Czech people, like the Sudeten Germans, were victims of the consequences of war.[31] It was the dual or dueling images of victimization that that fueled public debate about the expulsions throughout the 1990s.

The Czech and German governments made an attempt to put the expulsions behind them on February 27, 1992, when Kohl and Havel signed the Treaty on Neighborly Relations, which was nothing more than an agreement to put the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in proper perspective so that Czech-German relations could evolve

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[28] Ibid, 26.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid, 27.
[31] Ibid, 30.

beyond the past.[32] What the treaty did not do was more revealing than what it did do. While both parties pledged friendship and neighborly relations, they failed to address the issue of compensation for confiscated property of Sudeten German expellees and Czech claims against Germany for "human and material" suffering during the war.[33] Czechoslovakia and Germany agreed to be friends from 1992 on, but the past remained omnipresent in relations between the two nations. Czech officials insisted early on in the treaty negotiations that under no circumstances would the Benes Decrees be repealed.[34] Germany responded with a refusal to repeal the 1938 Munich Pact because, according to German leaders it would nullify legal measures taken in the "Sudetenland from 1938-1945 including the registration of births, marriages and property transactions."[35]

In practice, the 1992 Treaty on Neighborly Relations and Friendship represented a way for both nations to achieve political goals related to the expulsions and the future of Europe.[36] First and foremost the treaty made Czechoslovakia's membership bid to the European Union a certainty because Germany agreed to support it.[37] Second, the treaty was an attempt to "marginalize non-government groups such as the *SdL*" which through

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[32] Ibid, 35.
[33] John Tagliabue, "Kohl and Havel Sign Pact but Issue Remains" *New York Times*, February 28, 1992. http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/28/world/kohl-and havel-sign-pact-but-issue-remains.html (Accessed 9 June 2010).
[34] John Dornberg, "Germany's Expellees and Border Changes – An Endless Dilemma?" *German Life*, June/July 1995, http://www.germanlife.com/Archives/1995/9506_01.html. (Accessed on 13 April 2005).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Burcher, *The Sudeten German Question,* 31.
[37] Ibid, 32-33.

their representation of the interests of the expelled Sudeten Germans strained Czech-German relations.[38] Future friendship and neighborliness may have been agreed to but the expulsions were to become a hot button topic in the politics of East-Central Europe in the future.

In 1993, Czechoslovakia dissolved into the nations of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, both of which sought to become members of the EU with help from Germany. However, the politics of the past yet again affected the politics of the present when the *SdL* and prominent Sudeten German leaders sought to link any expansion of the European Union with grievances related to the postwar expulsions.[39] Mainly the *SdL* (and some other expellee groups) sought the repeal of the Benes Decrees, procure the right for Sudeten Germans to return to their native Sudetenland and "restitution or compensation" for land confiscated during the expulsions.[40] They were willing to utilize their political power within German politics to highjack the Czech Republic membership bid to the EU achieve their demands.[41] In 1995, Germany was at the forefront of EU expansion through its support of membership for Central European nations such as the Czech Republic.[42] However, the expellee issue and the influence of the Sudeten German lobby on German politicians posed a possible threat to the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the European Union.[43]

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[38] Ibid, 33.
[39] Justin Burke, "Ethnic Germans Seek to Readjust Europe's Postwar Teutonic Plate," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 August 1995.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.

Despite pressure from the Sudeten Germans to hold up the Czech Republic's EU membership bid, Vaclav Havel gave a "basic lecture" on Czech-German relations on February 24, 1995, that reiterated that the Sudeten Germans were never going to receive compensation in the form of land or money from the Czech Republic.[44] Havel explained that any developments related to the Sudeten German question would be part of a "future oriented policy" that was to be the basis of Czech relations with Germany.[45] Although the Czechs nixed compensation for property lost during the expulsions, Havel did declare that the Sudeten Germans and their descendants would be welcomed back to their former *Heimat* as "guests of honor" in the land of their "forefathers."[46] For German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, the Sudeten German issue was not that simple. He was hamstrung in a way, because if he failed to support the Sudeten German quest for some form of compensation for their suffering during the expulsion his government coalition would be in trouble. The Sudeten Germans composed 16% of the German electorate.[47] On the other hand if Kohl supported "Sudeten German demands" that Germany oppose the admission of the Czech Republic and Poland into the European Union, it would greatly damage Czech-German and Polish-German relations.[48] Oddly enough the issue of whether or not the Czech Republic and Poland were to be admitted to the EU was a

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[44] Burcher, *The Sudeten German Question,* 44.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Justin Burke, "Ethnic Germans Seek To Readjust Europe's Postwar Teutonic Plate."
[48] Ibid.

"paradox" for the expelled Sudeten Germans and their descendants.[49] The paradox was this: if the Czech Republic and Poland were admitted to the EU, the Sudeten Germans would then be able buy property and settle in their homelands from which they were expelled in accordance with EU regulations and possibly lose their political clout within Germany.[50] Yet, the Sudeten Germans were adamant that Czech Republic EU membership "without the abolition of the Benes Decrees" would never happen.[51]

The dispute over the postwar expulsion issue was further complicated by the fact that the only nation in Europe Germany had yet to compensate for acts of Nazi persecution during World War II was the Czech Republic.[52] For Germany, the problem was that many inside the Czech Republic believed that the Sudeten Germans had made a "wrong decision" when they cast their lot with Nazi Germany and subsequently as a whole Czech society was of the opinion they had done no wrong and the "expulsions were an appropriate response to transgressions committed by Germans" during the occupation.[53] This denial of guilt resulted in the refusal of Germany to compensate Czech victims of Nazi aggression until the Czech Republic formally apologized for the expulsions.[54] Both the Czechs and Sudeten Germans saw themselves as victims of the

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Alan Cowell, "Memories of Wartime Brutalities Revive Czech-German Animosity," *New York Times,* 9 February 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/09/world/memories-of-wartime-brutalities-revive-czech-german-animosity.html (Accessed on 9 June 2010).
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

war but from different perspectives of the past and present and the reality of the aftermath of World War II was that the "humane treatment of humans was not common" at the time.[55]

Apologies came in 1996 when German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Czech Republic Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec initialed what was called the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development.[56] The agreement was a mutual apology. Germany acknowledged that "National Socialist policies of violence paved the way for the ground flight, expulsion and forced settlement" of people that occurred after the war.[57] The Czech Republic expressed remorse for the "suffering and injustice" suffered by innocent victims that resulted from the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the former Czechoslovakia that was the result of the "expropriation and the deprivation of citizenship" that resonated from the "assumption of collective guilt."[58] However, the apology of the Czech Republic represented a contradiction because the Benes Decrees had not been repealed, and even though they were unenforced they still existed in law.[59] Officially signed on January 20, 1997 the new Czech-German treaty did more than establish friendship between the two nations.[60] Contained in the provisions of

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[55] Ibid.
[56] Alan Cowell, "A German-Czech Pact on Wartime Abuses," *New York Times*, 11 December 1996. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/11/world/a-grman-czech-pact-on-wartime-abuses.html (Accessed on 9 2010).
[57] Ibid
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ruth Walker, "German-Czech Pact Ends a Bitter Legacy of WW II," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 January 1997.

the agreement were the stipulations that Germany was not to pursue property claims on behalf of the Sudeten Germans and their descendants.[61] Germany was to back the Czech Republic bid for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and EU membership. Finally, a joint Czech-German fund was created to compensate former Czech concentration camp prisoners in an attempt to promote friendly relations between the Czech and German peoples.[62]

The German-Czech agreement was mutually advantageous and secured German support for Czech inclusion in NATO and the EU, but the agreement also benefitted German interests because it solidified and strengthened both organizations.[63] The new agreement forced the leaders of various Sudeten German political interest groups to grasp the reality that "their demands for return of property no longer resonated" throughout the Sudeten German diaspora.[64] The desire to pursue property claims dwindled among Sudeten Germans over time time and their successful integration into Germany economically and socially. Forty-plus years after their expulsion, the expellees had become an aging group. Many who had lost property had passed away, and political the representation of the group had been assumed by the descendants of the original expellees who had benefitted from integration into German society and realized that the recovery of property was politically unrealistic. Hence, political support for Sudeten German property claims waned. German Chancellor Kohl agreed to the treaty in spite of

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[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

warnings from Sudeten German organizations that he could pay a heavy political price for his actions, but he also realized the issue had the potential to cause great strife within East-Central Europe.[65] He and explained the situation this way "we cannot stay in the past, or, in the end, the past will win."[66] Kohl suffered little political backlash over the ratification of the reconciliation agreement with the Czechs. Even though the Sudeten Germans and their descendants comprised a powerful political constituency, especially in Bavaria, "their rhetoric was widely seen as political posturing."[67]

The Expulsions in the Twenty-First Century

Ironically, the War in Kosovo in 1999 characterized the next phase in the debate over the expellee issue in East-Central Europe. German expellees saw the forced migration and return of Albanians to Kosovo as a way by which to gain "international recognition" and a solution their own expulsion saga.[68] Expellee organizations connected their own plight to that of the Kosovar Albanians in an attempt to reverse the ethnic cleansing that followed World War II through tactics that were "beyond moral reproach."[69] Events in Kosovo allowed the expellees and the representative organizations to instigate debate about the expulsions of Germans in 1945 that identified "ethnic

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[65] William Drozdiak, "Germany, Czech Republic Bury an Old Hatchet," *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 January 1997.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ruth Walker, "German-Czech Pact Ends a Bitter Legacy of WW II," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 January 1997.
[68] Karen von Oppen and Stefan Wolff, "From the Margins to the Center? The Discourse on expellees and Victimhood in Germany," in *Germans As Victims*, ed. Bill Niven (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006), 199.
[69] Ibid.

cleansing as a phenomenon of the twentieth-century" that resulted in the German public becoming more compassionate and understanding regarding to the expulsions.[70] In short the war in Kosovo inspired German expellees to debate the "significance" of their own past and led to their desire to commemorate and memorialize that past.[71]

The year 2000 was the beginning of a new century and the world was undergoing a technological transformation that made nations and individuals around the globe more interdependent through electronic communication. Also undergoing a great transformation in the region of East-Central Europe was the issue of the expulsion of Germans after World War II. This stemmed from the evolution of German expellee thought that came to believe they were victims of the war too, just as the Czechs and Poles had been. Exploration of German victimization during the postwar expulsions of 1945 was advanced in the 2002 novel *Crabwalk* by German author Gunter Grass, a native of Gdansk (Danzig) from which the German population had ousted been after the war. *Crabwalk* was a fictional account of the January 30, 1945, sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff*, a German passenger ship sunk by a Russian submarine.[72] The *Wilhelm Gustloff* was well over its 10,000 passenger capacity and included approximately 3,000 German refugees from Danzig, of whom only 1,100 survived.[73] Grass brought the issue of the expulsions to the fore of Germany society, especially within the expellee community.[74]

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[70] Ibid, 202-203.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Alfred M. de Zayas, *The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace* (New York: 1993), 65.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Peter Finn, "Debate is Rekindled Over WWII Expellees: German's Plight Evokes New Sympathy," *Washington Post*, 11 February 2002.

Grass's depiction of German victimization resulted in the rediscovery of the expulsions by the descendants of expellees from the Sudetenland and the recovered Polish territories.[75] For these descendants, the idea of discovery and contemplation of German victimization gave additional life to the belief that those responsible for the expulsions should apologize to their victims.[76] The concept of German victimization reverberated throughout German society and created a school of thought, especially among younger generations of Germans, that Germany as a whole "had paid its debt to history" and it was time for the world to realize millions of Germans were victims of the war, just as the Czechs and Poles had been.[77]

The awakening sense of German victimization brought about a harsh reaction from Czechs and Poles. Czech Republic Prime Minister Milos Zeman proclaimed that the "Sudeten Germans were Hitler's fifth column bent on the destruction of Czechoslovakia."[78] Zeman added that "many Sudeten Germans committed treason, a crime punishable by death according to the laws of the time" and their transfer to Germany was much better fate than the customary penalty for treason, the death penalty.[79] Historian at the Czech Academy in Prague, Josef Harna explained that the Sudeten Germans had only themselves to blame for their expulsion, which was triggered

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[75] Ibid.
[76] Tom Hendley, "Some Germans Clamor for Recognition as Victims: Stories of Postwar Expulsions Getting More Attention," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 June 2002.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Peter Finn, "The Debate is Rekindled."
[79] Ibid.

by their support of the Nazis during the occupation of Czechoslovakia.[80] Candidate for Chancellor of Germany Edmund Stoiber, of the Christian Social Union (CSU) the Bavarian sister party to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), forcefully countered the comments of Zeman Harrna and many others and claimed that the "expulsion of Sudeten Germans" was unjustifiable "under any circumstances."[81]

Another dimension of the expulsion issue early in the new millennium was the demand of German expellees that the legal basis for the expulsions, the 1945 Benes Decrees, be repealed. The Benes Decrees made the Sudeten Germans noncitizens and placed them outside of Czechoslovakian society through the revocation of rights such as property ownership and citizenship. The decrees remained valid law in the Czech Republic, and are still intact to this day due to the refusal of the Czech legislature to repeal them. In April 2002, the parliament of the Czech Republic voted 169 to 0 against repeal of the Benes Decrees out of fear that repeal would lead to a deluge of "property claims" by the Sudeten Germans.[82] Most Czechs conceded that the expulsions had been severe but reiterated that they had suffered through a six-year German occupation in which the Sudeten Germans were willing accomplices who had welcomed Nazi troops into Czechoslovakia in 1938-9.[83] Predominant public and political opinion in the Czech Republic overwhelmingly saw Sudeten German demand for repeal of the Beněs Decrees

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[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] "A Spectre Over Central Europe," *The Economist*, 15 August 2001, http://www.economist.com/node/1284252?story_id=E1_TRNQVN (Accessed on 24 June 2010).

[83] Ibid.

as invalid and an attempt to change the results of World War II.[84] Historian Harna described the Benes Decrees as "an expression of Czech liberty" that was in no way "criminal ethnic cleansing because non-criminal anti-Fascist Sudeten Germans were allowed to stay" in Czechoslovakia.[85]

Not only did the Sudeten German survivors and their descendants want the Benes Decrees repealed so too did other East-Central Europeans.[86] Many politicians throughout Central Europe and numerous Sudeten German leaders demanded that the Czech Republic not be admitted to the European Union unless the Benes Decrees were repealed.[87] Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vehemently demanded that Czech Republic admission to the EU be linked to repeal of the Benes Decrees.[88] Czech Republic officials were unyielding in their declaration that there would be "no formal apology or repeal of the Benes Decrees."[89] Despite relentless pressure from various expellee organizations both Germany and Austria decided not to veto the Czech Republic's inclusion in the EU, which paved the way for the Czech Republic to become an official member in 2004.[90] However, debate over the Benes Decrees was all about politics in

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[84] "A Spectre Over Central Europe."

[85] Peter Finn, "The Debate is Rekindled Over World War II Expellees: German's Plight Evokes new Sympathy."
[86] P. Wallace, "Putting the Past to Rest, *Time*, 18 March 2002, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,216394,00.htmal (Accessed on 10 June 2010).
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ian Fisher, "Czech Decrees Dating to the 40's, Divide Europe," *New York Times*, 27 February 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/27/world/Czech-decrees=dating-to-1940-s-divide-europe.html (Accessed on10 June 2010).
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

2002. The nations of East-Central Europe were facing national elections and politicians exploited the issue as a means by which to garner publicity and more importantly votes.[91]

In 2000, Erika Steinbach, a Christian Democrat (CD) member of the Bundestag and President of the Federation of Expellees proposed that a Center against Expulsion be erected in Berlin (*Zentrum de Vertreibungen*) to memorialize all Europeans who had been victims of ethnic cleansing and expelled from their homelands in the twentieth-century.[92] The plight of Armenians, Jews, Croats Hungarians, Albanians etc., was to be one aspect of the Center against Expulsion, but most of the center's space was to be devoted to Germans expelled from their homelands by the Czech and Polish governments.[93] The establishment of the Center against Expulsions began to receive great support amongst Germans in 2003, which triggered cries of opposition from Czechoslovakia and Poland.[94] It was Poland where opposition to the Center against expulsions was the most intense.[95] Outrage appeared throughout the Polish media where social commentators and political experts referred to the proposed expulsion center as the "Center against Reconciliation."[96] The Polish weekly magazine *Wprost* published a "photomontage" of Erika Steinbach dressed in a SS uniform astride the back of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder accompanied by the headline "German Trojan Horse."[97] Such depictions of Steinbach by

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[91] Ibid
[92] Tom Hendley, , "Some Germans Clamor for Recognition as Victims."
[93] Pawel Lutomski, "The Debate About a Center Against Expulsions: An Unexpected Crisis in German-Polish Relations?" *German Studies Review* 27, No. 3 (October 2004): 449.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.

the Polish media made her the representation of evil in the hearts and minds of Polish citizens who believed that to locate the Center against Expulsions in Berlin would make German victimization equal to that of the Czechs and Poles.[98] What made the Center against Expulsion even more controversial to many was that it was to be located next to the new Holocaust memorial.[99]

Negative reaction to the Center against expulsions by Polish politicians and citizens was not productive and it only promoted "old phobias and stereotypes" that strained German-Polish relations.[100] Polish reaction to the proposed Berlin center was a reaction to the reformation of German "public, national and historical memory" that now concluded that German civilians were also victims of the circumstances World War II.[101] German reassessment of World War II memory was a reassessment that befuddled many Germans and the "traditional victims of German aggression the Czechs and Poles."[102] For Czechs and Poles the German presentation of civilians and expellees as victims was seen as another attempt to rewrite history. Germans, especially the expellees saw themselves not only as victims of war but also messengers of a truth that had been hidden from the world for way too long. German "reunification and the fall of communism" transformed the idea of "nationhood" which led to increased public debate about the expellees and

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[98] Richard Bernstein, "Honor the Uprooted Germans? Poles Are Uneasy," *New York Times*, 15 October 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/honor-the-uprooted-germans-poles-are-uneasy.html (Accessed 25 May 2008).
[99] Lutomski, "The Debate About A Center Against Expulsions,"455.
[100] Ibid, 450.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.

their historical *Heimat*.[103] The concept of identity had become "multi-dimensional" and thus strained German diplomatic relations with both Poland and the Czech Republic and also complicated the process that led to admission to the European Union for both nations.[104]

Membership in the European Union was a conundrum for Polish officials who feared that EU membership status would generate an avalanche of court cases brought forth by the expellees at the European Tribunal of Justice in Luxembourg.[105] Possession of personal property had become a "human right" according to European law and "dispossession without compensation," as in the case of German expellees, depending upon interpretation of the law, could have possibly been seen as an infringement of human rights.[106] In 1995, the United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso iterated in a speech at *Pualskirche,* Germany that "the right not to be expelled from one's homeland was a fundamental human right."[107] Then in 1997 a United Nations Court of Human Rights (UNCHR) report served to fuel the aspirations of expellee organizations and alarm the Polish and Czech governments when the report "emphasized the right to return, restoration of properties, and compensation for any property that cannot be restored."[108] Polish fears were heightened even more by a June 22, 2004, decision rendered by the European Court of Human Rights that favored a

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[103] Von Oppen and Stefan Wolff, "From the Margins to the Center? The Discourse on," 197.
[104] Ibid, 208.
[105] Lutomski, "The Debate About A Center Against Expulsions,"460.
[106] Ibid, 461.
[107] Von Oppen and Stefan Wolff, "From the Margins to the Center? " 199.
[108] Ibid, 200.

descendant of Polish expellees "from the former Polish territories of the east" that became part of the Soviet Union during the war.[109] Poland was found "liable" for the loss of property and ordered to compensate the descendants of the expellees for lost property located in Lvov (Lemberg as it was known before the war) in the Ukraine.[110] Liability was placed on Poland because it was a member of European Union and the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.

Polish fears became a reality in 2004 when the Prussian Trust filed claims for property compensation on behalf of German expellees and their descendants (*Preussiche Treuhand)* in Polish court.[111] Compensation claims filed by the Prussian Trust were based upon the belief that crimes against humanity had been committed against Germans during the postwar expulsions and that there was one law for all and that crimes committed against the Polish people during the war were no different than those committed against the expellees.[112] Things grew more problematic for Poland when the Prussian Trust filed twenty-three cases against Poland in the European Court of Human Rights.[113] The Polish government insulted by the German organization's assertion that they had suffered during and after the war and believed such thoughts to be ridiculous when Warsaw had been

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[109] Lutomski, "The Debate About A Center Against Expulsions," 461.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Tom Hendley, "German Restitution Bid Stirs Outrage in Poland," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 September 2004.
[112] Ibid.
[113] "World War II Revisited: Poles Angered by German WW II Compensation Claims," *Spiegel Online*, 18 December 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,455183,00.htmal

destroyed and approximately six million Poles, half of whom were Jews had died at the hands of Germans.[114]

German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed on December 15, 2004, that Germany had no "complaint against Poland" but could not prevent an individual or group such as the Prussian Trust from filing compensation claims in European court.[115] Merkel's stance on the Prussian Trust straddled a very precarious line in that by stating that Germany had no complaint with Poland she honored the decision of a 2004 German-Polish committee that found there was no legal foundation for German restitution claims against Poland.[116] At the same time, Merkel placated the large expellee constituency within German by allowing them to pursue individual property individual property restitution cases against Poland and the Czech Republic. A final verdict issued by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France on October 9, 2008 rejected the Prussian Trust's claim that Poland owed German expellees compensation for human rights violations and property lost in 1945 during the expulsions.[117] For Germany and Poland the decision was final and the dispute and the issue was closed for good.[118] But the Prussian Trust threatened to bring more cases before the European Court of Human Rights relating to expellee

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] "Germany: Strasbourg Court Rejects the Prussian Trust's Claims," *Center for Eastern Studies*, 16 October 2008, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2008-10-16/germany-strasbourg-court-rejects-prusian-trust-claims (Accessed on 7 August 2011).
[118] Ibid.

property confiscated by Poland after 1945 and also pursue property claims against Poland in the American judicial system.[119]

Demands for compensation by the German expellees was a constant characteristic of politics within the region of East-Central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but it became overshadowed by the issue of German victimization in the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. German victimization became a hot issue again when, on October 10, 2007, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Federation of Expellees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the German government planned to complete the Center against Expellees. The center would house museum exhibits that pertained to episodes of European expulsions of the twentieth-century but with emphasis on the German expulsions that followed World War II.[120] To Czechs and Poles, the idea of a museum and monument in Berlin that compared the expulsion of Germans in 1945 to the genocide committed against Jews and Gypsies was a misrepresentation of history.[121] Czech and Polish opposition to the Center against Expulsions increased in intensity when Merkel nominated Erika Steinbach for membership on the board of directors of the museum. Steinbach's nomination was opposed by the Poles for a number of valid reasons: as a conservative member of the *Bundestag* Steinbach had voted against the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's permanent

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[119] Ibid.
[120] "Past Recalled: Quarrel of a Plan to Commemorate German Expellees from the East," *Economist*, 1 November 2007. http://economist.com/node/648310?story?_id=E1_TDDGQGVQ
[121] Ibid.

western border and she also opposed Poland's admission into the EU.[122] She was also consistently falsely portrayed as a Nazi and a Holocaust denier by the Polish tabloid press.[123] Czechs, Poles and the European Jewry considered Steinbach's nomination to the board to be evidence that the Germans were going to use the museum to portray themselves as the sole victims of the circumstances of World War II.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel was rather dispassionate on the issue of the expulsions and did not want to put Steinbach on the expellee museum board, but she needed votes from the expellee-laden conservative CDU/CSU constituency that supported Steinbach.[124] Merkel also knew that the CDU/CSU wanted expellees and their descendants to decide the composition of the museum board, and thus the nomination of Steinbach was a calculated move to secure conservative support in the next election.[125] Although the Czech Republic opposed Steinbach's nomination, Polish opposition was even greater and Polish officials hinted that Steinbach's inclusion on the museum board of directors would negatively impact German-Polish relations.[126] The German expellee diaspora believed that they had the right to be represented by Steinbach, president of the Federation of Expellees, and Poland should accept the composition of the board and stay

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[122] "Erika Steinbach and German Victims of WW II: I Want the Truth, and Nothing But." *Spiegel Online*, 9 March 2009, http://www.speigel.de/international/Germany/0,1518,612131,00.html
[123] Ibid.
[124] Rene Pfister, "Splitting the German Government: Expellee Leaders Steinbach Puts Merkel in a Tight Spot." *Spiegel Online*, 11 November 2009. http://www.spielgel.de/international/Germany/0,1518,6629000,00.html
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.

out of German domestic affairs.[127] For German expellees and their descendants the Center against Expulsions and the inclusion of Steinbach on the museum board was part of a quest for acknowledgement of their suffering during the expulsions.[128] For Czechs, and especially the Poles, the presence of Steinbach on the Expellee Museum board was a German attempt to revise the history of the Second World War.[129] An increase in tensions between Germany and Poland combined with pressure from within Germany and abroad led Steinbach to withdraw her name from consideration for the museum board, a solution that satisfied Merkel, quieted the Polish government and allowed the project to move forward.[130]

Even now, the issue of the expulsions seems to be as much of a social and political issue as it ever was throughout East-Central Europe. Conservative politicians in Germany have utilized the expulsion issue to cultivate votes since the end of the Second World War and still do so today because there is a constituent base of expellees and their descendants that still represent a large percentage of the German electorate. In early 2011 Chancellor Angela Merkel, in conjunction with the Free Democrats (FDP) "courted" the expellees and their descendants through the proposal of an Expellee Commemoration

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[127] "German Expellees Controversy: Steinbach Eschews Post on Museum Board," *Spiegel Online*, 4 March 2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/Germany/0,1518,710132,00.html
[128] "Germany's Expellee Museum: Charges of Historical Revisionism Stir Up Berlin," *Spiegel Online*, 4 August 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/Germany/0,1518,710132,0.html
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.

Day.[131] Merkel's party, the CDU, was becoming increasingly unpopular with the German public and the Expellee Commemoration proposal was described by *Spiegel Online* reporter Charles Hawley as being part of a "tried and true method in Germany of shoring up the conservative vote, not unlike the Republicans in the U.S. pandering to religious conservatives."[132] Opposition to the day of expellee commemoration came mostly from within Germany from sixty-eight historians who published an open letter that explained that support for such a day by the *Bundestag* would send an insensitive and "incorrect historical-political signal" that there was no difference between Holocaust victims and German expellees.[133]

While the expellees continue to see themselves as victims, it is conservative German politicians who use collective victimization and memory to harvest the expellee vote in much the same way that Czech and Polish politicians use their victimization at the hands of the Germans during World War II for political purposes. As Stefan Wolff points out the idea of the expellees as victims is not new at all but has long been at the core of "expellee identity" and had gained renewed currency as part of the debate of homeland and belonging in the region of East-Central Europe after the Cold War.[134] Therefore the expellees have always seen themselves as victims but the exploitation of their victimization by German politicians has shifted the debate in Europe from the actual

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[131] Charles Hawley, "Germany and Its World War II Victims: Historians Condemn Commemoration Day Proposal," 15 February 2011. http://www.spiegel.de/internationl/Germany/0.1518.745731.0.html
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Stefan Wolff, "German Expellee Organizations between Homeland and at Home: A Case of Study of the Politics of Belonging," *Refuge* 20, no. 1 (November 2001): 60.

expulsions to a debate that categorizes the victims of the war. For Jews, Gypsies, Czechs and Poles the expellees, or any German for that matter, can never be seen as a victims whereas the expellees see themselves as equally the victims. The intense feelings generated by the expulsions exist because the nations involved Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic have failed "to recognize the injustice of collective victimization."[135]

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the discourse on the expulsions has moved away from discussion on expellee repossession of property and compensation for lost property and suffering to the present debate on victimization and memory. Debate on the expulsion of Germans shifted as Europe was going through a great physical, economic, political and cultural transformation, triggered by the end of Communism and the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the creation of the European Union and admission of the Czech Republic and Poland to the European Union and the war in Kosovo. All of these developments helped to redefine the discourse on the expulsions. The expulsions remain a very contentious and controversial topic, but they have been far from front-page news in the American print media. Few stories have been written about the expulsions and the effect that they had on relations between Germany and its Polish and Czech neighbors. The only discussion of the expulsion in the United States has been among scholars who have written books, journal articles and participated in conferences devoted to the post World War II expulsions in Europe. But the reality of the situation is that scholarly works on the expulsions by American scholars represent a mere fraction of historical scholarship and are rarely, if ever, read by the American public. Thus,

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[135] Ibid.

American examination of the expulsion of Germans has been anything but mainstream history since the end of the Cold War and therefore awareness in the United States of the largest episode of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century is minimal. The lack of United States Government recognition or policy statements regarding the expulsions since the end of the Cold War adds to the lack of public knowledge regarding the subject. Basically the expulsions have not been a priority of the popular media, government or academia. Yet the story is out there hidden in plain sight, right where few will ever find it.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The expulsion of Germans in East-Central Europe after World War II represents the worst of humanity on all levels. Given the history of Eastern-Central Europe in the twentieth-century the participation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the expulsion of Germans is really not that surprising. But what is surprising is the matter of fact attitude with which the United States approached the expulsions from conception to conclusion. The lack of importance placed upon the expulsions by the U.S. spilled over into American society where the expulsions were of little concern to the average citizen. There were pockets of opposition in journalistic, intellectual, political, religious, military and diplomatic circles but nothing seemed to spur a movement of disdain amongst the American public. Even though the expulsions received some, albeit sporadic, coverage in the American print media other post war issues took precedent over the fate of East-Central Europe's German minority. At Potsdam, where Article XIII set the legal precedence for the expulsions, matters such as the location of Poland's western border and the composition of its government and the discussion of war reparations between the U.S. and Soviet Union dominated discussion. Thus the lack of importance attached to the expulsion of Germans by the U.S. government contributed to the lack of a popular anti-expulsion movement among the

greater American public and enabled of ethnic cleansing through the Potsdam Agreement, which favored the rights of nations over the rights of people.

The secondary status of the expulsions as a policy priority emanated from Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, who both had more on their mind during their presidencies than the fate of German expellees. Roosevelt's lack of concern about the expulsions began in summer 1943 during a visit by President Edouard Beněs of Czechoslovakia to Washington. During Beněs's visit Roosevelt supposedly approved Benes's plan to expel the Sudeten German minority of Czechoslovakia.[1] However, there is no written record of Roosevelt agreeing to such an action.[2] Further of evidence the secondary importance of the expulsions can be taken from United States policy concerning the expulsions going into the Yalta Conference of 1945. The Roosevelt-led delegation opposed the transfer of population but also knew that the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the newly recovered Polish territories were going to happen regardless.[3] Since there was no desire to intervene the transfer of Germans presented the most peaceful solution to East-Central Europe's German minority problem and the subject was never discussed.[4] In July and August of 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, President Truman continued to display indifference toward the Germany

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[1] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec* (Washington, GPO, 1970), 749-751. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1943
[2] Ibid.
[3] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), 568. http://www.digital.library.wisc.ed/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945
[4] Ibid.

minority issue and believed the transfer of Germans to be an issue of lesser importance in comparison to other ongoing war related issues facing the United States.[5] Even though Article XIII laid down the orderly and humane condition regarding the transfer of Germans, it was an issue of secondary importance compared to the composition of Poland's post war government and the location of its western border, which went undecided.

While presidents Roosevelt and Truman assigned the German minority issue of East-Central Europe low priority, both legislative houses held opponents of Article XIII and its immediate and long-term impact in Europe and domestically. The opposition within the House of Representatives and the Senate resonated from both Republicans and Democrats who opposed the post war policies of Roosevelt and Truman, which they believed to be at odds with the political ideology of the United States. Article XIII may have organized the transfers, but the suffering of Germans being deported by the Czechs and the Poles continued, and it sparked vehement protestations from some quarters in congress. Though few in number, those congressmen critical of the Potsdam Agreement were direct and to the point. Republican Senator from Nebraska, Kenneth Wherry criticized the state department for not acting in the best interests of the nation and Democratic Senator from Mississippi James O. Eastland claimed a conspiracy of silence kept the American people uninformed on the hunger and disease facing the German expellees, which to him ran counter to the American principles of justice and peace and

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[5] Alfred de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 157

could be blamed on the Truman administration's support of the Potsdam Agreement.[6] The most vociferous criticism and opposition to Potsdam came from North Dakota Senator William Langer, a Republican and isolationist who believed the humanitarian aid policy of the United States toward the expellees was "totalitarian in nature" and cited the indifferent attitude of American citizens and politicians, and believed that the expellees were being punished for being German and nothing else.[7]

Congressional criticism of the expulsions is interesting in that it originated from a few individuals who for the most part based their opposition to Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement on information gleaned from newspapers such as the *Saturday Evening Post, New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Star, Chicago Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor* and other print media vehicles.[8] These were same sources utilized by the Committee Against Mass Expulsion in its publication of pamphlets explaining the role played by the United States government in the expulsion of the Germans. Those same media sources were available to Americans of all educational, economic, religious and racial backgrounds but only intellectuals, the politically engaged and those of East-Central European ethnicity who resided in the United States voiced their opinions on the expulsions with very little opinion on the subject coming from the

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[6] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong. 2d sess., 1946, 92, pt. 1: 894-895; Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 9: 11371.
[7] Charles M. Barber, "The Isolationist as Interventionist: Senator William Langer on the Subject of ethnic Cleansing, March 29, 1946," in *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 395-396, 398, 405.
[8] Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt., 1: 11371-11373.

average American. Granted this study only examines national media vehicles in order to understand the broad representation of the expulsions before and after the Potsdam Agreement. And with large German, Czechoslovakian and Polish populations present on the east coast, Midwest and southwest there is ample information in existence for further study on the expulsions on a regional basis within the United States. The expulsions became a niche issue in the United States taken up as a cause by segments of the populations whose occupation or personal situation made them more aware of what was going on in post war Europe.

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